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In this dissertation, I defend a particularist, developmental account of 
the demands of loyalty, particularly towards unchosen objects (e.g. familial 
loyalties, piety, and patriotism). After surveying the limited literature in the 
field, I begin by pursuing Bernard Williams' suggestion that the deepest 
loyalties in human life are not subject to justification on the basis of 
universalist moral theories. In general, I argue that modern ethical theory—
both broadly consequentialist and broadly Kantian—cannot account for 
demands of special concern towards particular persons, groups, and 
traditions, because those theories are intrinsically insensitive to the intra-
volitional values that inform such demands.  
In response to the inadequacies of the universalist views, I attempt to 
derive such loyalties from the intra-volitional structure of a mature human 
will. My argument describes the ground conditions of a morally mature will—
conditions with which any tenable moral theory must be compatible. I hope to 
be describing some of the essential features of human moral psychology as 
they are actually valued, features no moral theory can ignore while remaining 
faithful to the content of the lived moral life.  
I make special use of Harry Frankfurt's account of volition, autonomy 
and commitment, especially his notion of volitional necessity—the idea that a 
moral agent is compelled to perform certain actions not as a result of the 
deliberations of practical reason, but because his caring for certain objects is 
 itself partially constitutive of his will. However, I think this view is incomplete 
and so drawing on work by Jonathan Lear, I offer an account of the origins of 
moral responsibility in the course of personal moral development. I argue that 
moral responsibility can only be fully understood in light of how an agent 
achieves maturity as a reaction to and reflection of the public values of his 
social world.  
I ultimately hold that the structure of any humanly valuable will is 
characterized by the sort of volitional necessities that give rise to the deepest 
demands of love and loyalty. Accordingly, any adequate conception of the 
mature moral agent must make room for loyalties directed at unchosen objects 
as acts of self expression. 
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When a man feels his present ties to be arbitrary or to be a mechanical 
bondage, he sometimes says that it is irrational to be a mere spoke in a wheel. 
Now, a loyal self, is always more that a spoke in a wheel. But still, at worst, it 
is better to be a spoke in a wheel that a spoke out of the wheel. 
 
—Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Loyalty: An Introduction 
 
 
Where do your loyalties lie? The question has a kind of frisson. Loyalty is 
at the center of our lives, an inescapable consequence of our moral natures, 
and yet philosophers have not expended nearly as much effort in 
understanding this phenomenon as one might have expected. While one kind 
of loyalty (patriotism) has been picked over relentlessly, other significant 
loyalties—to family, institutions, traditions—have received much less 
attention. Indeed, the general phenomenon itself has seldom been the focus of 
sustained philosophical inquiry, commensurate with its place in our daily 
lives. 
I suspect there are a variety of reasons for this state of affairs, but two 
are most plausible. First, loyalty pe se may seem straightforward and not really 
in need of philosophical examination. There are a variety of questions 
surrounding loyalty: Should one be loyal? To what should one be loyal? When 
should I give up my loyalties? However, loyalty itself seems simple—merely a 
kind of constancy not itself in need of further explanation. 
This leads naturally to the second reason: loyalty per se seems, like other 
instrumental qualities, morally neutral. The value of a given loyalty seems 
entirely parasitic on the value of its object. Thus, a loyalty to some good end is 
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valuable only to the extent that the end is good, while loyalty to some evil end 
seems rather to intensify the evil. Like intelligence, wit, charm, courage, or any 
other instrumental good, the ultimate moral value of loyalty seems to lie in 
how it is used rather than in itself alone. As Kant points out at the beginning 
of his Groundwork, it is nature of the will that possesses such qualities that 
determines their moral value. For while they may all seem good ceteris paribus, 
when directed by an evil will towards an evil end all these putatively good 
qualities make the malefactor just that much more despicable. 
However, I think this assumption is a mistake, and I think we can 
readily see the nature of the mistake. Unlike some of these other 
characteristics, loyalty is not merely a instrumental quality or tool of some 
wholly independent self or agency. When we reflect on the question with 
which I began I think we can see that to ask someone where his loyalties lie is 
in essence to ask the question: who are you? In other words, there seems to be a 
deep connection between an agent’s loyalties and who, at the deepest level, 
that agent truly is. Firm loyalties reflect what the agent most deeply cares 
about and in so doing reveal the very ground from which his moral agency 
arises; or so, in the course of this dissertation I shall argue. 
 
A Quote from Williams 
 
In one respect, however, I have over-dramatized the lack of discussion 
about loyalty, because in fact there has been a significant and important 
debate in moral philosophy which takes up important issues closely related to 
the topic. In the mid-1970’s Bernard Williams published an influential paper 
criticizing the dominant moral theories (then as now)—consequentialism and 
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deontological “Kantianism.” I think it will be helpful to quote from its 
conclusion at length as I will return repeatedly to his central example and the 
intuitions it elicits over the course of this dissertation.  
The situation1 involves a man whose wife is trapped in a burning 
building with another woman, who acts to rescue his wife without subjecting 
his actions to moral evaluation; the question—is he justified in doing so? 
 
…surely this is a justification on behalf of the rescuer, that the 
person he chose to rescue was his wife? It depends on how much 
weight is carried by ‘justification’: the consideration that it was 
his wife is certainly, for instance, an explanation that should 
silence comment. But something more ambitious than this is 
usually intended, essentially involving the idea that moral 
principle can legitimate his preference, yielding the conclusion 
that in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally 
permissible) to save one’s wife…. But this construction provides 
the agent with one thought too many: it might have been hoped 
by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, 
fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not 
that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is 
permissible to save one’s wife. 
Perhaps others will have other feelings about this case. 
But the point is that somewhere (and if not in this case, where?) 
one reaches the necessity that such things as deep attachments to 
other persons will express themselves in the world in ways 
which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view, and 
that they also run the risk of offending against it. 
They run that risk if they exist at all; yet unless such 
things exist, there will not be enough substance or conviction in 
a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself. Life has to have 
substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to 
the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant 
supreme importance to the impartial system, and that system’s 
hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure. (Williams [1982], 18) 
 
                                                
1 The original inspiration for this sort of example comes from William Godwin’s Enquiry 
concerning Political Justice, 3rd ed. (1798), vol. 1, p. 127, quoted in MacIntyre [1983], where the 
choice involved was between rescuing, from his burning palace, “the illustrious bishop of 
Cambray” versus his valet, even should the latter be “my brother, my father, or my 
benefactor.” 
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This sort of challenge against the universalist (or impartial) moral theories lies 
at the heart of the sort of claims I wish to make on behalf of loyalty. 
Loyalties interfere with neatness of the universalist moral theories 
because they introduce the very messy particularities of real men and women 
acting in the world. A man moved to rescue his wife from a fire, a mother to 
save her baby from danger—these situations are so natural, so important, that 
subjecting them to questions of moral justification seems entirely out of 
place—“one thought too many.” Were the agents in question to have such 
thoughts we would really wonder whether the man truly loved his wife, or 
the woman fully loved her baby, in the way, deep down, we really think they 
should. 
So under descriptions like “duties of special concern”, “deep 
attachments”, life forming “projects” and goals, the types of questions I pose 
in the name of loyalty have engaged moral philosophers for some time. 
Nonetheless, I do think it useful to gather them together and recognize that 
they all concern loyalty in some way. By itself, etymology is never good 
philosophy, but we ought to note that the word ‘loyalty’ is derived through 
French from ‘law.’ And that is just how loyalties seem; they are laws, but laws 
of the heart and of the will, internal regularities whose force often binds the 
agent through his will as informed by his loves, rather than through his reason 
as formed by his judgments.  
This fact—of loyalties’ law-like nature—also provides the ground for 
our deep intuition that loyalties are somehow essentially within the sphere of 
morality. I do not mean simply “morally justified” but rather that loyalties 
need to be considered within our larger understanding of morality, both 
formally within moral philosophy and in the more important informal sense 
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of our actual practice within the moral world. Once we see loyalties as what 
they really are, I think there can be little doubt as to their moral significance. 
 
What is Loyalty? 
 
I have already noted that loyalty has often been understood merely as a 
kind of constancy or steadfastness. When we speak of loyal children, friends, 
soldiers, etc. we generally have in mind their performing actions and having 
attitudes that express or uphold a commitment in the face of some sort of 
inducement to break that commitment. The loyal soldier is one who follows 
orders in the face of death; the loyal friend is one who remains firm even 
when doing so is costly to him in money, time, or reputation, etc. More than 
anything else loyalty might seem to be an attitude, a way of approaching the 
world that is almost pre-reflective. 
It is this aspect of loyalty that often sees it ascribed to animals, 
particularly dogs. There is a hint of contempt in the way many approach 
loyalty, as if it is really only worthy of a dog. Acting from loyalty thus begins 
to seem more like an instinct than a reasonable course of action, and to the 
extent that people act from loyalty alone they can seem unreflective at best, 
automatons at worst. In expressing unquestioned loyalties we deliberately 
prescind from a certain kind of moral reflection. It is therefore wholly 
unsurprising that to moral philosophers—for whom recourse to extensive 
moral reflection is the very mark of a fully human life—loyalty will seem to be 
of, at best, dubious moral value.2 
                                                
2 Even steadfastness in the right—i.e. fighting the good fight—might seem best not described 
as a loyalty to the good, but rather a continual choice to pursue the good. In other words, to 
repeatedly choose the good is not quite the same thing as being loyal to the good (even if the 
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While there is certainly some truth in these concerns, I think the 
tendency to dismiss loyalty as unimportant is a mistake. This dissertation is 
essentially an attempt to make explicit not only the degree to which loyalty 
plays a significant role in human life, but also the degree to which it cannot be 
otherwise. Far from being only worthy of a dog, I will argue that loyalty is at 
the very ground of what makes us human. To see this, however, will require 
us to change how we approach loyalty.  
My argument ultimately asserts that loyalty is a property of an 
authentically human-shaped will, specifically an orientation of the will that 
issues in actions which reflect the internal structure of that will. As a property 
of the will, fully human loyalties are different from instinctual animal 
“loyalties,” and as such they represent an intrinsically moral phenomenon. I 
will argue that loyalties grow out of having a human-shaped will and are thus 
an inescapable facet of our moral lives. They are a reflection of the internal 
structure of such a human-shaped will and issue in action directly in 
consequence of that structure. Thus, my argument for loyalty is essentially an 
argument from moral psychology, which asserts that loyalties are the natural 
product of possessing a fully human will.  
Of course central to these claims is my notion of a human-shaped will. 
The course of my argument will naturally embrace a larger purview than this 
notion alone. Most obviously I have to give some account of what I take the 
will to be and what would make one particular will more “human-shaped” 
than another. In the coming pages I will develop both of these ideas at length, 
but I think we can begin with a concept of the will as that (whatever it is) 
                                                                                                                                       
actions performed are objectively identical in the two cases) because being loyal involves 
being moved to act without necessarily evaluating the nature of the obligation in each case. 
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which is the ground of morally responsible agency. That is, I see the will as 
that to which moral praise and blame is most accurately ascribed. Here I take 
this concept of the will very broadly, but as my argument develops it will take 
on more specific content. The distinction between how I see the will and how 
the relevantly similar capacity is described by proponents of the different 
strains in contemporary normative ethics will become clearer as we proceed. 
To see the importance of loyalty in morality we have to examine those 
other strains. In particular, I want to engage, and offer criticisms of, the 
dominant theories of normative ethics—consequentialism and Kantianism. 
My criticisms of these theories will ultimately turn on a series of claims I make 
about the nature of value—specifically the sort of value that underwrites our 
moral activity. What I hope to show is how the sort of value at the heart of 
loyalty—and indeed much moral activity generally—is rooted in the internal 
structure of the will. As such, that structure (and the value it represents) will 
influence and even necessitate certain actions independent of an agent’s 
practical reasoning. My criticism of the dominant theories of normative ethics 
is essentially that as theories of practical reasoning alone they are insensitive 
to the nature of the lived moral life, which is shaped by the sorts of values 
loyalty identifies. 
To make sense of an intra-volitional theory of value I propose to take 
up the hierarchical mode of the will proposed by Harry Frankfurt. I think this 
model allows us to see how an agent can act freely (and thus be held morally 
responsible for his actions), while nonetheless not exercising the sort of 
practical reasoning most moral theories seem to assume is necessary. At the 
same time, however, I think Frankfurt’s theories are incomplete, because they 
are too formalist. As a description of the structure of the will, Frankfurt’s 
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theories do not give us adequate guidance as to the sort of volitional content 
we should value; they are compatible with volitional structures that should 
strike us as moral monstrosities. 
The constraint on the theory that I intend to offer is precisely a 
description of what a human-shaped will consists in. I have a relatively 
naturalistic view of what is human-shaped which I derive from a picture of 
human development. I argue that human nature itself constrains the kinds of 
communities in which fully human agents can adequately develop. Some of 
these restrictions are derivable from an examination of how moral agents 
actually come to be, and I begin by examining a view of developmental 
psychology derived by Jonathan Lear from Freudian psychoanalysis. 
However, I expand the application of some of these psychoanalytical insights 
beyond empirical psychology and apply them more to what interests me—the 
will as the ground of agency. 
One of the key insights of this development model concerns the 
relationship of the development of an individual will to the structure of the 
moral environment in which it comes to fruition. In particular, we must 
examine the relation of the developing will to the public mores and morals 
which, I argue, it must in some way assimilate and metabolize even to come to 
be at all. Of central concern in this interaction between developing will and 
environment is the way in which unchosen relationships are at the very 
foundation of the development of will. I want to argue that there is something 
highly significant in the fact that these relationships are, and in some 
important way must be, unchosen.  
My argument for loyalty itself depends on my account of the 
development of the individual will in interaction with a moral community. 
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My notion of what a human-shaped will consists in lies in an account of how 
human nature constrains the possibilities of healthy moral communities. At 
the same time, I want to argue that the sorts of values that we actually do 
have—which inform some of our deepest moral intuitions—are the product 
of, and require, the kinds of structures I will describe. 
 
The Plan of the Dissertation 
 
This thesis is divided into two large parts, each containing four 
chapters. The first part is essentially negative; in it I introduce the subject, 
examine the pre-existing philosophical literature on loyalty, and then subject 
both of the two dominant strains of contemporary moral theory—
consequentialism and deontological “Kantianism”—to sustained examination. 
The second part is the positive project, there I introduce several topics, most 
importantly Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of the will and Jonathan 
Lear’s discussion of love in the development of the psyche. Then I attempt to 
achieve a synthesis of insights drawn from both, with my own development, 
to describe a view of the will which explains the nature of our deepest 
loyalties. 
In Chapter II I examine the limited available philosophical literature on 
loyalty. My discussion focuses on the two philosophers who have had the 
most to say about the topic—Josiah Royce and Andrew Oldenquist. The late 
19th century American philosopher Royce makes substantial claims for 
loyalty—that it is the ground of all morality—but his discussion is of limited 
contemporary application because he has a philosophical outlook (neo-
Hegelian Idealism), which few will find appealing today. Nonetheless, he 
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offers insights, especially into the nature of the deep interconnection between 
loyalty and the self. Like anyone drawing wisdom from Hegel (however 
mediated) he quite properly understands, at an almost instinctual level, that to 
understand the nature of loyalty and morality we have to understand the 
nature of moral selves. Thus, we can draw considerable inspiration from 
Royce which points in a fruitful direction, but his arguments have to be 
substantially augmented to be philosophically compelling to contemporary 
audiences. In particular, we have to lay out and defend an account of moral 
psychology that plausibly fills gaps in his argument as presented. 
Oldenquist’s contributions to the subject are much more recent and 
more readily applicable. His most interesting observation is that loyalties 
constitute an entirely distinct category of the normative which circumscribes 
the scope within which universalist moral principles apply. His claim is 
simply that loyalty provides the non-arbitrary criterion for defining the set 
among whose members one is morally required to be impartial. Thus, 
partiality itself (in terms of loyalties) provides the delimiting factor in the 
moral application of impartiality. This has the implication, which Oldenquist 
does not fully explore, that an unrestricted impartiality offends against 
morality. 
Finally, I close the second chapter with a brief discussion of some other 
philosophers’ work which is not explicitly directed towards loyalty but whose 
application to the subject is clear upon reflection (like the passage by Williams 
at the beginning of this Introduction). In particular, I introduce certain 
criticisms of the dominant universalist moral theories which point to their 
defects insofar as they offend against some deep intuitions concerning the 
moral importance of particularity.  
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In Chapter III my intention is to assess the extent to which various 
consequentialist theories can accommodate the demands of special concern, 
and thus loyalty. I begin by defining as consequentialist any moral theory 
constituted by two parts—1) a theory of the good which defines the good in 
terms of preferred states of affairs, and 2) a theory of the right which defines 
the nature of the agents’ obligation to promote actualization of the state of 
affairs defined in the theory of the good. Even from this bare structural 
description of the nature of consequentialist moral theories the essential 
nature of my objection to them is apparent. I reject, with Kant, the idea that the 
good can be understood in terms of states of affairs. Loyalties express 
particular (morally significant) values which consequentialism as such simply 
cannot comprehend as good. 
I begin by examining the effort of Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit to 
derive “duties of special concern” within a consequentialist framework. They 
argue that such duties are consistent with a consequentialist theory of the 
good—which again states that only states of affairs bear independent value—
by offering a “responsibility criterion” that assigns differing levels of 
responsibility to different agents insofar as they are individually obligated to 
promote the good. Thus they are duties of special concern because they only 
apply to certain, uniquely relevant individuals, but they remain duties within 
the consequentialist framework insofar as they remain directed at a 
universally valuable (desirable) states of affairs. I essentially argue against 
them that their efforts simply do not answer the challenge of loyalty, because 
they fail to identify the moral importance of the fact that the value of the 
goods aimed in loyalty lies in their particularity. In other words, they fail to 
offer a theory which assigns the right kind of value to the ends of special 
  
13 
concern, precisely because they do not understand that value in terms of the 
will of the agent who is bound to promote it. 
I diagnose the error of Goodin and Pettit as lying not in their particular 
efforts but in the nature of the consequentialist project as a whole. To amplify 
my conclusions I consider even more sophisticated consequentialist attempts 
to meet the same sorts of issues developed by Peter Railton and Samuel 
Scheffler. Railton offers a “sophisticated consequentialism” that divorces a 
subjective consequentialist calculus from an objective consequentialist 
understanding of the good. In short, he argues that a given agent might be 
moved to act from motives particular to him which do not make reference to 
maximizing a particular state of affairs in each case, but which—taken as a 
whole—will have the overall objective effect of maximizing that exact state of 
affairs. So in given cases the agent can be subjectively moved to act without 
regard to the objectively preferable state of affairs, if it is the case that having 
such a set of motives (i.e. such a character) will in the long run most contribute 
to the greatest good defined by that (preferred) state of affairs. Against this I 
argue that this way of thinking divorces the agent’s particular motivations 
from morality in a way that does violence to conceiving of the demands of 
special concern as part of a independently good will. Railton makes such 
motivations into non-moral personal preferences, which are allowable, but 
which possess no moral worth in themselves. I reject this account on the 
grounds that the intuitions underwriting loyalty need to be integrated into an 
account of the good which makes room for their place within the sorts of 
human will we value. 
Samuel Scheffler offers perhaps the most sophisticated broadly 
consequentialist account, one which tries to leave room for the demands of 
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special concern. He offers a “hybrid” theory which maintains a 
consequentialist theory of the good, while offering individuals an “agent-
centered prerogative” which allows them to defer maximizing the preferred 
state of affairs in certain circumscribed cases where doing so would alienate 
them from their own most important projects and goals. This prerogative 
allows, but does not require, this deferral; so any agent may always act to 
maximize the preferred state of affairs, but is not necessarily morally bound to 
do so. Against this I reiterate and expand the same sort of argument—namely, 
that the agent-centered prerogative does not capture the particular character 
of the demands of special concern insofar as they are necessary to a human-
shaped good will. In particular, I again argue that Scheffler’s account, 
attractive though it is in many ways, nonetheless still precludes the volitional 
nature of the good encapsulated within legitimate demands of loyalty. 
In Chapter IV I have a similar goal but with a different focus—namely, 
to understand the extent to which the broadly Kantian picture of morality can 
accommodate the demands of special concern. In a certain, very important 
respect I am much more sympathetic to Kant’s ethics, because I share his 
commitment to understanding morality entirely in terms of the good will. 
Where I break with Kant is in my understanding of what constitutes the good 
will. 
I begin by offering the most sympathetic reconstruction of the Kantian 
moral system I can. I note that for Kant the good will is, at the limit, a pure 
will—i.e. a will determined solely by a rational respect for the moral law 
which itself can be partially known (as synthetic a priori knowledge) by means 
of a transcendental deduction through the categorical imperative. A pure will 
is moved only by motives which apply to all other rational creatures and 
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which may constitute universal and necessary laws. Because the good will is 
at the limit a pure will, Kant cannot allow the good will to be determined by 
particular desires, no matter how subjectively significant to a given agent. 
Accordingly, the demands of loyalty are intrinsically ruled out of the bounds 
of morality; a will moved by such demands is “heteronomous,” and 
fundamentally unfree. Therefore, the demands of loyalty are intrinsically alien 
to morality. 
In other words, by its very nature Kant’s moral theory must be hostile 
to the demands of loyalty and any will which acts on such motives must be 
impure. An agent acting in response to the particularist demands of loyalty 
does not act on motives which may constitute universal and necessary laws 
for all rational creatures. Such motives make inescapable reference to the 
particular desires of particular agents. Any agent whose will is determined by 
his loves and loyalties is unfree, according to Kant, and so not acting as a free 
moral cause. 
After considering Kant’s moral theory, I turn to examining potentially 
more compelling “Kantian” theories deeply influenced by Kant, but also 
sensitive to some particularist concerns. Specifically, I devote an extended 
discussion to Barbara Herman’s attempt to offer an answer the challenge of 
particularity, which nonetheless remains true to Kant. She argues that the 
particularist challenge illegitimately imports a false and misleading picture of 
moral psychology. Under such a picture the demands of morality and the 
demands of loyalty conflict with each other in a kind of psychic space into 
which they both flow, and whenever the demands of morality win out the 
agent is alienated from what he most cares about. She claims that this model 
offers a false choice and instead offers what she calls the “deliberative field 
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model” in which all demands—of morality or loyalty—are “normalized” 
according to the “principles of practical agency.” This normalization allows 
them to be coherently integrated, for such principles prescribe the scope and 
nature of allowable deliberation. Unlike the former model, she claims this is a 
mature picture of moral reflection which allows the demands of special 
concern to be integrated into a moral life. 
My criticisms of Herman are rather detailed, but in essence I dispute 
her claim that the principles of practical agency can actually integrate the 
various demands in a non-question-begging way. I argue that any such 
attempt inevitably undervalues the demands of special concern because it 
rules them out of the will and refuses to acknowledge their central place 
within our moral agency. Without a more nuanced understanding of the will 
which sees it as more complicated than pure reason alone, we cannot account 
for the moral value of the demands of special concern. The chapter closes with 
a similar examination of moral contractualism. 
Chapter V inaugurates the positive project and is intended to offer a 
theory of the will which is sensitive to the sorts of concerns which I offer 
against the universalist theories. To do this I take up Harry Frankfurt’s 
innovative hierarchical model of the will. The model holds that the will is 
constituted by desires of at least two levels, first-order desires whose objects 
are things in the world (e.g. food or drink) and higher order desires whose 
objects are lower order desires (e.g. the desire to desire food). Frankfurt claims 
that the human will is most centrally constituted by these higher-order 
desires. Unlike first-order desires, higher-order desires can be and are 
essentially reflective. As such, their satisfaction represents not merely the 
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satisfaction of some passing whimsy, but rather reflects what the agent, whose 
will they constitute, most cares about. 
The signal consequence of this view most significant for my project 
involves what Frankfurt calls “volitional necessity.” A volitional necessity 
involves the determination of the will to act on account of one or more of these 
volitionally constitutive higher order commitments. It is not the outcome of 
practical rationality—that is, it is not a deliberative judgment. Rather it is a 
direct movement of the will in response to one of its essential constituent 
desires. When bound by a volitional necessity the will issues in action that 
directly expresses its internal structure. However, such necessities manifest 
the agent’s autonomy, because what is expressed in acting under a volitional 
necessity is the agent’s own innermost volitional commitments and concerns. 
To act under a volitional necessity is to most perfectly express who I am as a 
moral agent, because it makes public the commitments which make up my 
will, my identity, my moral self. 
It is these volitional necessities which provide the best model for 
understanding the expression of our deepest loyalties. I claim that the deepest 
loyalties just are volitional necessities and like them are the most authentic 
expression of an agent’s will. The key point is that, contra Kant, such 
volitional necessities actually are an expression of the will’s autonomy, 
because the necessity proceeds not from an external compulsion but the inner 
structure of the agent’s will itself.  
Despite the powerful insights I believe Frankfurt’s view contains, I 
think there is a problem with this view that he never really addresses. 
Namely, Frankfurt offers a view of autonomy that makes essential reference 
only to the structure of the will. He does not concern himself with how the 
  
18 
will comes to have the structure it does. Taken purely as a structural 
understanding of autonomy his view is actually compatible with external 
compulsion insofar as that compulsion involves introducing into a victim’s 
will higher-order commitments which serve some other agent’s ends or 
purposes. To be a full account of volitional autonomy Frankfurt’s account 
needs to be supplemented with an account of how an agent’s centrally 
constitutive higher-order commitments can freely arise. 
Chapter VI is offered as the start of my attempt to meet this challenge. I 
begin by presenting a view of the origins of the psyche offered by Jonathan 
Lear, which he derives from a Freudian account. My concern, however, is not 
with Freud, or even the precise details of the account as Lear gives it. Rather, I 
take Lear’s account (of the etiology of individual empirical psyche) as a model 
for developing my own account addressed to the more interesting problem of 
the etiology of an agent’s moral psyche—the ground of his moral agency. 
Lear’s most interesting claim is that love is the force which drives the 
development of the self. Love, particularly the love of a mother for her child, 
creates the environment in which the nascent psyche of the child actually 
comes to be in response to that maternal love. The maternal love creates a kind 
of challenge by which the nascent psyche, in struggling to meet it, is driven 
towards a higher and higher level of sophistication and development. At first 
the process is relatively straightforward, the mother’s love writes itself onto 
the soul of the child through his identification with her, but quickly it moves 
beyond this as the child’s soul strives to develop into the kind of thing worthy 
of love—viz., a human soul capable of loving back. 
From Lear I take up the important distinction between being held 
responsible and taking responsibility. The former is essentially a third-personal 
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attitude (though one which can be taken with regards to oneself), an attitude 
common in straightforward moral censure or praise. To be held responsible 
for some act is for some external authority to declare my responsibility for it 
(e.g. a criminal verdict). On the other hand, taking responsibility is an 
essentially a first-personal act; it is in a sense a creative act, an act that involves 
the expression of my will into the world by claiming ownership for a part of 
that world. Specifically in taking moral responsibility I announce my arrival as 
a true moral agent, i.e. a free cause of moral action. 
I argue that this model helps us to understand how not just nascent 
psyches but fully moral selves come to be. The key insight I want to draw here 
is that the etiology of the moral self is driven by the dialectic between the 
developing self and the ever more complicated loving and lovable 
environment in which it finds itself. It is loyalty which provides much of the 
driving force of this development, both as the developing soul is itself loyal to 
facets of the world around it (beginning with family, but quickly moving 
beyond to community, society, and tradition), and as the mature members of 
the community themselves bear loyalty to this new member and each other in 
sustaining a “good enough world” in which such moral development can 
actually take place. 
It is with these considerations in mind that in Chapter VII I attempt to 
tie together Frankfurt’s view of the structure of the individual will with Lear’s 
suggestion that the individual soul is deeply dependent on the world to give it 
shape and form. Thus, we now have the means to answer what I took to be a 
defect in Frankfurt’s account, his indifference to the source of an agent’s 
higher-order commitments. We find their source in the loyalties of the nascent 
agent’s social world, in the family and beyond. 
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For if this view is correct we have an understanding of where unchosen 
loyalties arise. These are the loyalties to family and community, etc. which are 
both the paradigmatic forms of loyalty and, under most moral theories, its the 
most morally suspect examples. For this account shows that some volitionally 
constitutive loyalties must be founded on unchosen commitments, for they are 
taken up from the developing agent’s moral environment as the very building 
blocks of the self. Such foundational commitments cannot be chosen because 
in this context choice is meaningless; until such commitments are somehow 
taken up there simply is no self there to do any kind of choosing at all. 
In the chapter I attempt to develop a more compelling account of the 
nature of the lived moral life than the dominant theories of normative ethics 
can offer. In particular, I try to show how loyalties lie at the center of morally 
responsible agency. I conclude by examining and defusing several objections 
to the developmental account as a whole.  
Finally, in the conclusion, I seek to tie together all of these various 
considerations in a formal definition of loyalty in terms of an orientation of the 
will reflecting its internal structure as itself formed as a reflection of and in 
reaction to the external loving and lovable moral world. Loyalty becomes the 
means for understanding how moral selves are possible, and how the moral 
community propagates itself. Ultimately, I argue that without loyalty we can 
have no morality, for without loyalty we can have no moral selves. In this I 
hope to have given us a means to understand how even Royce’s most 
dramatic claims for loyalty can be substantially sustained and why an 
understanding of loyalty has to be at the heart of any truly plausible moral 
theory. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A Review of the Literature 
 
 
There has been surprisingly little philosophical examination of the 
phenomenon of loyalty as such. While particular types of loyalty—especially 
patriotism—have given rise to a vast secondary literature, the general 
phenomenon itself has been much less explored. Nevertheless, several 
important works do exist, and this chapter will focus on a few of them in 
depth. 
As I suggested earlier I suspect the reason for this lack of coverage of 
the broader topic stems from the intuition that loyalty per se is properly 
regarded as a morally neutral quality. Like other traits and talents which can 
be put to differing uses, it might seem likely that (for purposes of moral 
evaluation) all that matters is the end towards which one is loyal, not the fact 
of one’s loyalty itself. As Kant notes in the Groundwork the value of 
intelligence, wit, judgment, courage, resolution, perseverance, etc. lies not in 
themselves but in the will that expresses these qualities, and the end towards 
which it is directed.1 These qualities in the service of a disordered or evil will 
and directed towards an evil end are far from good, but facilitate and promote 
evil. 
                                                
1 This discussion is towards the beginning of the Groundwork in and around Ak. 393. 
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Just as a quality like perseverance would be unlikely to spawn a large 
literature in itself, so loyalty has met a similar fate. On the other hand, 
particular loyalties, such as patriotism, bring with them implicit (or even 
explicit) judgments of the good. Their moral status is apparently parasitic on 
the moral status of the ends to which they are directed. Thus, it seems natural 
to subject such particular loyalties to moral and philosophical examination in 
a way that may seem inappropriate towards the more general phenomenon. 
While this may explain the general tendency to overlook the more 
general phenomenon, it does not really justify it. It rests on a premise—the 
moral neutrality of loyalty—which is dubious. At this point, however, my goal 
will not be to justify the rejection of this premise, but merely to examine in 
detail the work of the two English-speaking philosophers—Josiah Royce and 
Andrew Oldenquist—who have done the most important work in this area. 
 
Royce 
 
The most famous book on the philosophy of loyalty is almost certainly 
Josiah Royce’s aptly titled The Philosophy of Loyalty. Royce taught at Harvard in 
the late 19th and early 20th century and was one of the most influential of the 
American Idealists. The book consists of a set of eight lectures originally 
delivered to a non-professional audience. It is best understood in two parts. 
The first five lectures are dedicated to laying out what Royce himself calls “a 
confessedly inadequate definition of loyalty” (Royce [1995], 163). Though 
inadequate, it is necessary, he says, to lay the groundwork for the last two 
lectures in which he articulates his full understanding of the nature of loyalty. 
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(The sixth lecture, in which he discusses “training for loyalty,” is a kind of 
transition between the two parts).  
To the contemporary analytic reader the first part will likely prove 
much more congenial. The second part is clearly in line with Royce’s larger 
Idealist project and quickly points in a direction that Royce admits some may 
see as a “very mystical, or at least a very fantastic thesis” (146). Indeed, in the 
end of his analysis, loyalty itself becomes in essence religious. 
Royce is not reticent about the claims he is willing to make for loyalty. 
Right off the bat he asserts, “In loyalty, where loyalty is properly defined, is the 
fulfillment of the whole moral law” (9, italics in original). The proper definition, 
we eventually discover, is a religious understanding, but we may make some 
progress with his initial definition. On this initial definition loyalty is 
straightforwardly the “willing and practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a 
person to a cause” (Ibid.). The central consideration is his notion of a “cause.” 
Loyalty, according to Royce, is centrally directed not to other persons or 
institutions, but to causes. Of course, it is possible to express loyalty to persons 
or institutions in Royce’s system, but even this loyalty is to be understood as 
the commitment to a cause.  
 
The loyal man’s cause is his cause by virtue of the assent his own 
will. His devotion is his own. He chooses it, or, at all events, 
approves it. Moreover, his devotion is a practical one. He does 
something. (10) 
 
Loyalty then is an expression of will as a commitment to a cause. This 
volitional conception is centrally important for Royce because he understands 
loyalty as the central connection between an individual and his duty. In 
contemporary terms, Royce sees loyalty as the solution to the problem of 
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authority. As Royce understands it, the problem comes to the fore when as we 
try to understand “why my duty is my duty” when “we find [that] no external 
authority, viewed merely as external, can give one any reason why an act is 
truly right or wrong” (13). Thus, ultimately, my “duty is simply my own will 
brought to my clear-consciousness.”  
The idea here seems to be that my duty binds me through my own 
willing insofar as I am loyal. Your “own will and your own desire, once fully 
brought to self-consciousness, furnish the only valid reason for you to know 
what is right and good.” Thus, the normative force of the moral law is 
inherent in my own will insofar as I properly understand that will. In other 
words, the problem of authority is supposed to drop away as soon as we 
recognize the nature of our own wills. “Loyalty, then, fixes our attention upon 
some cause, bids us look without ourselves to see what this unified cause is, 
shows us thus some one plan of action, and then says to us, ‘In this cause is 
your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfillment’” (21). 
What he seems to imply here is that it is precisely through a loyal 
commitment to some “superpersonal” cause that one comes to have a self. The 
object of my loyal commitment is not merely external to me, but actually 
becomes constitutive of my will insofar as I am loyal to it. It is only insofar as I 
am able to commit myself loyally to some cause that I even have a will. 
Therefore, when I do my duty it is not as if I am acted upon by something 
external to my will, but rather in doing my duty I fulfill my own willing, loyal 
commitment to a cause. “[U]nless you can find some sort of loyalty, you 
cannot find unity and peace in your active living” (23).  
Royce next turns to meet what he expects will be the chief complaint 
against his account of loyalty. Posed by the proponents of “ethical 
  
25 
individualism” (what we would probably call liberalism), it is basically a 
concern for autonomy. The complaint is that loyalty “tends to take the life out 
of a young man’s conscience, because it makes him simply look outside of 
himself to see what his cause requires him to do. In other words, loyalty seems 
opposed to the development of that individual autonomy of the moral will 
which… all moralists must indeed emphasize as one of our highest goods” 
(31).  
Does not loyalty to some external cause, runs the concern, merely 
involve a kind of submission to an external determination; is it not, in essence, 
a kind of moral cowardice insofar as one is not taking responsibility for one’s 
own will, but rather allowing it to be determined by something outside of it? 
Royce’s response is simple. The very objection, he says, is itself dependent on 
loyalty. To express this objection is to voice one’s loyalty to a principle of 
autonomy. Thus, far from undermining the primacy of loyalty as a moral 
precept, it further confirms that a primal kind of loyalty is necessary for 
autonomy itself.  
Royce makes this case by observing that “a man’s self has no contents, 
no plans, no purposes, except those which are, in one way or another, defined 
for him by his social relations” (45). Since this is the case, a complete self-
creation is impossible; the self is necessarily made up of content it derives 
from the external social world. If you don’t wish to be merely an unthinking 
conformist, your: 
 
only recourse, then, is to assert your autonomy by choosing a 
cause, and by loyally living, and when need be, dying for that 
cause. Then you will not only assert yourself by your choice of a 
cause, but express yourself articulately by your service. The only 
way to be practically autonomous is to be freely loyal. (Ibid.) 
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Thus the very possibility of having a self is predicated on loyalty 
because a self comes to exist only through the “self-assertion” available in 
loyal commitment to a cause. It is important as well that we understand this 
not merely as a single choice, but expressed through temporally extended 
“service.” In other words, it is a life (or some rather large part of a life) lived in 
accordance with, and expressive of, a cause. 
As of yet we have only seen Royce extol loyalty in the abstract—loyalty 
to some cause or other. However, as he himself repeatedly insists, loyalty 
cannot be abstract but must be made concrete through a commitment to a real 
cause in the world. But now we face the obvious question—is not the quality 
of that to which one is loyal the determinative factor in judging of the 
goodness of that loyalty? In other words, is not one’s loyalty only as good as 
the cause to which one is loyal? To be loyal to a bad cause would seem not 
only not to be a virtue but a positive vice. Is not the loyal criminal even more 
insidious than one who might be easily turned into an informant? Is not the 
loyal Nazi Waffen SS more morally repugnant than the German army 
conscript who fights only because he must to survive? In short, how can 
loyalty itself be inherently morally valuable when it can be put to such evil 
purposes? 
On the other side as well, is not the loyalty to a good cause only as 
valuable as it is instrumentally necessary to that good cause? Is not its value 
completely parasitic on the value of its object? Ultimately the question 
becomes: why concern ourselves with loyalty at all, except insofar as it is 
instrumentally necessary to the furtherance of goals or causes whose intrinsic 
goodness is independent of any contingent factors like the loyalty of their 
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partisans? In other words, we might think that the good fight is good even if 
nobody is fighting it. 
Now it seems to me that Royce need not deny this last point. 
Nevertheless, according to Royce, the value of loyalty is not derivative merely 
from the value of the cause to which it attaches. Loyalty, in itself, is valuable 
insofar as loyalty to practically any cause (within certain limits) is constitutive 
of a self. “I say, whatever their cause, the loyal express themselves” (50). This 
seems central to Royce’s conception, because without loyalty there would be 
no moral agents whatsoever; so loyalty is of paramount importance in human 
life.  
In line with this claim that loyalty is so centrally important to human 
life, his conclusion that the proper ultimate object of loyalty is simply loyalty 
itself is not surprising. Again, we need to realize that this is merely a comment 
about the ultimate object of loyalty, because the proximate object of loyalty for 
any given person will be his particular cause. Thus, actually being loyal to 
loyalty consists not in committing oneself to some abstract notion, but in 
expressing loyalty to real causes in the world. However, it is important that 
we see that the goodness of these causes will be judged according to their 
affect on the loyalties of others. “And so, a cause is good, not only for me, but 
for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a loyalty to loyalty, that is, is an aid and 
a furtherance of loyalty in my fellows” (56). 
The idea is relatively simple. Since loyalty is itself the greatest good for 
humans—because it is through loyalty that moral agents come to be—so my 
highest duty should be to advance the cause (so to speak) of loyalty itself. 
However, since loyalty is only manifested through the devotion of real people 
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to real causes, the cause of loyalty itself is only advanced insofar as one 
exhibits loyalty in oneself and furthers it in others.  
“In so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause and so serve it, 
that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty 
in the world rather than less” (57). This is not an abstract principle of 
maximization of abstract loyalty, however, because loyalty is only made 
manifest in the commitment of real people to real causes, which requires each 
of us to choose and pursue his own cause. Similarly, it does not necessarily 
require that I dedicate myself to discerning which real cause, out of any that 
are theoretically available to me, would further the greatest number of other 
persons’ loyalties. 
I may choose my cause from among those that are (for whatever 
reason) “interesting, fascinating, [or] personally engrossing” (65) to me so long 
as it is not “destructive of loyalty in the world of my fellows” (56). Thus 
loyalty to loyalty does not determinatively prescribe my causes, but it does 
give me a way to evaluate them in terms of their permissibility (and 
desirability).2 Insofar as a cause is permissible, it is a legitimate object of 
loyalty and one’s duty of loyalty to loyalty requires that one commit oneself to 
this cause (whatever it may be) in a wholehearted and complete way.3  
Loyalty to loyalty requires this wholehearted commitment to whatever 
cause one makes one’s own because the expression of loyalty to any cause 
(except those inherently destructive of others’ loyalties) is, in virtue of the 
                                                
2 What I mean by this is that the principle of loyalty to loyalty does not generate some single 
determinate set of duties, requiring commitment to one particular cause. Rather, it gives one 
the means to judge, among those causes to which one is drawn for whatever reasons, which 
are permissible and which are not, and even among those which are permissible which would 
be the best to be pursued.  
3 This does not imply that there can be no gradation in my level of commitment; however, to 
the sorts of life-shaping causes Royce has in mind, I must be fully committed.  
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social nature of causes, itself “a loyalty to my fellow’s loyalty” (56). In other 
words, my loyalty to my cause must necessarily represent a kind of loyalty to 
the loyalty of those who share my cause. But the point extends even further, 
beyond those who are my “fellows” in virtue of their commitment to the same 
cause, to my fellow human beings taken as a whole. This is because (visible) 
loyalty to any permissible cause serves as a kind of moral exemplar to others, 
even those who do not share that cause.4 
Now we are in a position to say something about some of the problem 
cases we considered before. Loyalty to the Nazi cause is not laudable precisely 
because inherent in the ideal of Nazism is the destruction of others and their 
loyalties. As one could not have been a loyal Nazi without the wholesale 
destruction of the manifold loyalties of millions of persons expressed in civil, 
national, and international society, so the cause of Nazism is judged inimical 
to “the universal loyalty of all mankind” (58). Thus, loyalty to the Nazi cause 
is inconsistent with a loyalty to loyalty, and as an example of the “mutually 
destructive conflict of loyalties,” it qualifies as an example of “a supreme evil” 
(55).  
In the end, Royce thinks all morality in general can be understood as 
loyalty to loyalty. He writes: 
 
all those duties which we have learned to recognize as the fundamental 
duties of the civilized man, the duties that every man owes to every 
man, are to be rightly interpreted as special instances of loyalty to 
loyalty. In other words, all the recognized virtues can be defined in 
terms of our concept of loyalty. And this is why I assert that, when 
                                                
4 Thus we are able to respect principled opposition, even if we think the opponent’s cause 
mistaken. The consistent statesman with whom I disagree on the deepest principles of justice 
might earn my respect in a way that the politician who vacillates between inconsistent 
positions in his support of causes never does; this is so even if the former should never take 
up a position congenial to mine and the latter should often be in apparent practical agreement 
with the consequences of my position. 
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rightly interpreted, loyalty is the whole duty of man. (66, italics 
in original). 
 
Although he goes on to consider some additional facets of loyalty, 
including the nature of “conscience,” we have here the main outlines of the 
initial, “inadequate” definition of loyalty. The “sovereign and central moral 
maxim” of human life is simply, “Be loyal to loyalty” (71). At this point, rather 
than merely continuing to rehearse Royce’s argument, I think we will do well 
to begin examining it more carefully. 
I fear that Royce’s claim that the whole of morality is to be found in a 
loyalty to loyalty may strike some as cute to the point of preciousness, not to 
mention wildly implausible. However, I think that as we take it seriously and 
look at his claims with sympathy, we will find that there is more to it than 
what initially meets the eye.  
There is a two-fold problem with his presentation: 1) these lectures 
were not intended “to be an elaborately technical philosophical research,” but 
were meant to “appeal to any reader who may be fond of ideals” (xxiv). I 
think this leads Royce to be less precise in his articulations than he might have 
otherwise been and more prone to somewhat oversimplifying his thesis. 2) 
Royce just does not quite have all the philosophical tools (a worked out 
metaethics, for instance) he needs to make a fully compelling case for his 
theory. Nevertheless, I also think that Royce has cottoned onto an interesting, 
and in some deep sense correct, insight. 
Let us begin with Royce’s interesting claim that loyalty serves to 
obviate the problem of authority. Of course, I am the one who is calling it the 
“problem of authority.” Royce talks about it as being a problem of how to 
bring the “external” demands of the moral law into some kind of harmony 
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with the internal commands of the individual will. So when we ask the 
questions—why does the moral law have authority over me? why should I do 
my duty?—the answer is simply because I am loyal to something (and so, 
ultimately, to loyalty itself). 
Let us now return to this remarkable claim to which I adverted earlier: 
“Loyalty, then, fixes our attention upon some cause, bid us look without 
ourselves to see what this unified cause is, shows us thus some one plan of 
action, and then says to us, ‘In this cause is your life, your will, your 
opportunity, your fulfillment’” (21). This seems to say that my will itself just is 
loyalty to my cause. What the cause does is unify me; it seems generative of 
my very self. Thus, I have to be loyal to my cause, because that just is what I 
am—the choice to be loyal to this particular cause. In some way my self is 
derived from my loyalties. 
In general this might seem a very strange way to approach the matter. 
We might think that one has some set of interests and predilections and, based 
upon what one antecedently cares about, one makes choices about which 
causes to be loyal to. So we might think that the paradigm of loyalty is 
someone who looks deep within himself through a kind of sustained moral 
introspection and, based upon what he finds there, makes choices as to which 
causes he feels himself most inclined to support. It is in virtue of his 
understanding of the good that he chooses the causes to which he becomes 
loyal. 
On this understanding, the self, and the will it expresses, is prior, both 
logically and temporally, to its particular commitments. Loyalty then is a 
relational property of a pre-existing self, which expresses loyalty to whatever 
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cause interests it. The self is clearly prior to its loyalty. Royce is opposed to 
this understanding. 
For Royce the self cannot exist prior, either logically or temporally, to 
its loyal commitments, because a self just is the concrete expression of that 
loyalty. I am my loyalty. This seems to be clearly analogous to Harry 
Frankfurt’s much later claims (to be examined in Chapter V) that one’s central, 
core commitments to what one cares about are somehow partially constitutive 
of the will. Let us pursue this line a bit further. 
A key part of what loyalty does, according to Royce, is unify the self. 
“[U]nless you find some sort of loyalty, you cannot find unity and peace in 
your active living” (23). Royce seems to think that the nascent individual will 
is a more or less unformed thing. “By nature I am a victim of my ancestry, a 
mass of world-old passions and impulses, desiring and suffering in constantly 
new ways as my circumstances change, and as one or another of my natural 
impulses comes to the front.… I have no personal will of my own” (16). 
Royce’s solution to this problem is loyalty, which allows “a happy sort of 
union… between the inner and the outer, between my social world and 
myself, between my natural waywardness and the ways of my fellows” (19). 
The idea seems to be that loyalty to some cause (whether we realize it 
or not) has made us into what we are—selves and moral agents. Our agency 
does not express our loyalties, rather it is itself generated through them. This 
comes to pass through “specific training” which focuses my internal energy 
and binds my natural waywardness into a coherent unity able to express itself 
as a will in the world. Without loyalty I become a mass of competing drives 
and desires, without consistency or character.  
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However, to begin the expression of loyalty requires “us to look 
without ourselves” into the social world and to copy it, at first by “mere social 
conformity” and “docility as an imitative creature” (19) but ultimately 
through a full-fledged choice to commit myself to “superpersonal” projects or 
ideals. Thus, for Royce the having of a self requires that that self be called 
forth through the loyalty of a nascent will to projects or causes which it 
cannot—from the beginning—fully comprehend. Rather, to some degree, it 
must commit itself in a kind of faith, or—as he later explicitly compares 
himself to William James—as “a will to believe.”  
If Royce is correct, then the problem of authority is an illusory one. To 
ask why I should do my duty is more or less equivalent to asking why I 
should be who I am. There is no more answer to be given than: because I must 
be. That is, because being (not having) a self requires it. Thus, in being formed 
through loyalty to superpersonal causes I find myself just as that creature who 
is loyal. There is no problem because the issue is not the legitimacy of external 
authority but the nature of the very constitution of the will. To fail to be loyal 
to the constitutive superpersonal cause of my choice, to fail in my most central 
commitments, is in some sense to lose my will (or perhaps never fully to 
develop one in the first place).  
Thus, loyalty to loyalty is not as empty as it might have at first 
appeared. What loyalty to loyalty really means is the willing of morality. It is 
by being loyal that my self is called forth, and so by cultivating and assisting 
the loyalties of others I help them to call themselves forth. My loyalty to 
loyalty calls forth not only my own agency but helps call forth the agency of 
all whose loyalty I promote. 
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Even by just exhibiting my own loyalty in the world, I call forth the 
world of loyalty. That is, I make manifest the way in which the world bears a 
significance I both receive from and press upon it. However, as Royce makes 
quite explicit in his brief discussion of Nietzsche, this is not a self-created 
significance—it is not Will-to-Power. It is an inherited significance, which is 
not the less mine for being inherited. Rather, it is made my own through my 
loyalty to it.  
Here we ought to make clear that Royce is not merely a traditionalist or 
social conformist. His claim is not that our selves are created by society; rather 
they are called forth by it.5 Thus, keenly feeling the concerns of the “ethical 
individualists” Royce constantly reminds us that the will makes a choice here. 
We choose (or at least consent to) that to which we are loyal. And yet, what and 
who we are is partially what we become through this choice and the service that 
follows it. This is of vital importance because these partially self-constituting 
choices of cause are not discrete choices that, once made, stand independent, 
secure, and finished. Rather the choice of one’s cause is just the beginning. 
Ultimately, we are constantly reminded, what is really important is not the 
choice as much as the loyalty that follows it (keeping in mind of course that 
the choice is constrained insofar as one cannot legitimately choose a cause that 
is destructive of others’ loyalties). It is this loyalty, this temporally extended 
service made manifest through many discrete choices over the course of a life 
(or some significant portion of one), that gives real meaning and content to the 
self. 
 
                                                
5Royce himself does not really speak of this phenomenon as a “calling forth,” but I think this 
phraseology apt to describe the very complicated relation between the self and the social 
world into which it strived for independence whilst remaining enmeshed.  
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At this point we must make the transition from the initial “inadequate 
definition of loyalty” to Royce’s final considered view. Before we begin I think 
it should be noted that this project only makes sense in the context of a kind of 
Hegelian understanding of the nature of the self. As we move forward I will 
make some effort to point out and partially explain some of the initially 
strange assumptions that seem to lay behind much of his thinking. 
His movement towards his full definition of loyalty begins with a 
discussion of the nature of truth. He examines William James’ famous 
statement of his Pragmatist conception of truth in order to argue that it is 
inadequate. I do not propose to examine Royce’s claims against James partly 
because I am not convinced that they are entirely fair, and they are simply 
irrelevant to our purposes here. Ultimately Royce makes an almost Platonic 
claim concerning the unity of truth (i.e., that all truths, and indeed all virtues, 
somehow converge into something unitary). He writes: 
 
whoever talks of any sort of truth whatsoever, be that truth 
moral or scientific, the truth of common sense or the truth of a 
philosophy, inevitably implies, in all his assertions about truth, 
that the world of truth of which he speaks is a world possessing 
a rational and spiritual unity, is a conscious world of experience, 
whose type of consciousness is higher in its level than is the type 
of our human minds, but whose life is such that our life belongs 
as part to this living whole. This world of truth is the one that 
you must define, so I insist, if you are to regard any proposition 
whatever as true, and are then to tell, in a reasonable way, what 
you mean by the truth of that proposition. 
The world of truth is therefore essentially a world such as 
that in whose reality the loyal believe when they believe their 
cause to be real. Moreover, this truth world has a goodness 
about it, essentially like that which the loyal attribute to their 
causes. Truth seeking and loyalty are therefore essentially the 
same process of life merely viewed in two different aspects. 
Whoever is loyal serves what he takes to be a truth, namely, his 
cause. On the other hand, whoever seeks truth for its own sake 
fails of his business if he seeks it merely as a barren abstraction, 
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that has no life in it. If a truth seeker knows his business, he is, 
then, in the sense of our definition, serving a cause which unifies 
our human life upon some higher level of spiritual being than 
the present human level. He is therefore essentially loyal. Truth 
seeking is a moral activity; and on the other hand, morality is 
wholly inadequate unless the light of eternal truth shines upon 
it. (146) 
  
There are many interesting claims here, but we can concentrate on just 
a few. First, there is a claim about the unity of truth, that all actual truths 
somehow participate in the “world of truth.” This “living whole” is somehow 
a “type of consciousness… higher in its level than… our human minds.” It is 
only within the context of this unity of truth and virtue that we can 
understand the claim from the introduction that “[j]ustice, charity, industry, 
wisdom, spirituality, are all definable in terms of enlightened loyalty” (9). 
Second, we have this further claim that “truth seeking and loyalty… are 
essentially the same process.” This suggestion will be vital in helping us to 
understand why Royce ultimately attributes so much importance to loyalty—
such as to make it “when… properly defined… the fulfillment of the whole 
moral law” (9).  
Finally we have the claim that truth-seeking (and thus loyalty) cannot 
have as its object a “barren abstraction,” but must be expressed in terms of real 
causes. This cements its connection to action—specifically, moral action. In 
other words, as I noted above, loyalty for Royce requires the “willing and 
practical and thoroughgoing devotion of a person to a cause” (Ibid). So to be 
loyal is to do something. Loyalty in the absence of real action in the world is 
empty; loyalty to my cause involves me making practical decisions and 
carrying them out. Since in the first half Royce takes himself to have shown 
that all justifiable loyalties are ultimately loyalty to loyalty itself, if loyalty is 
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indeed to be assimilated to truth-seeking, and truth is somehow unitary with 
all the virtues, then we come to see how practical loyalty becomes itself a 
species of moral action.  
With this notion of eternal truth in place we can now begin to 
understand Royce’s final and complete definition of loyalty, which comes in 
two related forms: 1) “Loyalty is the will to manifest, so far as is possible, the 
Eternal, that is, the conscious and superhuman unity of life, in the form of the acts of 
an individual Self,” and 2) “Loyalty is the Will to Believe in something eternal, and 
to express that belief in the practical life of a human being” (166, italics in original). 
One remarkable thing here is the notion that loyalty somehow mediates 
between the self and the “Eternal,” that it is through a thoroughgoing 
commitment to a cause that the individual self is brought into communion 
with the larger “world consciousness” or “world life.” Thus it is loyalty to a 
particular, real cause which gives us the intimation of the truth which 
adumbrates the essential unity of the world of truth.  
We should note that this is a practical effect of our wills. In other words, 
it is within our power partially to manifest the unity of Truth. This is a 
practical suggestion, and this allows us to understand why Royce attributes so 
much importance to loyalty itself, rather than the nature of any particular 
cause. What is important here is this notion of a “Will to Believe” (which 
Royce is self-consciously borrowing from William James).  
In his famous essay “The Will to Belief” James writes that his thesis is: 
“Our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option between 
propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on 
intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstance, ‘Do not decide, but leave the 
question open,’ is itself a passional decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is 
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attended with the same risk of losing the truth” (Castell [1948], 95, italics in 
original). The central idea here is that there is no non-passional way to 
proceed. It is not good enough to merely reserve judgment about a 
proposition, for that decision has the same status with respect to the will as 
explicitly committing oneself. There is no safe option. 
In the case at hand, loyalty just is this kind of expression of will and is 
the only means by which the self is brought into some kind of relation with 
the world of truth. To care for the truth requires loyalty to some cause and 
ultimately loyalty to loyalty itself. For it is only by committing oneself to some 
real cause that one stakes out a place for oneself in the Eternal, that one fulfills 
one’s responsibility as a Self. 
For this to be remotely plausible will require one to take Royce’s 
Idealism6 seriously. In his metaphysics Royce seems to be a neo-Hegelian, but 
he combines this with a rather American, in fact almost Pragmatist, insistence 
on acting in the world in the service of real causes. The reason for this is quite 
simple. As Royce sees it, the greatest task of moral philosophy is simply to 
allow us to resolve the apparent contradiction between our individual 
autonomy and the social nature of our concrete moral laws. Moral philosophy 
                                                
6 The following quotations make clear the extent of his Idealism: 
 
The real world is therefore not something independent of us. It is a world whose stuff, 
so to speak,—whose content,—is of the nature of experience, whose structure meets, 
validates, and gives warrant to our active deeds, and whose whole nature is such that 
it can be interpreted in terms of ideas, propositions, and conscious meanings, while in 
turn it gives our fragmentary ideas and to our conscious life whatever connected 
meaning they possess. (169)  
 
… when I inquire about the real world, I am simply asking what contents of 
experience, human or superhuman, are actually and consciously found by somebody. 
My inquiries regarding facts, of whatever grade facts may be are therefore inevitably 
an effort to find out what the world’s experience is. In all my common sense, then, in 
all my science, in all my social life, I am trying to discover what the universal 
conscious life which constitutes the world contains as its contents and views as its 
own. (171) 
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exists to answer the question: How can I be free if I am required to submit (to 
the moral law)? 
The answer is now apparent. My submission to an external law, i.e., my 
loyalty to it, is the means by which I legitimately express my will to truth. To 
be compelled by the truth is not to be compelled at all; that is, it is not in any 
way inconsistent with autonomy. But loyalty (i.e., legitimate loyalty—loyalty 
to loyalty) is analogous to being compelled by the truth. In fact, since such 
legitimate loyalty is a loyalty to the Eternal, the world consciousness, such 
legitimate loyalty is itself a kind of truth-seeking. 
Thus a self, insofar as it is a self, is an expression of will (i.e., a willing 
thing). This is a point that Hegel argues in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
However, the will, to be a real will for a human being, to be a human self, 
must have content—it must express itself though a temporally extended 
commitment to some real cause. What is true is just what we find in the world-
consciousness. “In so far as any of my ideas are true, my own personal ideas 
are therefore active processes that go on within the conscious life of the world. 
If my ideas are true, they succeed in agreeing with the very world 
consciousness that they define” (171). 
Thus in making a real commitment to a real cause in some sense I 
presuppose the existence and necessity of the Eternal. For in embracing a 
cause I am, to some degree, asserting its truth. However, as we have seen, in 
Royce’s metaphysics all that is true is part of this superpersonal world of 
truth. Thus my loyalty is inevitably a will to believe in the world of truth. 
It should now be clear why Royce is not moved to provide an analysis 
of the goodness of any particular causes an agent might adopt. So long as it is 
a cause that is not inimical to others’ loyalties—i.e., insofar as it is an 
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expression of a loyalty to loyalty—it will come to be part of the world 
consciousness. In virtue of this, however, as we maintain our loyalty to loyalty 
we come more and more to understand the nature of this Eternal (i.e., we 
come to know more of the truth), and consequently our loyalty is transformed 
and expanded to take the Eternal itself, insofar as this possible, as its object. 
This is why loyalty to a particular end ultimately engenders a universal 
loyalty. 
We might think of it this way. Loyalty to my particular cause, which I 
find attractive for my own reasons, becomes a kind of admission ticket to a 
process that may eventually lead me towards fuller participation in the very 
essence of the universe. We cannot achieve direct access to the fullness of the 
world of truth because of our limitations, epistemological and otherwise. 
However, we can be loyal through nothing more than an act of the will. 
In other words, though finding the Eternal is hard, being loyal—
expressing loyalty to my particular cause—is relatively easy. I can choose my 
cause and commit myself to it without a great deal of deliberation or 
consternation, because it is not necessary that I choose the uniquely best cause. 
So long as I have even a partial understanding of the nature of loyalty what I 
have to do is not choose what is best, but just choose some (non-loyalty 
undermining) cause and fully commit myself to it. In so doing, I express my 
will in the world and through this expression I constitute myself (as among 
other things the kind of being that can enter into a relationship with—and 
partially constitute—the world of truth).  
This happens because over time my loyalty to my cause unifies the 
potentially disjointed individual choices of my life into an (internally) 
coherent whole. Thus, what I come to be is what I have chosen to do, and my 
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loyalty to my cause unifies these discrete choices into a plan. In other words, it 
is through my loyalty to my cause that I come to have a life. 
To have a life is not just to have biological existence. To have a life 
requires that one have a self which expresses moral agency. One thing we 
should see, however, is that one cannot set out to possess a life in the abstract; 
one only finds a life through a serious, temporally extended commitment to a 
particular cause. So in loyalty to my particular causes I come to have a life, 
and to participate in the world consciousness. This gives me my first entrée to 
the world of truth. It gives me, for the first time, the standing necessary to 
successfully gain access to the Eternal. 
Thus ultimately the Eternal itself comes to be expressed in and through 
the loyalty of the loyal. The Eternal comes into the world through those who 
are loyal, by means of their loyalty. This is not experienced as external 
determination, but as the authentic expression of their own wills. Thus, 
autonomy is itself manifest through loyalty, for in my loyalty I come to be 
transformed. “Loyalty means a transformation of our nature” (180).7 
 
At this point we might ask ourselves just how useful Royce’s analysis 
can be if it depends on this apparently highly implausible view of the 
metaphysical status of truth and “the Eternal.” Although I don’t think Royce’s 
                                                
7 We might think of it this way. In our fallen state (if we may borrow a certain metaphor for 
our condition) we lack access to the truth, in virtue of our lack of order. By becoming loyal to 
a particular cause I give some kind of form to my existence; I come to have a life. This in turn 
begins to give me access to the world consciousness (which, indeed, through my own willing 
of a cause I partially constitute). As I come to recognize this, my loyalty itself expands and 
begins to encompass a loyalty to loyalty itself. This can bring me to a greater awareness of the 
world of truth, and this will in turn become the object of my commitment. Thus eventually the 
world consciousness itself can become the focus of my loyalty, and in so doing I am 
transformed. Needless to say, we are here within the realm of theology. Royce readily 
acknowledges this, and conceives of his analysis of loyalty as providing an understanding of 
the “absolute religion.” 
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central metaphysical commitments are that different from some of Plato’s or 
Hegel’s (or later, Heidegger’s), nonetheless we might feel them out of bounds 
for a contemporary discussion of loyalty. One might think that any view that 
ultimately depends on such extremely controversial views of truth and a 
superpersonal world of consciousness cannot be helpful to us. 
However, we are not required to accept the whole of Royce’s 
metaphysics in order to derive something useful from his discussion. We 
should concentrate on this notion that loyalty to a cause is in some deep sense 
generative and constitutive of a self. I think Royce is right on target in thinking 
that what is most important in our moral philosophy is coming somehow to 
recognize the proper relation of the individual self to the content of a moral 
law that comes to us from without.  
What Royce is essentially arguing is that the moral law—to the extent 
that we come to recognize its truth—derives its authority over us by being 
itself part and parcel of the way a will must be ordered even to be a self. Thus, 
morality does not prove to be an alien external imposition at all, but part of 
the very content of what it is to be free. Loyalty mediates between the self and 
the world by giving the former a place in the latter. Loyalty thus becomes the 
very core of morality by bringing us to recognize how centrally dependent 
each one of us is on the social world which we inhabit. 
Furthermore, loyalty is a practical demand, and one it is easy to 
recognize the value of. We each of us are almost instinctively loyal. It requires 
little effort then to come to express some kind of loyalty. This becomes the 
first, necessary step that eventuates in a moral self. This is an important 
insight, but it seems to me that to be most useful for our purposes it requires 
less that we discern the Eternal than that we come to explain how the actual 
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contents of our loyalties are important to the kinds of selves we have reason to 
prefer. And to do this, I submit, will require us to pay attention to the way in 
which loyalty is central in the very development of a self.  
At this point I mainly wish to emphasize this notion that loyalty 
mediates between the self and the world. Without concerning ourselves with 
the “Eternal” and the “world of truth” we can still ask ourselves whether 
these apparently outlandish claims nonetheless engage some of our intuitions, 
even peripherally. I believe they do, and when these claims are augmented by 
a much more substantial and worked out hierarchical model of the will, 
supplemented by a developmental account of moral maturity, I think this will 
be much more apparent. However, that must await Part II 
 
Oldenquist 
 
Having considered the most famous book on the loyalty—and derived 
at least some inspiration from it—I want now to turn the contemporary 
philosopher who has made perhaps the most important contribution to the 
explicitly philosophical study of loyalty. In his essay “Loyalties” Andrew 
Oldenquist argues that “Anglo-American philosophy has ignored an 
important area of the normative” (Oldenquist [1982], 173). That essay is 
dedicated to capturing that overlooked terrain by sympathetically focusing on 
the importance of loyalties in human life. 
His single most interesting claim is easy to identify: “In terms of the 
logic of the reasons they provide, loyalties are a third category of the 
normative, distinct from both self-interest and impersonal morality” (176). We 
should be clear that this is a claim about “the logic of reasons”—i.e., the forms 
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reasons can legitimately take. The first two “categories of the normative” are 
familiar to moral philosophy.  
When giving reasons for his actions an agent’s appealing to his self-
interest is readily understandable. If asked why he did X, the rational egoist 
could simply reply “Because I judged that doing X would be good for me” 
and we would understand his rationale completely. This is not to say that we 
would approve of it, or even agree with his judgment (i.e., we might think he 
is mistaken in thinking that doing X was good for him). The point is merely 
that self-interest is a recognizable norm by which to order one’s actions, an 
appeal to which is a rational (if weak) response to a demand for the giving of 
reasons for why one acted in some way. 
Similarly, “impersonal morality” also constitutes a norm that can 
ground reasons. By “ground reasons” I simply mean that these categories of 
the normative can be self-sufficient stopping points in the regressive appeal to 
reasons. “Because (I think) it is good for me” or “because (I think) impersonal 
morality requires it” are both adequate answers to “why did you do that?”—
adequate not necessarily as full justifications (though they may be), but as 
reasons of the sort that can stand on their own. This is by no means to imply 
that reasons of this sort need end our investigation; there may continue to be 
questions of whether the agent is correct in his judgments and questions about 
whether further judgments about the content of morality are necessary. 
Nonetheless, for many philosophers reasons from either or both of these two 
categories have seemed intuitively plausible as grounding reasons. 
Thus Oldenquist is actually making a rather remarkable suggestion in 
claiming that loyalties constitute a truly separate “category of the normative.” 
One might wonder whether “because my loyalty required it” is an adequate 
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reason in the way that our previous “because” clauses were. One might 
further wonder whether or not an appeal to loyalty could not be reduced to 
one of the other categories. Thus, one might suppose that “because my loyalty 
required it” should be analyzed as “because (I think) doing what loyalty 
requires is good for me” or as “because (I think) doing what loyalty requires is 
itself required by impersonal morality—i.e., I have a impersonal duty to do 
what loyalty requires.” If this were the case then loyalties would not constitute 
a true third category of the normative because they could be reduced to one or 
both the other two. 
Oldenquist claims that loyalties “cannot be understood if we try to turn 
them into either impersonal duties or sophisticated egoism.” They cannot be 
impersonal duties “since an obligation of loyalty depends on viewing a thing 
as one’s own.” They cannot be mere appeals to self-interest “because people 
can sacrifice, in the name of loyalty, their happiness and even their lives, and 
it is probably this element of self-sacrifice that makes most people classify 
motives of loyalty as moral motives. Moreover, reasons of loyalty have a 
general appeal among members of a society whereas a self interest reason 
appeals only to the agent.” The second consideration is more plausible than 
the first because it does not seem that odd that there might be an appeal to 
personal happiness that goes beyond immediate pleasure or even existence in 
this world (e.g., a crude kind of afterlife reward of happiness). 
It might be objected that even if two people share a reason for loyalty to 
a shared interest—e.g., they are both members of the same family—in fact the 
reason can be reduced, for each of them, to “because doing what loyalty 
requires is good for me (all things considered, in the long run).” It may be true 
that both people might think that way, but having such a reason is really very 
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different than “because loyalty requires doing this.” In other words, if they are 
making the reduction then they are simply making a mistake about loyalty—
they have not understood that loyalty can constitute a reason at all.  
Consider that straightforward moral duties might be reduced in the 
same way—e.g., I did not lie because doing this is good for me (all things 
considered, in the long run). The mere possibility of this linguistic reduction 
does not, by itself, show that morality can be reduced to enlightened egoism, 
precisely because we tend to recognize that there is something essentially non-
self-regarding in reasons of impersonal morality. Similarly, there is something 
essentially non-self-regarding in reasons of loyalty. 
This observation, however, might make us question whether “most 
people” are not right in thinking that reasons of loyalty are a species of moral 
reasons. Oldenquist argues that the essential structure of loyalties—that they 
only attach to that of which I have a kind of ownership (as a member of a 
group)—precludes their being a species of impersonal moral reasons. These 
latter, we might think, attach in virtue of some intrinsic properties of agents 
and patients, not to their relational properties. Loyalties make essential and 
unmistakable reference to what William Godwin called (disparagingly) the 
“magic… in the pronoun ‘my.’”8 We might consider Oldenquist’s project to be 
an attempt to demystify to some extent what exactly that magic consists in, 
and thus make it perhaps seem less magical in the negative sense (i.e., 
mystical) and yet more magical in the positive sense (i.e., beguiling). 
Having asserted the existence of this third “category of the normative” 
Oldenquist wants to get some mileage out of it by claiming: “Our wide and 
                                                
8 MacIntyre quotes this in “The Magic in the Pronoun ‘My’” (MacIntyre [1983]),p. 122; the 
original source is William Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice, 3rd ed. (1798), vol 1, p. 
127. 
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narrow loyalties define moral communities or domains within which we are 
willing to universalize moral judgments, treat equals equally, protect the 
common good, and in other ways adopt the familiar machinery of impersonal 
morality” (177). In other words, it is loyalty which marks out the scope within 
which we will apply impartial judgments. He gives an example regarding the 
provision of resources between children within a family and the neighbor 
children. Between two brothers it seems correct that their parents should treat 
them (approximately) equally in giving them gifts, and no wrong is done if 
their parents do not include the neighbor child in the largess.9 Similarly, my 
loyalty to my fellow countrymen (including our shared loyalty to our country) 
would justify some welfare benefits for their sakes, even though, objectively 
speaking, much more good could be done for much poorer people in the 
Third World. 
Oldenquist notes that modern man is enmeshed simultaneously in 
many “nested”  “‘tribes’ or moral communities” (177). Like “concentric 
circles” many of my communities are themselves part of broader communities 
of which I am also a member. Thus, my family is part of my neighborhood, 
which is part of my town, which is part of my state, which is part of my 
country, etc. The widest loyalty communities may encompass our entire 
species (or perhaps even more—e.g., all suffering creatures or perhaps our 
fellow members of the Federation of Planets, etc.). Within each of the 
communities (or domains) I have reason to be impartial, but between each of 
these domains I may have reason to be quite partial. Thus, I may favor the 
                                                
9 It should be obvious, but this does not mean that in all cases I must prefer my children to the 
neighbor child. If it came down to giving my kids a new toy or preventing the neighbor child 
from starving, it seems plausible to think that I would do wrong not to discharge my 
resources for the neighbor child’s benefit over that of my own children. Nonetheless, the 
principle should hold in most cases. 
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interests of my family over the interests of my town, etc. However, there need 
be no hard and fast rule that says I must favor an inner circle over an outer 
one; circumstances, including what is at stake and the level of harm, etc. will 
determine which direction my loyalties will pull most. 
Oldenquist pushes this even further and claims that without loyalty 
impartial morality itself cannot make complete sense. This is because an 
impartial moral view must give some non-arbitrary account of who counts in 
our moral deliberation and why. So, for example, the utilitarian has to give 
some reason for why non-human suffering would not count as much as 
human suffering in the calculus of pleasure.10 The Kantian would have to 
explain why non-rational beings are not part of the moral community.11 
Oldenquist thinks that group loyalties provide the most plausible explanation 
of who counts and why. “On this view all morality is tribal morality and there 
will be as many systems of social morality as there are loyalties” (179).12 
 
…We are often told to look beyond our neighborhood, city, or 
country in the name of impartiality, and treat what we had 
hitherto favored as our own as just one among many 
                                                
10 I duly note that some “animal rights” type consequentialists bite this bullet, but most seem 
to hew toward Mill’s plausible (but undefended) assertion that it is better to be a Socrates 
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied. See Chapter III for an extended discussion of 
consequentialism. 
11 I am here reporting Oldenquist’s challenge, not endorsing it. I think that the Kantian would 
have a ready answer to this question, but it would turn on Kant’s claim that moral knowledge 
is “synthetic a priori knowledge” that can only be had through a transcendental deduction. 
See Chapter IV for an extended discussion of Kantian moral philosophy. 
12 Alasdair MacIntyre seems to make a similar point in a discussion of one of Bernard 
Williams’ criticisms of the way impartial moral theories inevitably alienate agents from their 
“deep attachments.” He notes that this “kind of problem only arises… for a variety of 
utilitarian and Kantian writers, because they liquidate the requirements of justice within the 
household or family, the requirements of justice within the political community, and the 
requirements of justice in a variety of other particular spheres (church and school, for 
instance) into a conception of the requirements of justice, as such, the imposition of which 
makes almost all social particularity irrelevant. Thus it is not impersonality and impartiality as 
such that create those problems…. It is rather an impersonality and an impartiality required to 
hold between all persons whatsoever equally, a socially contextless impersonality and 
impartiality which is the source of those problems” (MacIntyre [1983], 123). 
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neighborhoods, cities, or countries. But the demand for 
impartiality is never true impartiality, it is merely an invitation 
to give one’s loyalty to a larger whole with which someone 
identifies; in other words, an invitation to join a larger tribe. If 
our first love is to some narrower group, this forced shift may 
render our moral concern weak and pallid. Equal moral concern 
for the whole of humanity or the whole of sentient nature is, for 
most of us, too diluted to be able to generate effective moral 
enthusiasm and too weak to outweigh narrower loyalties. If one 
thinks that that wider loyalty must carry greater weight just 
because it is wider, it is important to remember that it identifies 
one’s kind under a different description than the narrower 
loyalty. The nature of the description as well as the size of the 
domain it encompasses determine how much I care about my 
kind under that description. This consideration by itself refutes 
the utilitarian claim that more is always better. I have extremely 
weak galaxy-member loyalty relative to species loyalty, and 
weak species loyalty relative to family loyalty. More is not 
always better because it not always more of the same thing. 
Hence, without further argument it will not do to claim, in the 
name of speciesism, that nationalism, community loyalty, and 
family loyalty count for less because the count for fewer. (181-2) 
 
The key claim here is this idea that “the demand for impartiality is 
never true impartiality” for the scope within which impartiality applies can 
only be determined by another, wider loyalty. Even when we think ourselves 
impartial between all members of the human race, we still are implicitly 
expressing a norm which is grounded in a (species-wide) loyalty. Thus, the 
claims of impartial morality to automatically trump the demands of loyalty 
are really best understood, claims Oldenquist, as the demand of a wider 
loyalty to trump a narrower one. He seems to think that hiding behind a claim 
of impartial morality is no escape from dealing with loyalty, because some 
form of loyalty is implicitly operating in whatever way one defines as the 
scope of that impartiality. 
What this suggests of course is that there is no such thing as impartial 
morality, simpliciter, for Oldenquist. Instead, since loyalty constrains the 
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scope within which impartial judgments are made, loyalty is always more 
basic than “impartial morality.” Impartial morality is, at best, impartial 
judgment within a very wide scope loyalty. 
We need now to get a better handle on just what sort of reasons loyalty 
supplies for Oldenquist. When loyalty is providing a ground reason for my 
action, what matters is that I am attached to the object by some bond that 
makes essential reference to that particular; the bond holds not in virtue of 
properties which that object could in principle share with a qualitative 
duplicate, but in virtue of its relationship to me as the one particular thing to 
which I am attached.  
Oldenquist considers an example in which a father, confronted by the 
situation in which both his daughter and her friend are drowning (and he is 
unable to save both), acts to save his daughter. It is not in virtue of impartial 
judgments about his daughter’s superiority that causes him to save her rather 
than her friend. Even if, objectively, the friend is superior (in intelligence or 
even virtue, perhaps), the father acts out of loyalty to his daughter simply 
because she is his daughter. Furthermore, if the friend were somehow 
qualitatively identical to his daughter (except for the relationship) this would 
change nothing. The qualitative duplicate could never (for example) substitute 
for his daughter (though he might come to love the duplicate in her own right 
if he adopted her, perhaps). Nonetheless, it is to this particular girl (his 
daughter) that reasons grounded in his loyalty must make reference. He might 
also bear some sort of loyalty to other of his children, or even his daughter’s 
friend, but those loyalties will need to be explained in virtue of those 
particulars. 
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Any attempt to give reasons for his actions that reduce them to a 
species of impartial moral reasons must inevitably miss the point of the 
attachment and the way it underwrites his loyalty. If he acts to save his 
daughter not because she is his daughter but because he makes a judgment 
that this situation instantiates some more general moral principle (e.g., I am 
morally obligated to save drowning children, ceteris paribus), then he has not 
acted on a principle of loyalty. However, it seems we have reason to think that 
this kind of reasoning—while certainly possible—is not what animates the 
father in that situation, and, if it were, would be somehow inappropriate. 
Consider the case if the father were a consequentialist and he (correctly) 
judges that saving the friend would better maximize the principle of the good 
he accepts and so ignores his daughter for the friend. In such a case, notes 
Oldenquist, we would feel contempt for a man who would let an abstract 
moral judgment overwhelm a loyalty to his own children.  
 
It is not just that people are as a matter of fact blindly loyal or 
biased toward various social units, this being a fact of human 
nature that we lament; rather, loyalty behavior elicits 
approbation and opposite behavior typically elicits guilt in the 
agent and disapproval in observers. The contempt we feel 
toward traitors is not unlike what we fell toward the father who 
lets his daughter drawn. Our loyalties are values that contribute 
to what we think we should do, all things considered. Therefore 
that can compete with what are called “considerations of social 
morality.” This is even more plausible if, as was suggested 
earlier, every group loyalty creates and grounds a domain of 
social morality. When these loyalties are themselves challenged 
in the name of “social morality,” the wider obligations 
determined by a wider loyalty are being asserted to have greater 
moral authority. As in any case of conflicting normative 
considerations, sometimes a person will judge his family or 
national obligations to take precedence over wider societal 
obligations and sometimes he will not. It depends, among other 
things, on how much is at stake in each domain, on the 
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possibility of a given action satisfying both loyalties to differing 
degrees, and on the “strengths” of the loyalties themselves. (187) 
 
This summary of his argument points to what may be its most 
significant weakness. Oldenquist adverts repeatedly to how we would feel in 
observing or participating in various situations where loyalties are either 
expressed or denied. One imagines that the impartial moralist would object 
that such feelings—especially feelings like contempt—are simply irrelevant to 
the moral evaluation of the actions in question. It may be true, 
psychologically, that we would feel just the way that Oldenquist describes, 
but of course that does nothing to show that we ought to feel that way, or that 
those feelings have any moral significance whatsoever. 
This objection does not require the impartial moralist to give no weight 
to moral feeling at all (though he may be inclined to do just that). In any case, 
whether or not feelings have a place in a moral theory, the sorts of situations 
that Oldenquist discusses, and the intuitions to which he appeals, are not 
sufficient by themselves to prove his point. He would need to give a moral 
argument for the moral applicability of the feelings. The mere fact of their 
existence no more excuses a breach of impartial morality than the 
kleptomaniac’s strong desire to steal justifies his thievery. 
In short, Oldenquist has far from proven his point, because the putative 
intuitions to which he points may themselves be subject to moral criticism. It 
may be that we simply ought not to have such intuitions, and that in a more 
perfect, more just world we simply would not. Perhaps the strong intuitions 
underlying the feelings in support of loyalty are simply the product of 
contingent social circumstances that are subject to alteration and indeed ought 
to be altered in light of an impartial ethic of justice. 
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Oldenquist’s response to this sort of objection can be derived from his 
book, the Non-Suicidal Society, which he developed out of the essay we have 
been examining. That response is relatively straightforward, but moves in a 
direction I suspect many moral philosophers would find deeply unsatisfying. 
In that book Oldenquist argues a relatively simple claim to justify loyalties. He 
thinks that human nature, as developed in the environment of selection in 
which our genetic forbearers supposedly arose, has most suited us—
psychologically—for relatively small group loyalties.  
He notes that one of the most significant problems facing modern 
society is the frustration of our human (and presumably genetically 
determined) need for relatively small human community, on account of which 
we become alienated from our actual societies. This alienation leads to moral 
corruption, as people become isolated and disaffected with the world around 
them. Thus, he essentially argues that to resurrect our ailing society (hence the 
title) we need to focus on recreating opportunities for the expression of small 
group loyalties within modern society. Substitute objects of loyalties will 
model those from our evolutionarily significant past and so satisfy our human 
needs for community and belonging. 
We can see that Oldenquist would respond to the impartial moralist’s 
charges with a series of claims about human nature. Drawing on evolutionary 
biology, he makes claims predicated on the thesis that modern human beings 
evolved in small communities and so are still psychologically best suited to 
social orders where small group loyalties can be expressed. Accordingly, 
membership in such groups is required for happiness and for agents’ 
investment in social norms and institutions. Thus, he would claim that the 
feelings and intuitions to which the argument for the normative status of 
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loyalty appeals supervene on facts about human nature. Given the relative 
fixity of that human nature, he can then claim that any moral theory that 
requires the frustration of these psychological properties will be, quite 
literally, inhuman. 
Even from this short précis one can get the sense that Oldenquist’s book 
is an unusual one for a philosopher and may in fact seem more like a piece of 
(at best) philosophical anthropology than moral philosophy. I suspect that the 
impartial moralist will simply be unmoved by this analysis, for it is always 
open to him to continue to insist that these facts (if facts they be) about human 
nature cannot by themselves generate a normative argument for loyalty. It is 
always open to the impartial moralist to argue that justice requires we get over 
our psychological attachment to small group loyalties, even if we happen to be 
psychologically best suited to them. This sort of argument from psychology 
simply cannot constitute an adequate moral argument. 
Here we have actually hit a kind of impasse, the significance of which I 
hope will become more clear in the chapters that follow. For I too will be 
making a kind of argument about the how loyalties are integral to human 
nature. However, I will take a much different tack than Oldenquist, as my 
argument will focus on the nature and constitution of the will. As such, I have 
hopes that my argument may be more persuasive to the impartial moralist 
than Oldenquist’s can be, because my appeal will be to a faculty—the will—
which is much more evidently the proper subject of moral philosophy and 
moral psychology than the sort of almost empirical claims which Oldenquist 
advances. 
That said, I have deep sympathies for Oldenquist’s project and 
conclusions. However, I think that it is possible to give an argument better 
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focused against the impartial moralist than the sort of naturalist argument that 
Oldenquist adopts. Thus, even if Oldenquist is correct in his claims about 
human nature (I have my doubts but will reserve judgment here), his moral 
argument can only be sustained to the extent that the necessity of loyalty as 
integral to the moral agent can be established. In short, Oldenquist’s argument 
becomes too psychological and empirical to be fully philosophically satisfying. 
It must be supplemented with an argument whose focus is on the will—the 
locus of moral activity—and not the empirical psychology of human beings. 
Only then will his conclusions—many of which I find intuitively plausible—
be vindicated in a manner that at least meets the impartial moralist on his own 
ground. 
 
Beyond Loyalty, per se 
 
It is certainly the case that other philosophers have also considered the 
normative status of loyalty. However, I do think that Royce and Oldenquist 
are the most significant for my purposes here. Therefore, in what follows I will 
touch on a few developments in contemporary moral philosophy that do not 
focus on loyalty per se but which are important for understanding where my 
project fits in the larger debates of our time. However, I will not be delving 
into the details of these arguments as I did for Royce and Oldenquist. The 
reason for this is simple: I will cover the most important of these (for my 
purposes) in the next two chapters when I look first at what Consequentialists 
have to say about loyalties (Chapter III), and then how broadly Kantian views 
consider the matter (Chapter IV). Thus, my purpose in the last section of this 
chapter is mainly to introduce some of the background to the debates in moral 
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philosophy into which I am wading—in media res, and for my own slightly 
idiosyncratic purposes—in the chapters which follow. 
Perhaps the most important pre-existing debate from which I am 
drawing materials is the continuing controversy over the whether the most 
influential contemporary moral theories—consequentialism and Kantianism—
can be reconciled with the felt important of certain intuitions attaching to what 
Bernard Williams called our “deep attachments.” In particular, the debate has 
come to a head over whether such moral theories are so universalist with 
respect to their basic premises that they simply can never truly see particular 
attachments as morally significant. 
Bernard Williams has played a very important role in opening this line 
of debate. This strain in his thinking came to the fore in his seminal critique of 
utilitarianism, which has come to be called the objection from personal 
integrity. In the context of a debate with J. J. C. Smart, Williams wrote, “how 
can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard as one satisfaction among 
others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which he has built 
his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the causal 
scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?” This would be “to 
alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his 
own convictions” (Smart and Williams [1973], 116).  
This objection basically turns on the fact that the utilitarian theory 
makes no distinctions concerning the levels of responsibility which govern 
when and where the moral agent is required to act. Thus, the fact that my own 
convictions, plans, projects are mine is irrelevant in determining what I am to 
do when faced with a moral choice. I must always act in such a way as to 
maximize the good, even if that requires me to drop everything that matters to 
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me and respond to the actions of some person wholly unconnected with me. 
Such a requirement, argues Williams, is entirely unreasonable for it would 
“neglect the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the 
actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which 
[the agent] is most closely identified” and so would constitute “in the most 
literal sense, an attack on his integrity.” 
I do not wish to go deeply into this issue here because it will be taken 
up again in the next chapter. I merely want to introduce the nature of the 
objection. Williams continued to develop this type of objection in the years 
that followed. A particularly important statement of them can be found in his 
essay “Persons, Character, and Morality” from which I have already quoted in 
the Introduction and to which I will again return in the following chapters. 
There he continued to press the notion that modern ethical theories (both 
consequentialist and broadly Kantian) are in some ways inevitably alienating. 
They force a moral agent to take up an attitude towards himself and others 
which is inconsistent with the expression of “such things as deep attachments 
to other persons.” Yet Williams thinks such attachments are absolutely 
necessary, for without them “there will not be enough substance or conviction 
in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself” (Williams [1976], 18). 
Williams continued in a similar line in his book Ethics and the Limits of 
Philosophy, which ultimately seems to indict philosophy as being more of a 
hindrance than a help in the moral life. He argues there that our ethical 
theories are overly reductionist, that they attempt to describe the “truth 
about… the ethical” with only “one or two ethical concepts, such as duty or 
good state of affairs” (Williams [1985], 17). Ultimately he argues “that 
philosophy should not try to produce ethical theory”, and “that in ethics the 
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reductive enterprise has no justification and should disappear.” I cannot begin 
to examine the scope of this argument (though I will touch on very similar 
themes from Williams and others in the following chapters, especially in 
Chapter VII). Nonetheless, in this book Williams launched a kind of war 
against the entire project of philosophical ethics as it has been practiced to that 
time (and continues to be practiced to this day). Whether or not we are 
sympathetic to his rather strict claim about the “limits of philosophy” in 
justifying an ethical life, we must nonetheless recognize how important 
Williams has been in pointing out how much divergence there really is 
between most ethical theories and the real substance of a lived, ethical life. 
About the same time as Williams was formulating his objections to 
utilitarianism, Michael Stocker published “The Schizophrenia of Modern 
Ethical Theories” in which he argued that such theories, by dealing “only with 
reasons, with values, with what justifies,” fail “to examine motives and the 
motivational structures and constraints of ethical life” and in virtue of this 
“fail as ethical theories” (Stocker [1976], 453). The schizophrenia consists in the 
fact that theories do not adequately value the person, “not merely the person’s 
general values nor even the person-qua-producer-or-possessor-of-general-
values” (459). 
The defect Stocker is identifying lies in the fact that such theories have 
the agent focusing on the wrong thing. “[L]ove, friendship, affection, fellow 
feeling, and community all require that the other person be an essential part of 
what is valued.” In other words, it is the particular individual, not the other as 
an instantiation of some broader principle which must be central to our ethics. 
It is the other herself who is valuable, not the fact that she is intelligent or 
beautiful or kind, etc. Stocker think that contemporary ethical theories only 
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focus on such “general values” and thus construe justification entirely in non-
particular terms. 
In short, Stocker’s claim is that “if we take as motives, embody in our 
motives, those various things which recent ethical theories hold to be 
ultimately good or right, we will, of necessity, be unable to have…” the sorts 
of motives necessary “to realize the great goods of love, friendship, affection, 
fellow feeling, and community” (461). The key idea is that such ethical 
theories (both “utilitarianisms” and “deontologies”) simply rule out, in their 
descriptions of morally acceptable motivations, those motives which 
necessarily underwrite the goods of love and friendship, etc. 
Thus Stocker’s argument, as many of these arguments are, is a kind of 
reductio ad absurdum. He attempts to show that if you take seriously what both 
utilitarian and deontological ethical theorists have to say about allowable 
motives, you then rule out the particularist motives that undergird the true 
valuing of people and selves—including, he notes, our own selves. This, 
presumably, is unacceptable as it contradicts our deep intuition that goods 
like love and friendship are indeed among the greatest of goods. We cannot 
take the theories seriously and still hold onto what Stocker takes to be some of 
the most essential motivations in our moral lives. The “schizophrenia” lies the 
way in which such theories divide us from ourselves and others “in regard to 
the personal relationships of love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and 
community.” 
A third significant philosopher to express doubts along similar lines 
about the nature of modern ethical theories is Alasdair MacIntyre. In his 1981 
book After Virtue, he presented a picture of the emptiness of contemporary 
moral theory that was nothing less than shocking in its audacity. His central 
  
60 
claim is: in “the actual world we inhabit” what we possess of the language of 
morality are merely “the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now 
lack those contexts from which their significance is derived. We possess 
indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key 
expressions… [but] we have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our 
comprehension, both theoretical and practical, [of] morality” (MacIntyre 
[1984a], 2).  
MacIntyre’s argument is essentially that our moral language is merely 
left over from a now destroyed Aristotelian virtue ethics past. It was that 
virtue ethics, and particularly its teleological conception of human nature and 
the good, which provided the “contexts from which [the] significance” of 
moral concepts was derived (or derivable). Without such a context—and he 
makes the historical claim that it has been lost—our use of moral terms, 
concepts, and categories is empty. 
Obviously, we cannot here examine this remarkable thesis. What I 
mostly want to point out is MacIntyre’s sympathy with the general line of 
criticism of the (universalist) modern moral theories. This is especially clear in 
MacIntyre’s 1984 Lindley Lecture “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” Though MacIntyre 
rather scrupulously avoids actually answering his own question, he does, 
however, set up a dichotomy between two entirely incompatible and 
incommensurable “moralities”—the morality of patriotism and the morality of 
modern liberalism. This again basically reflects the division of ethics—and 
presumably intuitions about ethics—between those who favor a particularist 
(patriotic) morality and those who favor a universalist (liberal) morality. 
The morality of patriotism is reflected in the following claims: 
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Detached from my community, I will be apt to lose my hold 
upon all genuine standards of judgment. Loyalty to that 
community, to the hierarchy of particular kinship, particular 
local community and particular natural community, is… [thus] a 
prerequisite for morality. So patriotism and those loyalties 
cognate to it are not just virtues but central virtues. (MacIntyre 
[1984b], 11) 
 
The central idea in the morality of patriotism is that the ethical life is 
fundamentally inseparable from the loyalty that binds the individual to his 
community. It is not merely that, all things considered, loyalty will conduce to 
the best moral outcome, but the much stronger claim that without loyalties 
like patriotism morality itself is impossible. These loyalties are fundamentally 
intrinsic to ethics. 
MacIntyre contrasts this with the morality of liberalism which is 
characterized by a entirely different conception of the moral.  
 
first, that morality is constituted by rules to which any rational 
person would under ideal conditions give assent; secondly, that 
those rules impose constrains upon and are neutral between 
rival and competing interests—morality itself is not the 
expression of any particular interest; thirdly, that those rules are 
also neutral between rival and competing sets of beliefs about 
what the best way for human beings to live is; fourthly, that the 
units which provide the subject-matter of morality as well as its 
agents are individual human beings and that in moral evaluation 
each individual is to count for one and nobody for more than 
one; and fifthly, that the standpoint of the moral agent 
constituted by allegiance to these rules is one and the same for 
all moral agents and as such is independent of all social 
particularity. (MacIntyre [1984b], 7-8) 
 
The key idea here is also relatively simple: ethics is to be understood as 
completely divorced from “social particularity.” What matters is an objective 
description of the nature of the human individual (moral agent), and it is with 
respect to the individual alone that any moral rights and duties are to be 
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understood. Such a view is putatively neutral before competing “special 
conception of the good” (as Rawls called them), for it is not based on any 
explicit claims about the purpose or end of human nature. Rather it is founded 
on a conception of “ideal conditions” in which “reasonable” agents give their 
consent to rules of conduct and social intercourse (at least at some basic level). 
As I noted before, MacIntyre does not try to settle the debate between 
these competing moralities, each of which—in his view—suffers defects. 
Ultimately we come to see that so barely described, each of the competing 
alternatives is inadequate. In After Virtue, MacIntyre finally holds that—
consistent with his thesis I noted above—neither of the proposed alternatives 
truly represents a recovery of the lost teleological context which he sees as 
necessary for a genuine ethics. That said, I think he is generally more receptive 
to the claims of the morality of patriotism, but they need to be modified to be 
consistent with the “tradition of the virtues” and the shared striving for the 
good in a moral community committed, as a whole, to that good. 
The key modification is the reintroduction of a shared conception of the 
good for man based on an understanding of virtue. A true patriotism is only 
possible in a society possessed of a government that expresses or represents 
“the moral community of its citizens” (MacIntyre [1984a], 254). Lacking such a 
shared commitment today our modern societies “lack in the fullest sense a 
patria” and so a genuine patriotism is simply impossible. “Modern systematic 
politics, whether liberal, conservative, radical, or socialist, simply has to be 
rejected from a standpoint that owes genuine allegiance to the tradition of the 
virtues; for modern politics itself expresses in its institutional forms a 
systematic rejection of that tradition” (255). Thus, “loyalty to my country, to 
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my community—which remains unalterably a central virtue—becomes 
detached from obedience to the government which happens to rule me.” 
My goal in this very quick examination of MacIntyre has not been to 
explore fully his arguments for their great intrinsic philosophical interest. 
Rather, what I hope I have done is show how three particularly influential 
philosophers have fundamentally altered the contemporary debate over both 
the status and nature of moral philosophy itself and its relationship to ethics 
as lived. I have merely wanted to set up some of the apparatus surrounding 
the debate, and though I assume it is obvious where my sympathies lie, 
nonetheless I have as of yet not even begun the presentation of my argument. 
In short, my purpose in this last section of this chapter has not been to 
advance a particular argument for the superiority of the particular over the 
universal. Rather, I have only hoped to show that the debates into which I am 
offering my argument for loyalty are not as settled as the main practitioners of 
the dominant traditions might assume. For the debate is not properly the one 
so often assumed, between consequentialism and various liberal deontologies, 
but between either such type of universalist moral theory and the actual 
practice of the ethic life informed by the particular goods of friendship, family, 
community, country, and religion which seem intrinsically particular. 
 
The overall debate has now become shaped into a disagreement over 
the essential universality or particularity of ethics itself. This is, of course, 
intrinsically related to a continuing debate between advocates of cosmopolitan 
and communitarian conceptions of community and justice. I do not propose to 
expand further on the background literature because I think we should now 
be reasonably clear on the nature of one of the most important sub-debates 
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into the heart of which this dissertation will be aimed. There are other cognate 
and not so cognate literatures which will have an important bearing on my 
argument—particularly in moral psychology—but I will introduce them in the 
course of my argument in following chapters so that I can expose them, unlike 
the précis of this chapter, to more sustained philosophical examination. The 
next chapter begins this examination with a discussion of consequentialism. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
Consequentialism and the  
“Demands of Special Concern” 
 
 
In the previous chapters I attempted to motivate the prima facie 
challenge loyalty poses to the most prevalent theories of normative ethics. My 
contention is that common sense morality gives an important place to the 
concerns of loyalty—including and especially towards particular, unchosen 
objects—which is incompatible with the largely universalist nature of those 
theories. I take these intuitions about loyalty to be morally important 
phenomena, worthy of careful attention; however, as of yet I have not 
presented a positive case for taking the demands of loyalty to be legitimately 
binding.  
It is possible that the particularist demands of loyalty are simply 
unjustified and that the clear sense many people have that they constitute 
valid demands is merely the mistaken prejudice of sentiment that many critics 
have claimed it to be. My defense of this particularist conception of the 
demands of loyalty must wait for Part II. Nonetheless, there are important 
middle positions as well, and indeed I think most modern moral theorists 
occupy one of these.  
These theorists acknowledge that there is some real moral content to 
the conceptions of common sense morality regarding the demands of loyalty. 
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However, they hold that this real content is in some way derivative from more 
basic universal moral commitments. They would think that the great priority 
common sense morality seems to give to loyalty is in fact a mistake—a 
relatively innocent mistake perhaps, but a mistake nonetheless. The goal of the 
moral theorist then becomes to show how any genuine moral content in the 
demands of common sense morality can be accounted for within the confines 
of his moral theory. The remainder is either rejected outright or, more likely, 
demoted in status to become a kind of permissible (personal) preference rather 
than a valid obligation. 
In the present chapter my task is limited; I wish to examine what 
resources the advocates of a consequentialist moral outlook have to account 
for the felt demands of loyalty. In the end I hope to show the essential 
structure of consequentialism, particularly the conception of value 
characteristic of that theory, is inadequate for appreciating the legitimate and 
unique values expressed in rightful demands of loyalty. In order to do this I 
will examine some of the best cases that can be made from a consequentialist 
perspective in detail and attempt to show that even when a consequentialist 
claims to have found a consequentialist justification for a duty of loyalty, this 
justification fails to capture the essence of a demand of loyalty because 
consequentialism as a whole cannot properly acknowledge the value towards 
which that demand aims. 
 
The Structure of Consequentialism 
 
For my purposes here I identify as consequentialist any view that holds 
that the only relevant values for moral theorizing or deliberation are 
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embodied in states of affairs. These are among the class of views that Scanlon 
calls “teleological,” and what distinguishes them “is not the elements of a state 
of affairs that they take to contribute to its intrinsic value (whether these 
include actions or only their consequences), but rather the idea that it is only 
states of affairs that have value” (Scanlon [1998], 80).1 What individuates a 
consequentialist view is its particular principle of the good—a theory 
describing an ideal (or at least preferable) state of affairs. 
Consequentialism can be described in terms of two principles: a 
principle of the right (which governs what I ought to do, or how I ought to 
act) and a principle of the good (which determines what is of value). As I am 
understanding them, all classical consequentialist theories have more or less 
the same principle of the right (for moral agents): act in such a way as to bring 
about the optimal state of affairs as described by some given principle of the 
good (i.e., promote the good). Different species of consequentialism are 
distinguished by their different principles of the good—what they take to be 
the optimal state of affairs (Scanlon call this the “to be promoted”). For 
example, the principle of the good for classical utilitarianism (hedonism) is the 
state of affairs in which the net pleasure (total pleasure minus total pain) of 
the relevant subjects is maximized. Other forms of consequentialism have 
different principles of the good. 
                                                
1 It might be thought that by definition consequentialism would refer only to the subset of views 
that consider only the consequences of actions, and not the actions themselves. If this is taken 
to mean that what Scheffler calls “agent-centered restrictions” are excluded then this is 
generally correct; however, a view that gives some value to actions from an agent’s 
perspective, as we will see in examining Scheffler’s views, would still probably qualify as 
broadly consequentialist. 
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As we shall see when we examine Samuel Scheffler’s attempt to retain a 
broadly consequentialist2 picture of the good which is immune to an 
important objection against classical consequentialism, it may be thought 
possible to alter this principle of the right and still remain within a broadly 
consequentialist framework. However, no analogous alteration of the basic 
structure of the principles of the good is possible while remaining true to the 
essence of the consequentialist position. In other words, no strictly 
consequentialist moral theory can recognize as valuable anything not 
described in terms of a state of affairs. Thus, within such a view things have 
intrinsic value only, as Scanlon puts it, “as components of states of affairs—as 
things that occur, and that it is good (or bad) to have occur.” 
This is extremely important, because this claim will severely delimit the 
scope of what a consequentialist can recognize as valuable. Thus, for a 
consequentialist, any statement of the form “x is valuable” can only mean that 
the occurrence of x contributes more to the optimal state of affairs than the 
non-occurrence of x.  
Consider, just as an example, Kant’s assertion in the famous opening of 
the Groundwork that there “is no possibility of thinking anything at all in the 
world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, 
except a good will” (393). A consequentialist will think this statement is not 
only false, but also deeply incoherent. The consequentialist will think it false 
because he can point to occurrences that, according to his preferred theory of 
the good, he will assert to be intrinsically valuable. He will think it incoherent 
                                                
2 When I speak of Scheffler’s project as “broadly consequentialist” with respect to the good, 
what I have in mind is that his account of value is still in terms of a Scanlonian “to be 
promoted.” It may be that he does not wish to specify the exact nature of this to be promoted 
in terms of a metaphysical concept like a state of affairs. My discussion of Scheffler will be 
expanded below.  
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because a “good will” is not, and cannot be, one of those occurrences. This is 
simply because a “good will” is not an event; a will does not occur in the 
relevant sense.3 
The mistake, according to the consequentialist, is in thinking that there is 
independent (intrinsic) value in having a particular orientation of the will. 
This is not to say, however, that all orientations of the will are equally 
valuable. Indeed, in the classical models a particular orientation of the will, as 
embodied in the principle of the right to promote the good, is the correct one 
to have. However, the reason that this orientation of the will is to be preferred 
has got nothing to do with it qua the will, but only because such an orientation 
will best promote the putatively optimal outcome. 
What this means is that in certain cases it might well be that the best 
way to achieve a desired outcome is to cultivate orientations of the will that do 
not directly (from the agent’s perspective) promote the good. Suppose, for 
example’s sake, that our principle of the good describes the optimal state of 
affairs as one in which pain is minimized. Suppose as well that there is a 
brilliant but very selfish doctor who happens to be better able to ease the pain 
of others than anyone else but has no particular desire to do so. However, 
suppose he is motivated by a desire for money. In the short run, the best 
outcome—the minimization of pain—will not come about through my 
attempting to get him to embrace my principle of the right; to the extent that it 
is under my control, my best course of action would be to pay the doctor as 
                                                
3 Dick Miller has pointed out that there might be some kind of rather weird consequentialist 
who would take as principle of the good the state of affairs of wherein good wills (or souls) 
are maximized. This would be a very strange thing for a consequentialist to say for a variety 
of reasons, but most importantly because it is not clear that the consequentialist can give any 
kind of specification of what a good will is. The concept itself seems inimical to his implicit 
theory of value, and as such either incoherent, or, strictly speaking, arbitrary. 
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much as would increase his efficiency in relieving others’ pain. In other 
words, the governing factor in what attitude it would be best for me to 
cultivate in the doctor is not the intrinsic value of the orientation of his will, 
but what will most effectively cause him to minimize aggregate pain. 
Now a consequentialist might argue that in the long run I would better 
serve the cause of minimizing pain by cultivating in the doctor an attitude of 
respect for his patients and ultimately a direct appreciation of the good in 
minimizing their pain. However, there is no sufficient reason to think that this 
need be the case. It may turn out that by making the doctor less selfish I make 
him less efficient; he comes to identify and sympathize with his patients, 
directly desiring that their pain be minimized, but that causes him to spend 
more time with each patient, makes him less willing to make important snap 
judgments, and in general slows him down. In any case, in the short run, it 
becomes clear that given his psychological make up as it is available to me, the 
putative good can best be promoted by accommodating rather than changing 
his attitude. 
The point of this example is merely that the classical consequentialist 
can attach no value to attitudes or orientations of the will except insofar as 
those attitudes promote or impede the occurrence of states of affairs. In fact, 
consequentialism considers states of the will only instrumentally and can 
argue for the promotion of any given state of the will only by reference to an 
efficiency criterion. Thus, as with our doctor, it may very well be the case that 
the optimific outcome is achieved only when some given agent not is a 
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consequentialist at all (i.e., he does not his actions according the principle of 
the right—viz., promote the good).4  
 
The Demands of Loyalty in a Consequentialist System 
 
Now that we have some picture of the structure of consequentialism we 
can return to the question at hand—can consequentialism account for the 
demands of loyalty as normatively legitimate? If the demands of loyalty are 
legitimate, then the values towards which those duties aim must be real 
values. Therefore, it is clear that for a form of consequentialism to account for 
the demands of loyalty as legitimate it must be able to recognize the values of 
loyalty as (independently) valuable. This means, given the formal structure of 
consequentialism as we have just examined it, that these values must be 
embodied within states of affairs. So we are left with a question that is 
relatively easy to state, if not to answer: can the values which inform the 
demands of loyalty be adequately understood as components of some state of 
affairs? 
To answer this question will require us to have a reasonably clear 
understanding of the nature the values informing the demands of loyalty. One 
thing we might observe immediately is that it does not seem to be the case that 
the value of loyalty is properly understood as strictly additive. In other words, 
it is not simply the case that the more loyalty there is in the world the better. If 
this were the case, it would follow that I would have a duty to cultivate the 
                                                
4 This phenomenon has been explored by Peter Railton in his attempt to shield 
consequentialism from the charge that it is inevitably alienating (“Alienation, 
Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” 1984). I examine that discussion below. 
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maximum number of occasions for expressing loyalty. Further it would seem 
that I would have reason to be disloyal in certain occasions if by doing so I 
could maximize loyalty on the whole. 5 
The point is that the value of loyalty cannot be properly appreciated if 
it is viewed strictly in terms of the occasions of behavior that express it. 
Furthermore, in the occasions where I do express loyalty I do not do so in 
order to maximize the occurrences of loyal behavior in the world, but because 
I care about the person or institution, etc. to which I am being loyal. Thus our 
question has now become more precise: can the value of the object of my 
loyalty be captured in terms of a state of affairs? Unless that value can be 
understood within it, consequentialism is systematically insensitive to real 
goods.  
I want now to look at one attempt to construct these kinds of duties 
within a consequentialist framework, and then ask how well this attempt 
answers the questions we have posed. One thing that essentially characterizes 
the demands of loyalty is their particularity—these demands have both 
particular objects and limited (i.e., particular) scope. In the literature these 
kind of demands have come to be called “special duties” or duties of special 
concern; let us examine the attempt made by Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit6 
to derive duties of special concern within a consequentialist framework. 
 
                                                
5 This is somewhat analogous to the case of friendship as examined by Scanlon: “We would 
not say that it showed how much a person valued friendship if he betrayed one friend in 
order to make several new ones, or in order to bring it about that other people had more 
friends” (89). 
6 “The Possibility of Special Duties” (1986). 
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Goodin and Pettit 
 
Goodin and Pettit have attempted to develop a strain of 
consequentialist thinking that is in accord with common sense morality 
concerning what they call “relativised independent” obligations. In doing this 
they purport to examine and meet what they take to be the greatest obstacle to 
special duties, the “neutralist’s challenge,” by modifying their account of 
consequentialism to incorporate a “responsibility criterion.” They claim that 
this serves to relativise duties to particular agents without fundamentally 
altering the character of duty. Examining this attempt will bring us some way 
towards answering the questions I posed above. 
To begin we should note that they classify putative duties of special 
concern as “relativised independent” obligations. In other words, they are 
duties specific to the bearer that do not apply universally to everyone; they 
have an independent moral status and are not merely instrumental in 
satisfying some more basic universal duty.7 Thus if there is a duty of special 
concern such as “Bob has a duty to educate his children,” it is relative to him 
(i.e., Bob does not have this duty because everyone has a duty to educate 
Bob’s children, but because they are his children), and independent in that it 
does not depend on any more basic duty (e.g., some kind of implicit promise 
                                                
7 In their usage, a given duty is relativised if it is of the form ‘A has the duty to bring about 
some state of affairs specific to A,’ e.g., Bob has a duty to educate Bob’s children, while some 
other person Sam has a duty to educate, not Bob’s children, but only Sams’s. A given duty is 
dependent if it is instrumental to satisfying some more basic duty (e.g., Bob has a duty to 
abide by his contracts because contracts constitute a form of promising and everyone has a 
duty to keep his promises). 
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thought to have been made by Bob to his children).8 With these distinctions in 
hand let us return to the problem. 
Goodin and Pettit view the potential problem—the “neutralist’s 
challenge”—to be the most pressing objection to putative duties of special 
concern. They think this because they claim that “special duties break the 
intuitive connection between the right and the good, for they make the duty of 
parents toward their child a function of something other than just the call of 
the good” (Goodin and Pettit [1986], 654). Of course, the force of this is most 
pressing when morality is viewed through a consequentialist lens, and those 
who fail to share the intuition, or more precisely this view of the good, are less 
likely to be moved to the same degree.9 To see this let us look at the argument 
as Goodin and Pettit develop it: 
 
1. It is (a) necessary and, given some general qualifying 
conditions, it is (b) sufficient for someone’s having the 
independent duty that-p, that p should be desirable. Duty is, and 
is exclusively, a function of desirability. 
 
2. If p is desirable from the standpoint of A – if A would be right 
to believe that is was desirable – then p is equally desirable from 
the standpoint of any assessor. Desirability is universal. 
 
3. Therefore if A has the independent duty that-p then: by 1-a, p 
is desirable from A’s standpoint; by 2, it is desirable from 
everyone’s standpoint; and by 1-b, it is something in respect of 
which everyone, given the appropriate qualifications, has a duty. 
(661) 
 
                                                
8 I am not claiming that this is necessarily a plausible more basic duty, merely that an 
independent duty does not depend on any kind of further duty. 
9 This is certainly not to say that deontological theories cannot generate a kind of neutralist 
challenge, but it will be somewhat different in character. 
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They note that there two ways of rejecting this argument—either, by rejecting 
(1) that duty is exclusive a function of desirability, or by rejecting (2) that 
desirability is universal. They claim that each of these responses is 
unsatisfactory.  
They argue that the first strategy is most commonly “intuitionist in 
form” and “just uncritically endorses whatsoever ordinary intuitions we 
might have about our duties without offering any reason for supposing that 
these (and only these) are obligations which we should acknowledge” (663). 
Of the second strategy they say it “misrepresents the special duties it purports 
to save” (664). Their argument for this is that this view accepts “that if 
something attainable by an agent is attractive then it is potentially obligating 
and gives rise to a non-conclusive moral demand.” But this would entail “that 
other people [could not] be in a position to find attractive the desideratum 
involved” in a given agent’s special duty, since otherwise it would become a 
duty for them as well and so de-relativised. Thus, if Bob has a special duty to 
educate his children, this proposal would require that nobody else could be in 
a position to find the educating of Bob’s children desirable, since it would then 
become a duty incumbent upon that person as well. However, it seems 
“absurd to suggest that other people” might not find a state of affairs such as 
Bob’s children being educated to be desirable. 
Their solution is really a modified form of the first response. They want 
to suggest that duty is not exclusively a function of desirability; rather it is 
(exclusively) “a function of desirability and responsibility, of attractiveness 
and accountability” (665). With the proper criterion for assigning 
responsibility they think they can avoid the neutralist’s conclusion by 
relativising responsibility such that for some given state of affairs p (e.g., Bob’s 
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children being educated), p can be recognized as universally desirable without 
this generating a corresponding universal duty for all who recognize the value 
of p to bring it about. This is because the responsibility to bring about p, via an 
application of the responsibility criterion, is Bob’s alone (or Bob’s and his 
wife’s, etc.). Thus in the abstract anyone might find it attractive that Bob’s 
children be educated, but the mere fact that someone acknowledges that this is 
a preferable state of affairs will not obligate him to bring it about, unless he 
happens to fall under the constraints of the responsibility criterion. Let us then 
look at Goodin and Pettit’s proposed criterion. 
  
An agent A (be A an individual or group) is responsible for a 
state of affairs p if and only if: 
 
1a. p is (virtually) uniquely susceptible to A’s influence, whether 
that influence amounts to partial or total control; 
 
OR 
 
1b. p is susceptible to the influence of A and a number of other 
agents; and it is not possible for those agents to exercise 
influence simultaneously without compromising the desired 
outcome p or some other desired result; and A is the salient one 
to assume control. 
 
OR 
 
1c. p is susceptible to the influence of A and a number of other 
agents but it is possible for these agents to exercise simultaneous 
control without compromising p or any other desideratum; 
  
AND 
 
2. A is in a position to know the truth of whichever one of those 
three conditions obtains. (666) 
 
The purpose of this criterion is to assign responsibility most 
fundamentally to the person(s) in the best position to bring about the desired 
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state of affairs. This means that the good to be achieved (towards which the 
duty aims) is desirable in itself (making the duty independent) but binds only 
such persons as meet the requirements of the responsibility criterion (thus 
making it relativised). Thus, everyone can recognize that Bob’s children being 
educated is a desirable state of affairs that generates corresponding duties, but 
only a small number of people (Bob, his wife, etc.) are directly responsible for 
making sure that this state of affairs is realized. 
To see how this plays out let us apply this schema to a concrete 
example, the case of my special duty to see to the education of my children 
(the desired state of affairs in question is that of my children being educated, 
which we will name p). If there is such a duty then according to Goodin and 
Pettit a series of conditions will be true. First, it will be the case that it is 
desirable for my children to be educated. Second, an appreciation of the 
attractiveness of that state of affairs is open to anyone. Third, given that it is a 
special duty of mine, according to the responsibility condition I must either be: 
(a) (virtually) uniquely influential in bringing about p, or (b) the “salient one 
to assume control” among a group of agents any of whom might be influential 
in bringing about p, but who cannot all exercise that influence without 
compromising p or some other desired result, and aware which of these two 
cases obtains.  
So which of (a) or (b) is likely to be true? If the desired state of affairs is 
my children being educated it seems strange to think that I alone could be 
influential in bringing this about. Since most children are not formally 
educated by their parents, it is reasonable to assume that there are a variety of 
people who might be influential in bringing it about that my children be 
educated. My wife most immediately comes to mind, as well as other 
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members of my family, immediate and extended. Family friends and 
neighbors also would exercise some degree of influence. Of course the 
authorities charged with public education could exert a great degree of 
influence. Presumably, therefore, the case in question would answer to 
condition (b) of the responsibility criterion; I am merely the “salient one to 
assume control.” 
This is the view that Goodin and Pettit express. In cases like providing 
“for the education of my children,… there is no realistic hope of smooth 
simultaneous control, so we search for the single most salient party,… [who] is 
likely to be me…” (670). They go on to say that under normal circumstances 
“information, resources and the actual conventions of familiar societies will 
dictate that I am the obvious candidate to be given control.”  
Under the description they have given, what is ultimately most 
important is just a desirable state of affairs. In this case, what is valuable—that 
from which the duty derives its import and meaning—is the state of affairs of 
my children being educated. The question we need to ask is whether or not 
the value of this state of affairs completely captures the value that underwrites 
the demand of special concern to favor my children over others in 
provisioning an education. 
I want to suggest that it does not. Goodin and Pettit want to argue that 
the good towards which any duty aims must be, in principle, universally 
desirable. Remember they argue against making it a condition of duties of 
special concern that the good towards which they aim be unavailable to others 
on whom the duty is not incumbent. Another way of putting this is that a 
good is a good, whether or not any particular person recognizes this, and so if 
x is in fact a good, then x is a good for everyone in principle. 
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Now it is important to remember that they think “that if something 
attainable by an agent is attractive then it is potentially obligating and gives 
rise to a non-conclusive moral demand.” They decline to allow the desirability 
of a good to be particular because they say it would be “absurd to suggest that 
other people will not find attractive what is at stake in the special duties that 
common sense ascribes to a particular agent.” I think there is a confusion here 
to which Goodin and Pettit are insufficiently sensitive. 
First I want to make a more general point about the nature of what 
constitutes a good—i.e., what is attractive.10 Suppose that I have two married 
friends, Anne and Bob. Suppose as well that I think either or both of the 
following: a) that marriage, in general, is a good, and so that, ceteris paribus, 
any instantiation of marriage is a good,11 and b) that Anne and Bob’s 
marriage is a good. (Say, for instance, that I have known both Anne and Bob 
from before their marriage; I can see the love they bear for each other and how 
they each have greatly benefited from the marriage). In any case, I recognize 
that Anne and Bob’s marriage is a good; I take it to be valuable; I take it to be 
attractive. However, it would be ludicrous to suggest that I value Anne and 
Bob’s marriage the way (much less to the degree that) Anne and Bob each 
value their marriage and each other. 
As I noted above, Goodin and Pettit suggest that it would be “absurd to 
suggest that other people will not find attractive what is at stake in the special 
duties that common sense ascribes to a particular agent.” This is true—I, and 
other people, can find Anne and Bob’s marriage valuable—but the point is 
                                                
10 Of course, to say that something is attractive does not mean what I just happen to fancy it; 
rather it means that I judge it to be a good. 
11 Though I do happen to think this, nothing hangs on it for the purposes of this example, and 
even should it fail to be the case I trust that the general point will nonetheless be apparent. 
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that we will not value it in the way in which Anne and Bob value it. As such, 
although it is valuable (both in principle and actually) to people besides Anne 
and Bob, it is certainly not the case that those of us who do value their 
marriage will each have the kind of duties of special concern that Anne and 
Bob bear to each other. 
So we avoid the problem because we do not fall prey to the “absurd” 
notion that people besides Anne and Bob cannot find a real good (in this case, 
their marriage) attractive. Accordingly, although what I can do to promote 
their marriage is probably rather limited, it might seem that, since I am a 
friend of both Anne and Bob, I have some kind of prima facie obligation to do 
whatever I can. It might even be suggested that anyone who sees marriage in 
general as a good would be prima facie committed to promoting Anne and 
Bob’s marriage to whatever extent he is able, even if he has no prior 
knowledge of Anne and Bob.12 Thus, what I find attractive—i.e., the real good 
that is their marriage—can inform “a non-conclusive moral demand,” but that 
does not imply that it informs the same moral demand that obliges Anne and 
Bob with respect to each other and their marriage. 
                                                
12 Of course, this is not to suggest that anyone who values marriage as a good has some kind 
of obligation to seek out all the married couples in the world and promote their marriages; 
rather, it means simply that to the extent that he happens to come into contact with Anne and 
Bob such a “non-conclusive” obligation might arise. So if I have a house to rent and based on 
all other factors I have narrowed down the potential tenants to two couples—one married and 
the other not—to the extent I esteem marriage a good I have a reason to favor the married 
couple over the unmarried one. In other words, though they are identical in other relevant 
respects, I make a non-arbitrary justified choice in favoring the married couple. It is only in 
situations like this, where some other more important factor may give rise to a conclusive 
moral demand in the other direction, that I have some kind of prima facie but non-conclusive 
demand to favor the value I esteem. I am not asserting that this is necessarily justified, I am 
only suggesting that valuing something like marriage as a good can generate demands to act 
in particular ways even towards people with whom one does not have a special relationship. 
Another example of a less specific prima facie obligation for him that values marriage in 
general might simply be to support a tax structure that doesn’t “punish” marriage. 
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Thus the general point is this: a real good can be valuable in different 
ways to different agents, and thus inform different duties of special concern 
with regards to those agents, while remaining available, as a good, to 
everyone in principle. Goodin and Pettit wanted to avoid making 
attractiveness non-universal because to their minds a good, in order to be a 
good, must in principle be recognizably a good for everyone. What this 
example shows, however, is that even if it is true that a good is in principle 
recognizable as a good universally, it need not be equally valued, morally or 
otherwise, by everyone who recognizes it as a good. 
This naturally suggests that if there is a demand of special concern on 
me to favor x, it is informed not merely by the fact that I recognize that the 
occurrence of x contributes to some good, but also by the fact that I value x in 
some particular way. What makes a duty of special concern special is not that 
the good towards which I am aiming is necessarily unavailable to others. 
Rather, what makes it special is that the value which underwrites the duty of 
special concern has a volitional component founded on the fact of my special 
relationship with the object of my special concern. As I suggested above when 
examining Kant’s assertion about the good will in a consequentialist light, 
consequentialism, being wed to a view that the good can exist only in terms of 
states of affairs, is unable to adequately account for the volitional constituents 
of value. 
To better appreciate this let us look again at some examples. I return 
again to Bernard Williams’ case because I think it will shed more light on the 
nature of the value at stake. Recall that the situation involves a man being 
forced to choose between saving his wife or another woman from a fire, when 
he does not have time to save both. The question Williams is considering is 
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whether the fact that she is his wife is enough to justify the man’s decision to 
favor her. He writes: 
 
… surely this is a justification on behalf of the rescuer, that the 
person he chose to rescue was his wife? It depends on how much 
weight is carried by ‘justification’: the consideration that it was 
his wife is certainly, for instance, an explanation which should 
silence comment. But something more ambitious than this is 
usually intended, essentially involving the idea that moral 
principle can legitimate the preference, yielding the conclusion 
that in situations of this kind it is at least all right (morally 
permissible) to save one’s wife…. But this construction provides 
the agent with one thought too many: it might have been hoped 
by some (for instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, 
fully spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife, not 
that it was his wife and that in situations of this kind it is 
permissible to save one’s wife. (Williams [1981], 18) 
 
I fear that Williams’ assertion “that his motivating thought, fully 
spelled out, would be the thought that it was his wife” may be somewhat 
misleading, and in any case some more spelling out—not of the thought, but 
of its significance—is in order. 
Williams seems to think that the train of thought leading up to action in 
this case does not ever get to the stage of moral vetting. The “one thought too 
many” consists in the thought: “is what I’m about to do morally permissible?” 
Within the mental universe of the husband, seeing that his wife is trapped in 
the burning building, his thought should simply be the imperative: “save my 
wife.” In fact, the question of “choosing” may never to come up. The train of 
thought is not this: 1) there are two women trapped in the burning building, 2) 
it is apparent that I can only successfully save one of them, 3) which one 
should I choose?, 4) Oh, I should save my wife. Even less likely would be 
included the “one thought too many”: 5) But am I morally justified in saving 
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my wife? It seems more likely the thought is more on the order of: Oh no, my 
wife is trapped inside; SAVE HER NOW! 
Now we have to be careful here. So far it might be conceded that this 
latter thought might best describe what a loving husband does think, but 
avoids the real question: is he justified in having this reaction; is he justified in 
not exposing his desire to save his wife to moral evaluation? In other words, 
does he not fail as a moral agent to the extent that he acts without first 
assuring himself of the moral permissibility of so acting? We are interested not 
only in the descriptive psychology of someone acting in this situation but also 
in the moral legitimacy of that action. 
To make this objection, however, is precisely to miss the point. The 
question at hand is whether this kind of moral introspection is always the 
proper standpoint to have with respect to one’s will. In the case at hand 
Williams seems to be suggesting that to subject the impulse to favor my wife 
to further moral evaluation—to have “one thought too many”—is precisely to 
fail to value my wife as I should value her.13 To value her properly is to 
recognize that she is so central to my projects—to my character—and her good 
is so inextricably intertwined with mine, that my acting against her good is, to 
a large degree, volitionally impossible.14 
                                                
13 The claim here is not that when it comes to acting on my duties of special concern all moral 
evaluation is to cease; it is much more complicated than that. The point is that there are certain 
objects the value of which I can only properly express in having my will directed towards 
favoring them under most circumstances. This obviously does not mean that should I should 
favor my wife irrespective of any other consideration. Should she go on a wild murder spree I 
should not shield her from moral evaluation; not only do I have a duty to try to stop her, but 
also by the same token a special responsibility to do so. 
14 When I say that doing ~X is “volitionally impossible” I mean more or less the converse of 
what Harry Frankfurt means when he says that the doing of X is “volitionally necessary.” 
These points, including an explicit discussion of Frankfurt, will be covered more completely 
in Part II, but the general idea is that an action is volitionally impossible if it utterly conflicts 
with my central self-defining commitments. 
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What is at stake here is the notion that “deep attachments to other 
persons,” as Williams goes on to say, “will express themselves in the world in 
ways which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view.” I want to 
suggest that they “express themselves” by directly conditioning the will of the 
agent. I will explore this in much greater depth in Part II, but at this point 
what we need to appreciate is that the human agency itself is founded at a 
very deep level on these kinds of attachments. Williams again, “unless such 
things [expressions of these deep attachments] exist, there will not be enough 
substance or conviction in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself. 
Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to 
the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant supreme 
importance to the impartial system, and that system’s hold on it will be, at the 
limit, insecure” (Ibid.). 
What I want to take from this is the notion that the value which informs 
these demands of special concern is somehow intrinsically caught up in the 
volitional structure of agents in special relationships. It should be clear that 
what is efficacious in determining this value is not, for instance, that I have a 
marriage license. In other words, I am taking for granted at the moment, as I 
think Williams is as well, that the fact that the man is married to some woman 
is equivalent to his being deeply attached to her. Of course it is possible to be 
married to someone whom you do not love, but in this case a variety of points 
are in play. There may be a sense in which one is morally deficient in thinking 
of one’s wife in that matter. In other words, one is failing to value something 
that is valuable. Additionally, however, if one’s relationship is like this, then 
there might be little in the way of special concern at all, in which case there 
would be little in the way of a demand of special concern. 
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With this notion of volitional value in hand, incomplete though it is, I 
want now to go back to our original question for consequentialism which 
launched our investigation of Goodin and Pettit. Recall that that question was: 
can the value of the object of my loyalty be captured in terms of a state of 
affairs? We should now be able to see that the answer to this question is “no.” 
The reason for this is simply that the value of the object of my loyalty in cases 
where the demands of special concern are conclusive is intrinsically bound up 
in my volitional structure—i.e., in my character. Furthermore, that value, the 
value intrinsic to my will, cannot be accounted for in terms of states of affairs; 
this value is not something that occurs in the world, but is bound up in the 
structure of my will itself.  
Naturally, Goodin and Pettit are not going to be concerned about this 
directly because I suspect that they would simply deny that there is some 
unique morally significant value that is intrinsically intra-volitional. My 
response is that the phenomenology of the cases we are interested in (e.g., the 
loyalty exhibited by the man in Williams’ example) cannot be properly 
understood except as cases of intra-volitional value. The problem for Goodin 
and Pettit is that they are wedded to a theory of value that is deeply 
inconsistent with our lived moral life. 
Accordingly, the kinds of duties that Goodin and Pettit generate are not, and 
cannot be, duties of loyalty at all. It is absolutely vital that we see that the 
“special duties” that Goodin and Pettit purport to generate according to their 
“responsibility criterion” are not properly demands of loyalty, because the 
values that underwrite those duties are not specific intra-volitional values, but 
universal values made incumbent upon a given individual or set of 
individuals through an efficiency criterion. The responsibility criterion is 
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merely a device that under “normal circumstances, information, resources and 
the actual conventions of familiar societies” will most efficiently ensure the 
achievement of a good whose value is in no way uniquely available to him 
whom the criterion identifies as the “salient one to assume control” (Goodin 
and Pettit [1986], 670). 
It is important to see that this failure is in no way peculiar to Goodin 
and Pettit. In fact their attempt is reasonably plausible as a way to derive a 
consequentialist duty that is superficially homologous to genuine demands of 
loyalty, but these consequentialist homologues cannot be genuine demands of 
loyalty precisely because they are not informed by a proper understanding of 
the value of the objects towards which genuine demands of loyalty are 
directed. The failure is not a lack of facility in their arguments but rather a 
misconstrual of the nature of the demands of special concern. This 
misconstrual is intrinsic to their consequentialist theory of value and its 
insistence that only states of affairs can have normative value. Instead, I think 
that the peculiar value of the objects of duties of loyalty lies significantly in the 
volitional structure of the agent and that this value cannot be properly 
accounted for in terms of a state of affairs. 
Now this objection is most powerful against an act-consequentialist 
theory, whereby what an agent ought to do in any case is constrained by what 
would best promote the state of affairs described by his principle of the good. 
It is possible that a rule-consequentialist might allow for an agent, in 
particular cases, to be motivated by non-consequentialist considerations like 
love and loyalty. A rule-consequentialist (or even a “sophisticated” 
consequentialist of the type I will discuss below in connection with Railton) 
need not examine each particular action under a consequentialist calculus. 
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Thus, it might be argued such forms of consequentialism are not vulnerable to 
these sorts of criticisms arising from a Williams-type example. 
However, I think this is wrong. Consider that a consequentialist must 
necessarily view these motivations only in terms of their utility—i.e., their 
tendency to promote some state of affairs. The consequentialist theory can 
never regard these considerations as themselves intrinsically valuable. They 
are only valuable insofar as, given the contingent conditions in which agents 
finds themselves, these motivations tend (for the most part and over the long 
run) to promote the desired state of affairs. If the relevant circumstances were 
to change in such a way that these motivations no longer had the effect of 
promoting that state of affairs, the consequentialist would be constrained to 
jettison them, as they have no independent value beyond their utility. 
If I am right in maintaining the existence of intra-volitional values, then 
those values represent goods independent of their tendency (as informing the 
motives of agents having those values) to promote any given state of affairs. 
Those values are a function of the structure of the will, not of considerations 
extrinsic to it, such as some external state of affairs. I want to stress that a 
consequentialist can only recognize the value of love and loyalty extrinsically 
in terms of the effects they have when agents are motivated by them and not 
as valuable in and of themselves. 
 
It would now be well to consider some issues raised above but not yet 
fully developed. My claim thus far has been the Goodin and Pettit’s 
fundamental mistake is in no way unique to them, but is intrinsic to 
consequentialism. It is important to note that the criticism is founded on the 
claim that consequentialism simply cannot properly account for the values 
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that underwrite genuine demands of special concern. The claim is not that 
consequentialism cannot recognize these values at all, but that it cannot do so 
in the manner necessary for them to underwrite conclusive demands for 
action. 
As I promised above, I want to look at Peter Railton’s discussion of 
some closely related points. His discussion concerns the phenomenon alluded 
to above, that the consequentialist good might objectively be best served by 
not promoting a subjective identification with consequentialism. He has 
observed that this is analogous to what Sidgwick called the “paradox of 
hedonism” (the observation that those who make pleasure their direct goal are 
often much less likely to achieve it).  
As I have already suggested, the key distinction that Railton makes is 
between subjective and objective consequentialism. It may often turn out that 
a consequentialist picture of the good can be objectively promoted most 
effectively by agents who themselves do not subjectively understand their 
actions as being underwritten by a consequentialist principle of the good. 
What is to be preferred, then, is a “sophisticated consequentialist” aware of 
this fact: “someone who has a standing commitment to leading an objectively 
consequentialist life, but who need not set special stock in any particular form 
of decision making and therefore does not necessarily seek to lead a 
subjectively consequentialist life…[one who] seems to believe he should act 
for the best but does not seem to feel it appropriate to bring a consequentialist 
calculus to bear on every act” (Railton [1984], 153). 
Railton wants to shield consequentialism from the charge that it 
inevitably alienates agents from their deep commitments (e.g., special 
relationships) by forcing them to view all their actions through a 
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consequentialist lens. He wants to suggest that requiring agents to see all their 
actions this way would have the effect of not maximizing the good objectively. 
According to Railton, the sophisticated consequentialist will take an “indirect” 
approach,15 and determine that, given the nature and psychology of human 
beings as they are (not merely as the consequentialist might like them to be), 
the objective good (the best state of affairs) can be best promoted by allowing 
individuals to focus on their own particular attachments. This makes possible 
an consequentialism that recognizes that certain “characters” and “cultivated 
dispositions” best conduce to the objective consequentialist good. These 
characters and dispositions can and should be developed in service of the 
ultimate consequentialist good. 
For example, what Railton seems to have in mind is that having a 
disposition to value one’s wife specially will be the kind of trait that goes into 
making a character of the type the prevalence of which among relevant agents 
maximizes the objective good (as embodied in a consequentialist principle of 
the good). Thus the good understood as objectively consequentialist is best 
promoted by individuals who subjectively value objects such as their close 
family and friends intrinsically and not only by reference to some larger, more 
abstract good.  
Is this enough to answer my complaint that consequentialism cannot 
adequately express the volitional nature of value? I do not think so, precisely 
because this draws a sharp (and I think false) distinction between moral value 
and the sorts of values that undergird the demands of love and loyalty. 
Railton allows agents to be motivated by love and loyalty only to the extent 
                                                
15 This indirect approach, however, is not the same as rule-consequentialism. 
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that those motivations have an overall utility for promoting some state of 
affairs. Such motivations are not intrinsically the expression of a good will. 
Under such a view there can be nothing intrinsically good about the 
will motivated by deep attachments. It is merely a contingent fact about 
human beings, that having such subjective motivations will best promote 
some putatively preferable state of affairs. For human beings differently 
situated (or for non-human agents, for example), such motivations might fail 
to conduce to the preferred state of affairs. In such a case Railton’s 
sophisticated consequentialist would have no compunction about abandoning 
those motivations. There is nothing intrinsically valuable about them. 
Railton’s two-levels approach seems necessarily to draw a sharp line 
between directly promoting the good and being moved to act by one’s 
particular deepest attachments. In particular, by demanding that value inheres 
only in states of affairs, advocates of this approach must deny that having a 
will of a certain shape has intrinsic value. Accordingly, the values represented 
by the demands of loyalty are necessarily foreign to this conception of value. 
On such a view, loves and loyalties can not be properly understood as 
valuable in themselves, but only instrumentally valuable for promoting some 
state of affairs independent of their occurrence. I think this ultimately does 
violence to some of our deepest intuitions that our loves are intrinsically 
valuable independent of their overall consequences. 
 
Scheffler 
 
At this point I wish to turn to another theorist who is making a similar 
move in the service of saving a broadly consequentialist principle of the good, 
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at least to the extent that it is understood as embodying what is “to be 
promoted.” Samuel Scheffler, in The Rejection of Consequentialism, attempts to 
give some weight to a kind of first-personal valuing, while nonetheless 
retaining the legitimacy of acting to bring about the best outcome in any case. 
Carefully examining this attempt will help us further clarify the central 
issue—viz., the nature of the values informing the demands of special concern. 
In The Rejection of Consequentialism Scheffler examines two main 
objections to consequentialism. The first objection, raised by Bernard Williams, 
Scheffler calls the objection from “personal integrity.” The second, perhaps as 
old as consequentialism itself and strongly reiterated by Rawls, Scheffler calls 
the objection from “distributive justice.” Although it is certainly of general 
interest, the second objection and his response will not greatly concern us 
here. My focus will be almost entirely on the objection from personal integrity 
and Scheffler’s attempt to meet it, for its applicability to the examination of 
duties of special concern is readily apparent. 
Let us begin by examining the nature of Williams’ objection, which we 
will find is of a piece with the complaint about alienation that Railton 
considers, and then consider Scheffler’s response to it. Williams’ objection 
arises because the classical consequentialist principle of the right requires 
agents to act in such a way as to secure the optimal state of affairs as described 
by some principle of the good. What this means at the most fundamental level 
is that agents are responsible for bringing about a state of affairs, and not 
merely, for example, for the orientation of their own wills. Since I am required 
to bring about a state of affairs it is easily conceivable that situations may (and 
in fact almost certainly will) arise in which I am forced to give up my own 
particular plans and projects because circumstances are such that by so doing I 
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am better able to bring about the preferred state of affairs according to the 
operative principle of the good. 
Scheffler quotes Williams from Utilitarianism For and Against: “how 
can a man, as a utilitarian agent, come to regard as one satisfaction among 
others, and a dispensable one, a project or attitude round which he has built 
his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the causal 
scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?” This would be “to 
alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his action in his 
own convictions” (Smart and Williams [1973], 116). The basic idea here is that 
since, according to utilitarianism (though this would presumably apply to any 
non-egoist consequentialism), the agent is responsible for promoting a state of 
affairs, circumstances will often require him to give up the projects that are 
central to his life (at least in his own self-construal) and force him to act in 
ways he would not otherwise choose, simply because the world is set up in 
such a way that doing this will better conduce to the optimal state of affairs. 
Thus the objection is that utilitarianism robs the agent of personal 
integrity by requiring him always to be ready to sacrifice his own personal 
projects and plans at any time when doing something else would better 
conduce to the optimal state of affairs. It doesn’t matter how important his 
projects are to him if giving them up will produce the better state of affairs. In 
other words, his ownership of his own life is threatened, forcing him always 
to respond to outside circumstances by taking a third-personal view of the 
situation and according his own projects no more consideration than anybody 
else’s. Because at any time he can be required to drop whatever he is doing, no 
matter how important to him, to do something else that better promotes the 
desired state of affairs, he cannot pursue a life of his own—he cannot make 
 93 
 
and execute the kind of long-term, life-shaping plans that make a life unique 
and worthwhile. 
Scheffler considers this objection to be telling against classical 
consequentialism. He recognizes the importance of what he calls “the 
independence and distinctness of the personal point of view” and that 
classical consequentialism threatens it. Therefore, he proposes what he calls a 
“hybrid” consequentialist theory which incorporates an “agent-centered 
prerogative,” but which nonetheless does not go so far as to demand the kind 
of “agent-centered restrictions” that mark deontological theories. 
As a lengthy discussion of Scheffler’s analysis of deontological theories 
will not be profitable here, let me merely note that Scheffler believes agent-
centered restrictions—“restrictions on action which have the effect of denying 
that there is any non-agent-relative principle for ranking overall states of 
affairs from best to worst such that it is always permissible to produce the best 
available state of affairs so characterized” (Scheffler [1982], 2)—are not 
warranted by the independence of the personal point of view. On the other 
hand, the personal point of view can and does, on Scheffler’s analysis, 
underwrite “agent-centered prerogatives” the inclusion of which makes his 
hybrid theory unique. 
Scheffler believes that agent-centered restrictions (e.g., it is always 
wrong to kill an innocent person, even to save the lives of a greater number of 
other innocent people) are irrational. I do not want to rehearse his argument, 
but merely note this fact by way of explanation for why he favors agent-
centered prerogatives instead. In essence, Scheffler wants to leave open the 
possibility that agents always may, but are not required to, act in such a way 
as to bring about the best state of affairs as characterized by some principle of 
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the good. This is distinguished from classical consequentialism which requires 
agents always so to act. Furthermore, this is distinguished from deontological 
theories incorporating agent-centered restrictions, which will hold that that 
there are some occasions when an agent is required not to act to maximize the 
consequentialist good (e.g., as when bringing about that state of affairs would 
involve an assault against an innocent person). 
Thus, Scheffler thinks that a tenable moral theory must allow for the 
possibility of acting to bring about the best state of affairs as described by a 
given principle of the good in all cases, and yet not require the agent to do so. 
In certain circumstances the agent could choose not to act to bring about the 
best state of affairs in order to pursue his own plans and projects. This shields 
the hybrid theory from Williams’ objection from personal integrity. 
Nevertheless, the agent could choose to do precisely what classical 
consequentialism requires, either because that just is his central personal 
commitment, or because he is willing, in this case, to give up his own personal 
projects for the greater good (a kind of consequentialist martyrdom). In any 
case, however, the optimal state of affairs is in principle knowable—there is 
always a non-agent-centered perspective from which it is possible to evaulate 
potential outcomes vis-à-vis some given principle of the good.  
What makes the hybrid theory unique is Scheffler’s inclusion of the 
“agent-centered prerogative.”16 As Scheffler understands it, the agent-centered 
prerogative should meet two requirements: 
 
                                                
16 His complete theory also address the second objection mentioned above by being 
“distribution sensitive,” but this fact is less important for our purposes here and so will not be 
discussed in what follows.  
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First, such a prerogative should not merely permit an agent to 
devote energy and attention to his projects out of proportion to 
the weight from an impersonal standpoint of his doing so, but 
rather it should do this in such a way as to permit the coherent 
integration of the agent’s values and actions within the structure 
of a unified personality. But second, an acceptable agent-
centered prerogative should place appropriate restrictions on the 
values and actions whose coherent integration and development 
it will protect (19). 
 
Thus the agent-centered prerogative is sensitive to the first-person 
standpoint, by limiting the agent’s responsibility to bring about the best state 
of affairs as viewed from an impersonal standpoint. Accordingly, agents are 
allowed “to devote energy to their projects out of proportion to the weight sub 
specie aeternitatis of their doing so” (22). 
This agent-centered prerogative is important because it actually serves 
to specify, though still to an insufficient degree, the extent to which Railton’s 
“non-moral” values can come into play in determining right action. The 
prerogative, were it fully spelled out, might give a principled distinction 
between those personal values which are shielded from being over-ruled by 
consequentialist ones and those that must be surrendered.  
By allowing the agent to choose, “within certain limits,” to ignore the 
demands of the principle of the good by favoring his own projects out of 
proportion to the weight they would otherwise receive, the hybrid theory 
allows the agent to preserve his own integrity by sometimes refusing to act so 
as to produce the optimal outcome according to his principle of the good. 
Now obviously, the proviso within certain limits is of central importance. 
Unfortunately, Scheffler’s discussion of this key point is incomplete at best. 
The problem is readily apparent when we consider what limits might 
be set on the prerogative. It would not be enough to shield all and only those 
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projects which the agent construes as central to his self-conception. This 
would not be narrow enough because the agent who has a particularly 
egoistic self-conception might claim an agent-centered prerogative to more or 
less ignore all outside moral demands simply by making such egoism central 
to his own life’s project, and thus making a violation of it a violation of his 
personal integrity.17  
Furthermore, to the extent that only those projects taken by the agent 
himself to be important are shielded, the theory would fail to recognize as 
valuable any value that a particular agent failed to embrace. The fact that 
some given agent does not properly value something (e.g., a man who abuses 
his wife) certainly cannot be taken to mean that the value in question is not 
intrinsically valuable. 
Thus it seems as if the limits cannot be self-set, nor merely responsive 
to particular self-conceptions. Rather, it seems as if the legitimate limits to the 
prerogative could only be set by some reference to what projects are valuable 
ones to have, limiting protection to those projects, and excluding others that 
are too egoistic, narcissistic, or selfish. 
At this point we can begin to see the problem with Scheffler’s hybrid 
view. In order to meet the objection from personal integrity the hybrid view 
incorporates the agent-centered prerogative including a proportionality 
principle which allows the agent to give more weight to his own (legitimate) 
projects than he would be able to under classical consequentialism. However, 
this proportionality principle itself is under-described in Scheffler’s 
discussion, and, as I will now try to show, this is no accident. 
                                                
17 In such a case the violation of his personal integrity would not only be non-objectionable 
from the moral standpoint, but would be in some sense required. 
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The problem, in a nutshell, is that the proportionality principle must 
itself constitute an independent principle of the good that is hostile to the 
conventional consequentialist principles of the good. Thus, I claim that any 
attempt to incorporate a agent-centered prerogative of the type Scheffler 
describes into a broadly consequentialist theory is bound to fail, because the 
differential responsibility level the prerogative is designed to secure is 
intrinsically incompatible with consequentialism. 
Let us now try to see why this is so. The essence of any species of 
consequentialism is the particular principle of the good that underlies it. 
Indeed, Scheffler’s own commitment to a broadly consequentialist theory of 
the good seems to reside precisely in the intuition that there must be some 
best state of affairs, and accordingly that we are duty-bound to bring it about 
so far as we are able. Thus a particular advantage of consequentialism is that it 
envisions the good universally—the good will not be unique to any given 
individual or group of individuals, but will consist on one, agreed upon, 
objective state of affairs in the world.18 This is, of course, what was motivating 
Goodin and Pettit to assert the universal desirability of genuine goods. 
Now if Scheffler’s agent-centered prerogative were integrated into a 
consequentialist principle of the good, the resulting hybrid consequentialist 
theory would  lose a univocal, objective conception of the best state of affairs, 
its main advantage. Consider two agents, A and B, who are in morally 
identical choice situations and faced with the choice to ! or not to !. Let us 
                                                
18 This only holds in principle, of course. This would be the case under conditions of perfect 
knowledge of both the world as it is, and the results of any actions within it (much like Adam 
Smith’s perfect market depends on perfect knowledge and zero transaction costs). In the real 
world in which neither of the conditions obtains, consequentialism must operate on best 
guesses about both how the world is and the likely consequences of any particular actions. 
Thus, in principle consequentialism is beholden to the social sciences—and this by itself must 
constitute a huge objection to it as a moral theory, but that is an argument for another day. 
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specify that a classical consequentialism, according to the principle of the 
good they both share, dictates that an agent in A’s (and B’s) situation is 
required not to !. Now it is the case that A has a set of central commitments 
and convictions such that he is greatly invested in !-ing, and such that not !-
ing would alienate him from those projects. However, B, while he might 
prefer to ! as it would result in some minor pleasure to him, is not invested in 
it to the degree that A is; so while he would be a bit put out by missing the 
opportunity to !, B would nevertheless not experience anything like the 
assault on personal integrity that A would experience in giving up !-ing. In 
this case, it would seem as if A should exercise his agent-centered prerogative 
to ! anyway, while B should not. Thus, despite being in morally identical 
situations, the optimal state of affairs for A and B would be different. Thus, 
the univocal nature of the consequentialist theory is broken.19 
The point is not merely that differing preference schedules might 
change the consequentialist calculus for different agents; any act-
consequentialist theory would take those kinds of circumstances into account. 
Rather the point is that Scheffler’s theory breaks with the classically 
consequentialist commitment to the universality of the good, as the grounds 
for duty. Goodin and Pettit were clear about this when they sought to defend 
the universal desirability of the object of any duty (recall that they argued that 
for any action to be a duty, the good at which it aims must be universally 
desirable, even if responsibility for bringing it about is not universal).  
                                                
19 If it is not obvious, another restriction applies—viz. that the choice of whether to ! lie within 
the aforementioned, vague “certain limits.” Thus !-ing probably is going to be something like 
supporting the local opera company instead of sending the funds for famine relief, where A is 
a true devotee of opera and B mildly gets a charge from the end of Act I of Turandot. 
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Now I take this to be a telling objection to Scheffler’s hybrid theory 
precisely because in attempting to save a broadly consequentialist theory of 
the good, he is pre-supposing that there will always be a unique best state of 
affairs (as described by some given principle of the good). In the situation 
described, however, we now have two different “best” states of affairs, 
dependent only on the pre-existing commitment of one of the agents to his 
particular projects. At this point, then, we have to wonder if the hybrid theory 
really is a kind of consequentialism at all. 
This point can be expanded when we consider what it means for there 
to be multiple “best” states of affairs. If the hybrid theory is consequentialist 
then Scheffler is committed to arguing that there is a best-state-of-affairs-for-A 
and a best-state-of-affairs-for-B. Since consequentialist theories are 
individuated by their principles of the good, and each principle of the good 
describes a unique best state of affairs, the fact that we are presented with two 
different “best states of affairs,” seems to imply that A and B have different 
principles of the good (because a consequentialist principle of the good simply 
describes his preferred state of affairs). In other words, the very fact of the 
existence of divergent “best” states of affairs for A and B, despite being, by 
postulation, in morally identical choice situations, implies that they must be 
operating with different principles of the good. 
For different agents to desire to promote different putatively optimal 
states of affairs is for those different agents to no longer share in the universal 
desirability of their individual goods. As such, the different agents simply 
have separate, mutually incompatible principles of the good. Accordingly, 
they cannot motivate conclusive reasons against each other for claiming that 
certain particular actions are required by duty, simpliciter. They are simply no
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longer operating within the same constraints and neither can offer sufficient 
independent reasons to conclusively compel the other to accept his preferred 
state of affairs. Accordingly, it does not seem as if either can conclusively 
persuade the other that he has a duty to perform some action that is necessary 
to promote the first’s desired state of affairs, because for a consequentialist, 
duty is grounded on universal desirability. 
If they end up operating with different principles of the good, yet they 
both initially subscribed to the same principle of the good (by stipulation), this 
implies that whatever difference there is between the two agents itself has 
moral content and so constitutes a kind of principle of the good in its own 
right (since it serves to modify their initially shared principle of the good). As 
we know that the difference was produced by the proportionality principle 
that allows A to place more weight on !-ing than B, I take this to mean that 
this proportionality principle must then incorporate moral content, 
independent of the moral content contained in the original principle of the 
good. This is simply a complicated way of saying that the proportionality 
principle is itself a kind of principle of the good, whose distinctive moral 
content is just that making moral choices in accordance with one’s own 
commitments and projects is morally valuable. 
Well now we have two separate principles of the good, and indeed we 
will come to have as many as there are different individuals with different 
worthwhile projects protected by the agent-centered prerogative. Ultimately, 
then, the hybrid view begins to loose whatever advantages it originally had in 
claiming to be a kind of consequentialist theory at all. Furthermore, this still 
leaves completely unexplored the additional difficulty of specifying what 
projects will count a morally worthwhile. 
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Maximizing Good-willing as a State of Affairs? 
 
I want now to clarify some of my claims regarding the fundamental 
incompatibility of consequentialism with the sort of volitionally constitutive 
valuing that is at the heart of my claims for loyalty. In particular, I want to be 
clear about why consequentialism simply cannot subsume my concerns in a 
more expansive understanding of in what the good state of affairs consists. It 
is important for my argument to see that the volitional values at the heart of 
loyalty are deeply incommensurate with the metaethics of value that 
underpins the consequentialist position. 
A reasonably natural objection to my position, and one which I think 
both Railton and Scheffler would probably be inclined to make, is simply: why 
could consequentialism not subsume any sorts of volitional values within a 
principle of the good, simply by describing the desired state of affairs as being 
partially constituted by good-willing? In other words, why cannot the 
desirable state of affairs simply be that state in which good-willing occurs (or, 
even, is maximized)? Would not such a principle of the good obviate my 
concerns by making room for good-willing, and yet still preserve the essential 
metaethical conception of value intrinsic to consequentialism? 
To answer this requires us to think about how the value of the good-
willing is to be understood. In a case like the one proposed, why exactly is any 
instantiation of good-willing (whatever it may be) good? For simplicity’s sake 
let us keep to our staple example of the man loving his wife, and ask, 
 102 
 
assuming that it is good,20 what makes an action expressing a man’s love for 
his wife good? Within consequentialist metaethics there can be only one 
answer: such an action is good just insofar as it promotes the desired state of 
affairs. The point holds generally, within a consequentialist metaethics, for 
any given consequentialist theory, the moral goodness of all goods is 
derivative from the state of affairs prescribed by that theory’s principle of the 
good. 
This means simply that no instance of good-willing can be intrinsically 
good in-and-of-itself. Rather its goodness is entirely derivative. It my be 
objected, however, that this ignores the fact that we specified that the state of 
affairs to be promoted was in fact partially constituted by the occurrence of 
good-willing. Therefore, while its goodness is derivative, it is derivative from 
that which it itself partially constitutes and to that degree is valued 
intrinsically. In other words, while it may not be valued intrinsically in-and-
of-itself, it is still intrinsically valuable in that occurrences of it contribute to 
the state of affairs from which all goods derive their value. 
It is very important at this point to see that what is counted as good is 
the occurrence of an instance of valuing. This is simply because the 
components of a state of affairs can only be occurrences, events in the world. 
As such, we need to be clear that the putatively good state of affairs in our 
sample consequentialism is constituted not by good-willing itself, but by 
occurrences of good-willing. I suspect many consequentialists would be apt to 
reply that this is a distinction without a difference, but I think short 
consideration will prove otherwise. 
                                                
20 For the purposes of our discussion I am taking it for granted that it is a case of good-willing 
to love one’s wife; however, as will become apparent nothing turns on this. The reader may 
substitute whatever example of willing as is pleasing. 
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The difference between good-willing and the occurrence of good-
willing is the difference between doing an action and the effects of that action 
(i.e., its consequences). The distinction essentially involves the difference 
between a first-personal and third-personal conception of value. The value 
expressed in the good-willing is intrinsically bound up in the act of willing, 
not with the consequences of that act. Thus, a volitional value understood 
third-personally is divorced from the agency of the agent. 
Perhaps this will be clearer if we consider how a non-consequentialist 
metaethics might construe the goodness of an instance of good-willing. On 
one such account, what makes my good-willing good has to do intrinsically 
with the orientation and constitution of my will and nothing to do with the 
consequences it has. The value of the good-willing is internal to it as a willing, 
as expression of a particular orientation of the will, and does not derive its 
value from the state of affairs that eventuates from that act.  
There are two clear, but very different examples of this sort of volitional 
value. On a Kantian understanding, what makes a will good is that it be 
determined only by a respect for the Moral Law, which means that is 
determined only according to a rational law which it gives to itself (and all 
other rational creatures in the Kingdom of Ends).21 What makes a good-willing 
good for Kant is that the will have the proper shape, namely that it be 
internally constituted by and through a kind of rational respect, the form of 
which his entire moral philosophy is dedicated to describing. What I want to 
take from this, at the moment, is merely the idea that the goodness of a good-
                                                
21 I will be discussing Kant’s views at length in the next chapter, so I will not delve into detail 
here. I only wish to draw a contrast with the consequentialist metaethics of value, so the 
details are not vital to seeing the point. 
 104 
 
will does not derive from the consequences of its actions in any respect, but is 
a formal property of that will. 
The second example is similar in that the goodness of a good-willing is 
prescribed by a formal property of the will. This is the classical Christian 
(though not exclusively Christian) notion that a will is good only insofar as it 
reflects (is in concord with) the will of God. Again, at this point I am not 
interested in whether this is true or not. What I want us to see is merely that 
the goodness of a good will on such a view is a formal property of the will, a 
property of its shape or constitution. The effects and consequences of the act of 
will do not determine its goodness.22 
There is deep disagreement here about the metaethics of value. At some 
point the disagreement will reach bedrock intuitions about what the good 
consists in. What I hope to argue here is that consequentialism simply cannot 
contain the intuition that what makes a good will good is a formal property of 
that will, of its shape or constitution. The reason for this is that the only value 
consequentialism of any sort can embrace lies in the occurrence or non-
occurrence of some effect, not in the willing itself. 
This may become clearer if we look again at Railton’s “sophisticated 
consequentialist.” Recall, a sophisticated consequentialist is objectively 
committed to promoting some consequentialist principle of the good while 
nonetheless allowing that he need not subject his every act to a 
consequentialist calculus. Thus, such an agent might be committed to certain 
values (such as loving one’s wife intrinsically) that in any given case do not 
                                                
22 This is not to fall into the trap of saying such consequences are irrelevant. Surely the 
consequences of an action are important in understanding the relationship of the agency to 
the world, and as such can certainly inform the deliberations, etc. that often go into an agent’s 
determination of his will. However, the point remains that the goodness or badness of the 
willing itself is not derived from the state of affairs that eventuates from it.  
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maximally promote his desired state of affairs. The reason for this is that, in 
the long run, the desired state of affairs overall is best promoted by allowing 
agents this lee-way. In other words, it just turns out to be the case that 
allowing agents to shield certain decisions from the consequentialist calculus 
will best conduce, on the whole, for all of society, to the desired state of affairs. 
I think it is important that we recognize that these volitional properties 
are only valued contingently here. It just turns out that allowing agents this 
subjective non-consequentialism conduces overall to the best outcome, but 
there is nothing about the act of will itself that is valuable on such a view. If 
for whatever reason it turned out to be the case that having a will organized in 
this way did not conduce to the best outcome overall, then it could (indeed 
should) be abandoned without remorse, for nothing intrinsic would be lost. 
For example, suppose it turns out to be the case that in our present 
circumstances the state of affairs of having children be educated is best 
effected by their being raised in traditional families with both parents. If this is 
the state of affairs we wish to promote, then agents would be allowed, under 
Railton’s theory, to have attitudes characterizing such traditional families 
because overall this would best conduce to the desired state of affairs. 
However, suppose that the material conditions change such that, because of 
increased wealth or technology, etc., it came to pass that the state of affairs 
desired could best be achieved through compulsory boarding schools which 
separated children and parents from an early age. In that case, nothing 
internal to the theory would hinder this sort of social reorganization. 
Nothing turns on the truth or falsity of these claims about what would 
best conduce to the desired state of affairs. Rather, the point is that by 
conceiving of value entirely in the occurrences of events, the particular first-
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personal value of an act of volition cannot be adequately comprehended. 
Because the act of will itself is not a source of value in this metaethics, when 
contingent circumstances change the likely outcomes and effects of certain 
sorts of volitions, then the value of those volitions itself is changed and even 
perhaps destroyed. 
 
I fear the relationship of these points may be getting a little bit obscure 
at this point. The objections I have leveled so far have got nothing in particular 
to do with loyalties, and can be shared by any sort of deontological moral 
theories, be they Kantian or Thomist, or of some other sort altogether. For the 
point so far is merely that the moral value of willing itself cannot be 
adequately captured by the consequentialist metaethics of value. 
As will become more apparent in the next chapter on Kant and in Part 
II, I believe that loyalties essentially embrace a volitional metaethics of value. 
In other words, I argue that the value of loyalty consists in having a certain 
sort or shape of will—a volitional orientation of a certain kind. The defect of 
consequentialism lies precisely in the fact that it cannot see this value for what 
it is, but must “translate” it into terms of occurrences which conduce to certain 
states of affairs. It is only the states of affairs that have value, and the value of 
any particular volitions lies only in their effects. 
Describing a state of affairs as constituted by good-willing does not get 
out of this problem, because the constituents of states of affairs are 
occurrences—the effects of willing in the world. It is not the act of will itself 
that is valuable, but merely its occurrence and the effects that follow from it. 
The good is thus never seen from “inside” the agent, but only from 
“outside”—from the way the world is or is not. 
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In later chapters I will have more to say about these topics, but for 
present purposes I want it to be clear what I am claiming for loyalty. I have 
not yet even tried to make a positive argument for the legitimacy of loyalties. 
Rather I have concentrated on trying to show the deep incompatibility of the 
consequentialist metaethics of value with the sort of volitional value which is 
at the heart of the proper understanding of loyalty. Thus, as of yet, nothing I 
have said here should be construed as my full argument for legitimate 
loyalties, only an argument against the possibility of consequentialism as a 
complete theory of normative ethics. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Neither Railton or Scheffler tackles commonsense morality head on, 
which not only asserts that in Williams’ case I am “justified” in saving my 
wife, but that to fail to save, or even for that matter, even to delay to consider 
whether I am justified in saving her, is to act wrongly. The proper valuing of a 
wife by her husband that ought to motivate action in this case simply cannot 
be reconciled with a theory that dictates that all possible moral values must be 
embodied within a state of affairs. 
Scheffler makes a game attempt through his agent-centered prerogative 
to offer a principled way to create a protected zone within which agents’ life-
constituting personal projects are shielded from the demands of impersonal 
morality, but even if that prerogative could be fully spelled out, it could do 
nothing more than beg important questions. The prerogative would have to 
adjudicate between conflicting demands, both the demands generated by 
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impersonal morality and the demands generated by the agent’s own central 
life commitments.  
In order to do this, however, the prerogative would seem to require 
some kind of principle that identifies which of the agent’s life commitments 
are legitimately to be protected in which cases. It seems strange to think that a 
non-moral principle could allow us to make such determinations. However, if 
it is a moral principle, then how is that to be reconciled with the over-arching 
broadly consequentialist principle of the good that is supposed to underwrite 
the demands of impersonal morality? In other words, if the consequentialist 
principle of the good does not have universal scope, then it is unclear how it 
can actually be a principle of the good. 
To modify the principle of the right in the way Scheffler tries to do with 
his agent-centered prerogative inevitably introduces moral content into the 
practice of practical reason that is independent of the consequentialist 
principle of the good—viz. that it is valuable to express my own central 
commitments. But why is this valuable? This cannot be expressed adequately 
in terms of states of affairs, because the value in question is one of my 
orientation with respect to my own will; that it be truly mine. 
It is these volitional values that no consequentialist theory, 
“sophisticated” or “hybrid,” Railton or Scheffler, can adequately comprehend, 
precisely because the values are simply alien to states of affairs, or the “to be 
promoted.” I cannot “promote” a volitional value by any other means than by 
willing it. And though having such a conditioned will naturally entails that I 
am more likely to do some actions than others, the value of those actions does 
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not consist entirely in their occurrence, but lies partially in the fact that I did 
them, that they are the external manifestations of my immanent will.23 
Accordingly, to the extent that the demands of special concern are 
intrinsically and inescapably connected with values expressed volitionally, 
consequentialism is inadequate as a theory of value concerning them. Of 
course, it remains true that this is the case only insofar as these values of 
special concern are real values, and for the theorist inclined to dismiss them 
altogether, this argument will fail to be compelling. Although defense of these 
values as real values must await Part II, I think we can see already that merely 
dismissing them is inadequate; rather, the theorist must try to explain away 
their appeal. However, I have tried to show in this chapter why such attempts 
are themselves uncompelling, both internally, and as descriptions of the 
relevant common sense moral phenomena. 
                                                
23 One thinks here of Hegel’s thought that the will is “externalized” through shaping the 
world to its demands. The value of this, for Hegel, clearly lies not only in that the world is 
better ordered, but that the will (or self) in question develops and indeed is brought into being 
through this process. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
Kant and “Kantian” Approaches 
 
 
In the last chapter I explored the resources available to adherents of 
broadly consequentialist moral theories to account for the demands of love 
and loyalty. My intention there was to show that they fail to adequately 
capture the volitional value of the proper objects of love and loyalty because 
of the inherent limitations of the consequentialist understanding of value. In 
this chapter I will turn my attention to the prospects for broadly “Kantian” 
approaches, the result of which will have a similarly negative conclusion.  
I use the scare quotes around ‘Kantian’ advisedly; while I will consider 
Kant’s view directly, I also want to cast my net wider to consider views that 
have been called, justifiably or not, “Kantian.” Thus, I am interested not only 
in applying Kant’s own thinking to the problem, but also in considering 
“contractualist” views of morality that, while not Kant’s, nonetheless grow out 
a certain liberal tradition one of whose central foundations is Kant. As with 
the consequentialist views we considered in the last chapter, I believe it will 
turn out that all these Kantian views will be inadequate (though one may be 
superior to the other), but in an interestingly different way. 
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Kant 
 
Let us begin with Kant’s actual view, and once that is in place it will be 
easier to appreciate the moves that characterize some of the “Kantian” 
alternatives. I want first to discover how the demands of love and loyalty 
would come out in Kant’s moral theory as expressed most directly in the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. To do this we will have to have lay 
some groundwork of our own. 
It is difficult to speak of “Kant’s view of morality,” for there are many 
live exegetical disagreements. There is a line of Kant scholarship that holds 
that Kant’s thinking on the metaphysical grounds of morality changed 
significantly between the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. On 
this view it is thought that Kant himself came to realize the hopelessness (or at 
least superfluity) of the project of the Third Part of the Groundwork, in which 
he tries to derive the Categorical Imperative from pure practical reason alone 
(as “an a priori synthetic practical proposition”) in a manner analogous to his 
derivation of the categories of the understanding in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Recognizing this, so this interpretation goes, Kant pulls back and instead 
concentrates on the truly practical (i.e., directly action-guiding) aspect of his 
Categorical Imperative, without worrying overmuch about its supposed 
grounding in the nature of reason itself.1 
                                                
1 This kind of reading of Kant (with many variations, of course) has been especially 
popularized by Rawls and those following his lead. Consider this random example: on 
reading Rawls’ “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” (Förster [1989], 81-113) one might 
almost be led to wonder whether Rawls’s copy of the Groundwork was missing Part III, as he 
makes no mention of it or the important themes therein. One might also wonder how far some 
of these interpretations (e.g., Christine Korsgaard’s work) seek to “help” Kant out by saving 
him from himself, so to speak. In other words, many readers of Kant have been more 
impressed by (e.g., the universality of) the Categorical Imperative than its putative derivation 
from pure practical reason itself, and so have been inclined to stress the former and de-
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An alternative view, which seems to me the more accurate as a reading 
of Kant, is that there is a fundamental consistency between the methodology 
of the critique of pure practical reason in Groundwork III and Kant’s later 
works of moral philosophy. Further, any apparent inconsistencies arise not so 
much because Kant’s thinking about the metaphysical foundations of morality 
changed, but merely because the focus of his discussions is different. On this 
view, it is not so much that Kant changed his mind, or gave up on the earlier 
project, but that he turned his attention to more practical matters in ethics, 
thinking he had already secured the metaphysical foundations in the 
Groundwork.2 
Not being a Kant scholar I do not want to wade directly into the middle 
of this debate. However, I do think that it is impossible to come to a complete 
view of the majesty of Kant’s moral project without taking Groundwork III 
seriously. For even if that project is ultimately a failure, it nonetheless 
represents the most sophisticated sustained attempt to derive the ultimate 
principle of (practical)3 rationality—the Categorical Imperative—from the 
nature of reason itself. Further, any view that fails to come to grips with Part 
III simply cannot be fully accurate to either the spirit or the letter of the 
Kantian project.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
emphasize, if not downright disown, the latter. Personally, I have serious reservations about 
such moves, which I think not only inaccurate to Kant’s fundamental project, but also much 
less interesting. Such interpreters gain some additional prima facie plausibility, but at the 
expense of depriving the Kantian view of not only its most distinctive elements, but also its 
only real hope (in my view) of being correct. The fact that (again in my view) the full Kantian 
project ultimately fails suggest that these modified “Kantians” have even less hope for 
success. 
2 The leading defender of something like this view is probably Onora O’Neill, Constructions of 
Reason, especially Chapter 3, “Reason and Autonomy in Groundwork III” (O’Neill [1989]). 
3 O’Neill would go so far as to say, “that the Categorical Imperative is the supreme principle 
of human reason” (O’Neill [1989], 52), tout court, as it were. 
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Let us begin with a brief outline of Kant’s project. Fundamentally, 
Kant’s moral theory is an attempt to articulate how the requirements of the 
intelligibility of moral action condition which of such actions are morally 
permissible. Kant asserts that an inescapable requirement of practical 
rationality is the ability to give reasons for one’s actions. This means that for 
my activity to be motivated—to exist within the sphere of moral reasons—I 
must be able to give maxims describing my actions in terms of means-ends 
reasoning. Thus, two questions can arise: 1) are my chosen means a rational 
way to obtain my given end, and 2) is my end itself a good end? These two 
questions correspond roughly to the two types of imperatives “hypothetical” 
and “categorical.” 
Hypothetical imperatives are conditional imperatives. They command 
certain actions as the necessary means for the achievement of a given end. A 
hypothetical imperative is in some sense neutral as to ends; it commands what 
it commands in virtue of a given end, whatever it may happen to be. The 
Categorical Imperative on the other hand commands what it commands as an 
end in itself. The Categorical Imperative is thus not conditional upon any 
further end. 
Kant sees the space of moral reasons as informed by “maxims.” It is by 
placing our actions in terms of maxims that describe our means-ends 
reasoning that we make those actions morally intelligible. This is because the 
maxims are law-like in form, specifying the relation between agents as free 
causes, and their actions as effects. In a footnote at 401, he defines that a 
“maxim is the subjective principle of volition; the objective principle (i.e., that 
which would also serve subjectively as the practical principle for all rational 
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beings if reason had complete control over the faculty of desire) is the practical 
law.” 
What is behind this is a need to find law-like relations in human moral 
activity. In other words, Kant thinks that a necessary requirement for the 
intelligibility of the moral realm is that it be governed by laws in just the same 
way that the intelligibility of the physical realm requires that it be governed 
by the laws of nature. He thinks that we are able to understand the physical 
world—that is, to ascribe regularity and predictability to it—precisely because 
it is not random, but governed by exceptionless laws. It is by discovering 
those laws that we are able to gain knowledge about the physical world.4 
In just the same way, Kant thinks that the intelligibility of the moral 
universe depends on its being governed by laws. Accordingly, from the 
subjective point of view, making sense of our own actions in choosing them, 
we must understand those actions in terms of law-like relations. Just as it is a 
requirement of our knowledge of the physical world that we have knowledge 
of the laws that govern that world, so it is a requirement of our knowledge of 
the moral world that we seek out both subjective and objective understanding 
of moral activity within the context of law-like relations. Our understanding of 
morality as motivated agency is therefore defined by the agents’ articulation 
of maxims, just as our understanding of the universe is defined by physical 
laws. Therefore, to understand the moral significance of any action we must 
know both the means that the agent chooses to advance his ends and the 
nature of those ends themselves. 
                                                
4 It is perhaps worth noting that our conception of the laws of nature (including certain 
probabilistic effects of quantum level phenomena) is rather different than Kant’s Newtonian 
presuppositions. Nonetheless, the nature of his thinking should be clear enough.  
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Subjectively, i.e., when we are in the process of deliberating about what 
we are to do, we must articulate our practical reasoning in the form of a law 
by formulating a maxim to describe both our desired ends and our plan for 
achieving those ends. However, Kant thinks a problem arises so long as we 
concentrate only on the means side of our practical reasoning, taking our ends 
as given (by desire, for example). In doing this we are merely formulating 
hypothetical imperatives, conditionals that describe the means to achieve 
some given end, but which do not prescribe the end itself. Thus, in 
hypothetical imperatives reason is used merely instrumentally, in the service 
of ends which it does not evaluate.  
To the extent that those ends are set by the agent merely in response to 
his desires, according to Kant, the agent acts heteronomously with respect to his 
will. Such desires are not the product of his rational deliberation on what ends 
are most appropriate, but brute facts of his psychology, possessing no 
independent moral worth. Kant thinks that so long as we make sense of our 
practical reasoning through hypothetical imperatives alone we are unable to 
achieve a fully rational ground for our practical deliberations. The kind of 
unchosen desires which inform such hypothetical imperatives as ends are 
without independent moral status simply because they are not the product of 
any kind of rational deliberation. They come upon the agent continually and 
none able to justify itself beyond the brutal fact of a want.  
As I have already noted, hypothetical imperatives are conditionals; they 
have the form: (in conditions C) in order to achieve end(s) !, I will do action(s) 
". They do not however answer the question: but why do I want !? So long as 
you cannot give a rationally self-sufficient justification for your end, Kant 
thinks your practical reasoning will be caught in a regress. Hypothetical 
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imperatives will only give rise to further hypothetical imperatives, without an 
ultimate reason that can ground the entire process of practical reasoning.5 Thus 
the satisfaction of one desire only leads to others, each similarly insistent, each 
similarly unjustified. This, then, is the significance of the Categorical 
Imperative; the Categorical Imperative is supposed to be the self-sufficient 
ground of all (practical)6 reason. It provides a way out of the regress of 
cascading hypothetical imperatives by giving a reason for acting that requires 
no further justification. And this reason for acting just is what rationality itself 
requires. 
The humanity formulation of the Categorical Imperative (one of three, 
according to Kant, logically equivalent formulations of the CI) makes this clear 
by requiring us to recognize all other rational beings as ends in themselves.7 
When Kant claims that persons are ends, what does ‘ends’ mean? The second 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative clearly opposes means to ends. The 
requirement to treat humanity as an end suggests that I am not to treat 
persons as instruments for achieving some other purpose or goal of my own. 
However, what would it mean to treat a person as a purpose or goal? It seems 
much more natural to speak of a person having a purpose or goal, not being a 
                                                
5 It is true that one’s deliberations as to ends might lead simply end with “because I want it” 
or “because it gives me pleasure.” However, for Kant, such “reasons” are not real reasons at 
all; they possess no self-sufficient justification, and so merely reflect a will that is acted upon 
(by non-rational desires, etc.), rather than a will that acts (i.e., can give real reasons for its 
actions). 
6 Again, O’Neill would leave out the ‘practical’ and claim that the CI is the ground of all 
reason. I choose to assert only the weaker claim in Kant’s name, confident that if O’Neill is 
right about the superset, then I am not asserting a falsehood by predicating the same property 
of the subset (leaving the status of the disjunction open). 
7 The three formulations are: 1) The formula of the universal law: “Act only according to that 
maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (421); 2) 
the formula of humanity: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a 
means” (429); 3) the formula of autonomy: “Always choose in such a way that in the same 
volition the maxims of choice are at the same time present as universal law” (440). 
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purpose or goal. So what does Kant mean when he claims that persons are 
“ends in themselves”? 
An end, according to Kant, “has in itself an absolute worth” and alone 
can be “a ground of determinate laws” (428). “[R]ational nature exists as an 
end in itself;” it has no further purpose beyond itself. When Kant talks of 
persons as ends, what he really has in mind is that persons are fundamentally 
causes. Persons are ends in themselves because, for the purposes of moral 
discourse, a person (and only a person) can be the self-sufficient end (i.e., 
beginning) of the causal chain whose effects are the sorts of actions we 
conventionally subject to moral evaluation. 
In other words, to be a genuine agent, to bear responsibility for his acts, 
a person must be the free cause of those acts. With regard to the moral actions 
for which he is responsible, the agent must be a kind of Prime Mover, and it is 
only insofar as he is the first cause that he himself acts. Persons are ends in 
themselves insofar as they have the capacity to be free causes. This 
proposition is at the heart of Kant’s understanding of pure morality and 
accounts for the central importance of autonomy in his formal ethics. He 
begins section III of the Groundwork by claiming that the “will is a kind of 
causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational; freedom 
would be the property of this causality that makes it effective independent of 
any determination by alien causes” (446). 
It is in virtue of being ends in themselves that persons are “objects of 
respect.” Respect is a necessary logical requirement of recognizing what 
persons most fundamentally are—i.e., free causes. It is this recognition that 
grounds the demand for respect because it is most fundamentally a 
recognition of another’s rationality—another’s capacity to be a self-existent 
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end. This is why the second formulation notes that one must treat humanity, 
“whether in your own person or in the person of another” (emphasis added), 
as an end. Each “man necessarily thinks of his own existence” as a self-
sufficient end, but so “also does every other rational being think of his 
existence on the same rational ground” (429). Thus, in recognizing myself as a 
self-sufficient end I must at the same time necessarily recognize every other 
rational being as a self-sufficient end. In other words, I cannot rationally 
conceive of myself as a free cause—as the ultimate source of my own 
activity—without conceiving of all other creatures with the same rational 
capacity in the same way. Another way to see the point: to fail to recognize the 
ultimate value of another rational being would constitute a failure of my own 
rationality. It would be intrinsically irrational, much like denying a truth of 
mathematics, and would represent a fundamental misunderstanding of what 
is at issue. 
Respect and autonomy are, in some sense, the flip sides of the same 
coin. The will that is a free cause, in order to value its own autonomy 
properly, must value all other rational creatures in the same way by paying 
them respect. This is an absolutely key point, one missing from many 
discussions of respect for persons. This is why Kant thinks that respect comes 
out of the nature of practical reason itself; it is entailed as a logical 
consequence of the realization by each agent that he is a free cause.8 
                                                
8 I hope it is clear that here (and elsewhere where I am using quasi-perceptual verbs like 
‘recognize’) I am not making a point merely about an agent’s subjective psychology. An agent 
is a free cause whether he realizes it or not; after all, Kant thinks agents were free causes 
before he came along to do his transcendental deduction. The point is merely that Kant thinks 
that he has shown how agents must think of themselves in order to have an adequate 
understanding of themselves qua agents. 
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Within this context then we have a fully grounded reason for a demand 
for equal respect. For a rational creature to cognize his own rational nature he 
must understand every other rational creature to possess the same nature he 
has. To disrespect another rational creature is to undermine one’s own 
rationality; thus, reason itself requires respect because respect just is the 
practice of reason with regard to other instantiations of itself. 
What this recognition actually entails is that my own status as a moral 
creature—responsible for my moral actions as a free rational cause—requires 
that my moral life play itself out within the space of moral reasons. 
Accordingly, anyone else who is also within that space of moral reasons is 
condign of the same regard I pay myself when I recognize myself as a moral 
agent. Thus, I cannot treat another as a means without in essence failing to 
understand myself as a locus of causation within the moral world. To treat 
another as a means is to abdicate my own rationality. To fail to pay respect to 
other rational creatures is to fail to see myself as an ultimate cause, and thus as 
a moral creature. 
Within this context, then, we actually do have a fully grounded reason 
for the demand for respect. Recall that it is supposed to be an analytic 
requirement of practical reasoning to understand that practical reasoning 
must occur within law-like formulizations—i.e., maxims. This is because 
agents have to serve as primary causes of their actions in order to be morally 
responsible for them. As such, the nature of practical reasoning itself compels 
the recognition of all who engage in law-governed practical reasoning as 
agents. The price of admission to the sphere of moral reasons is precisely the 
recognition of all fellow practical reasoners as ultimate moral causes. Thus, for 
Kant, respect is an analytic requirement of practical reasoning. 
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So far we have seen how the nature of practical reason constrains 
agents to respect the agency of others and so treat them always as ends in 
themselves, and not as mere means to one’s own ends. There is an important 
loose end, however, that now needs to be taken up. I mentioned above that 
being motivated merely by one’s unreflective desires is to be heteronomous 
with respect to one’s own will.  
The will is heteronomous when it “does not give itself the law, but [its] 
object does so because of its relation to the will” (441). To be heteronomous 
with respect to one’s will is to be passive before one’s own desires; it is to 
suffer a passion, rather than to choose one’s own ends. A will that is 
heteronomous fails to achieve true autonomy and is thus fundamentally 
unfree. “The moral imperative must therefore abstract from every object to 
such an extant that no object has any influence at all on the will, so that 
practical reason (the will) may not merely minister to an interest not belonging 
to it but may merely show its own commanding authority as the supreme 
legislation.” 
Thus to be fully moral, a will must be abstracted from its objects (e.g., 
what one desires) and focused on giving itself the law.9 An autonomous 
(moral) will would “always choose in such a way that in the same volition the 
maxims of the choice are at the same time present as universal law” (440). It 
will of course surprise no one that this willing as universal law just is the 
Categorical Imperative. 
                                                
9 “For the proper and inestimable worth of an absolutely good will consists precisely in the 
fact that the principle of action is free of all influences from contingent grounds, which only 
experience can furnish” (426). 
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The form of the universal law requires simply that it be exceptionless 
and necessary, as Kant conceived of the laws of nature to be.10 Thus, for a 
maxim to be “at the same time present as a universal law” “in the same 
volition” means that the maxim must be willed as exceptionless and necessary. 
Which is to say, the maxim must be willed as binding on all (rational) agents 
(in the same circumstances). “The concept of every rational being as one who 
must regard himself legislating universal law by all his will’s maxims… leads 
to another very fruitful concept… a kingdom of ends… [which is] a systematic 
union of different rational beings through common laws” (433). The kingdom 
of ends then is “a whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of 
rational beings as ends in themselves and also the particular ends which each 
may set for himself).” 
This principle supplies the content of Kant’s moral philosophy. As I 
noted in passing in the last chapter, Kant’s chief, indeed only, concern is the 
nature of the agent’s will. “There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all 
in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without 
qualification, except a good will” (393). Thus, “what is essentially good in the 
action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they 
may” (416). Therefore, what matters for Kant is not what one does, but why 
one does what one does. The moral worth of any action can only be 
determined by an examination of the motives of the agent. 
Of course, as we have already noted, one problem with depending on 
motives in evaluating the moral worth of an agent’s actions is that motives are 
often obscured, sometimes even from the agent himself. Thus Kant’s project is 
                                                
10 It is of course no accident that universality and necessity are the “marks” of the a priori for 
Kant. 
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to describe the binding precepts of morality in terms of what a good will must 
will in order to be good. Whether any given person has such a will is 
unknowable to human beings, so much so that we cannot know if any action 
has ever had true moral worth. People have certainly acted in accord with the 
demands of the Moral Law, but often these actions have not been done out of 
a sheer regard for duty, but because of some natural inclination.11 
In other words, if I have told the truth to my mother, not because it is 
immoral to lie, but because I love her and so cannot bring myself to deceive 
her, then my actions—though in accord with the demands of morality—do not 
themselves have moral worth. In order to be morally worthwhile, my actions 
have to be motivated by a respect for my duty, and no “contingent grounds” 
such as my love for this particular woman, can influence my will. Kant 
realizes that this is an amazingly stringent demand and is prepared to 
acknowledge that it may deprive of moral status almost all of the actions we 
might pre-reflectively have believed to be moral, since the motives behind 
those actions were not a pure respect for the moral law alone.  
One of Kant’s most famous examples illustrates this point. Kant argues 
that the charitable actions of a misanthrope are more likely to have genuine 
moral worth than the same sort of actions done by a hearty humanitarian who 
takes pleasure from his charity. It is precisely because the misanthrope finds 
other people disagreeable, and so acts solely out of a sense of duty, that his 
charitable actions have moral worth. The humanitarian’s similar actions, while 
in accord with what morality demands, do not have independent moral worth 
                                                
11 At 397 Kant discusses the case of the honest shopkeeper who is honest only so has to 
maintain his reputation and so secure future customers. His actions—though in accord with 
what morality demands—do not have moral worth because they are not done out of a respect 
for duty. 
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because the motivation behind them is infected by the pleasure the 
humanitarian takes (and expects to take) from his charity. 
It is most important for us to see, in Kant’s framework, that morality, 
and indeed the requirements of duty generally, bind agents only qua practical 
reasoner. I am duty-bound by nothing other than the nature of my own 
rationality, and thus my actions are morally worthwhile only insofar as they 
proceed solely from a respect for my duty. Thus, the key feature of Kant’s 
moral theory is purity of motive, of acting out of a recognition of the demands 
of the Categorical Imperative, which is acting always such that the maxim 
describing my rationale for acting could be universalized for all rational 
agents. 
This point can generate some confusion. It is not the case, of course, 
that an action in accord with the demands of morality that is done from a 
private (i.e., contingent) motivation is necessarily immoral. The point is that 
such an action is not morally worthy—i.e., has no independent moral value. 
Such an action is not a reflection of a “perfectly good will.” This then would 
seem to generate a prima facie duty to cultivate a will which will not be 
determined by such “contingent grounds” as affection or friendship. 
It is at the point that many critics of Kant, myself included, wish to 
attack his theory, and I will have more to say about such criticisms below, but 
it is important that we be clear about what is at stake here. Kant is not 
committed to the ridiculous position that being moral requires one to have no 
special relationships; rather, he is only committed to the proposition that the 
perfectly good will cannot be determined by desires or motivations arising from 
those relationships. Now it may be the case, and Kant realizes this of course, 
that the limitations of human nature—the fact that we are imperfectly 
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rational—precludes the possession by any actual mere human being of a 
perfectly good will. Kant can accept this without a problem for his moral 
theory so long as he acknowledges that the motivations, demands, and desires 
arising from special relationships are simply outside the province of morality. 
Nonetheless, this is an extremely important consequence of Kant’s 
moral theory and clearly important to the question of what Kant can say about 
the demands of love and loyalty. What we need to see is that this consequence 
follows inescapably from the nature of Kant’s project. By constraining 
morality to just those demands that bind all rational actors, in virtue of their 
rationality, he leaves no place for sentiment of any sort to enter into the 
deliberations of practical reason with independent moral force. Thus, within 
Kant’s moral system, the demands of love and loyalty cannot have any 
genuine moral value insofar as that concern is founded in the specificity of 
sentiment towards particulars. 
Again, it is worth emphasizing that this conclusion does not necessarily 
rule out responding to such demands. However, so far as one understands 
oneself to be motivated by a demand of love and loyalty, one’s actions lack 
moral worth. Thus for instance, if I tell my mother the truth just out of the love 
I bear her (so I cannot bring myself to lie to her)12 my action has no moral 
worth. Obviously, however, that does not make it immoral. When I tell the 
nice lady next door the same thing out of a respect for my duty to tell the 
                                                
12 The experience of this kind of inability I will describe in the next chapter as a species of the 
phenomenon that Frankfurt calls “volitional necessity.” Now, this obviously does not mean 
that in no situation would I bring myself to lie to her. If I truly believed that deceiving her 
would (legitimately) shield her from some great pain, for instance, the same kind of volitional 
necessity might manifest itself in a decision to deceive her. On the other hand, Kant can leave 
no room for this, at least within the sphere of morality. To lie to her for any reason, even “for 
her own good” would be to disrespect her dignity as a moral agent (and so, ipso facto it could 
not have been for her own good).  
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truth, the same action is morally worthy. Thus, I have done nothing per se 
wrong in responding to the warm demands of filial love; however, I have also 
done nothing morally worthy. 
So far I have taken pains to make a kind of amoral space for the 
demands of love and loyalty. Being motivated by these demands may, and 
often will, generate actions that are objectively legitimate, i.e., actions that are 
indistinguishable from those that would be performed by an agent with a 
perfectly good will in the same moral choice situation—just as my telling my 
mother the truth was demanded by morality, even though I actually did it out 
of my love for her. However, insofar as the Categorical Imperative calls us to 
justify all of our actions by a willingness to will the maxim embodying them 
as universal and necessary, these actions are subjectively illegitimate. They 
express an imperfectly good will. 
I think it an open and inadequately explored question exactly how 
much of a problem this need be to Kant. One might think that he could take 
refuge in the simple fact that human beings are imperfectly rational creatures, 
and so never truly in a position to possess a perfectly good will (unlike God 
and His angels). Kant says in another context “out of such crooked wood as 
man is made, nothing straight can be built”; I am inclined to think that he is 
sympathetic to this view of the intrinsic imperfectability of men’s wills.13 
Whatever one might think of how serious a problem this is for Kant—
or indeed if it is a problem at all—it should be clear that the demands of love 
and loyalty have no place within Kant’s system as ultimate reasons for acting. 
                                                
13 This famous quote appears in sixth proposition of his essay “Idea Towards a General 
History (from) a Cosmopolitan Outlook.” This kind of outlook, of course, would be quite 
consistent with Kant’s rather strict Lutheran family background. Other readers of Kant seem 
to find this line less appealing, and so are apt to generate apologiai of various sorts on this 
issue. 
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Consider a maxim such as: In most cases I will favor my family and friends 
over strangers in order to express my love for them. A will acting on this 
maxim would be heteronomous because the maxim expresses an end that 
itself is “contingent.”14 
Again we need to be clear: to act on this maxim is not necessarily to act 
immorally. That would only clearly be the case if the maxim could not be 
willed as a universal law. For Kant, in testing a maxim we need to know both 
whether it is consistent—i.e., can be conceived as a universal law—and also 
whether it can be willed as a universal law.  
About the maxim in question, we can see that if everyone were 
required to favor his family, then each agent would still be able to do so. In a 
world where everyone must favor his own family, it is certainly possible to 
favor one’s own family—so the conception test is passed. The second question 
is whether we can will such a world. It does not seem to me that this would be 
a problem. We could not will a world in which people are positively 
prevented from helping people who are not members of their families. 
However, the maxim in question—to favor one’s family members—does not 
absolutely preclude helping others above the favor one renders to one’s 
family. In other words, I can will such a world without undermining the 
ground of my own rationality.  
There may be limitations on the extent to which I can favor my family. I 
think it would probably be impossible to will a world in which I am required 
to favor my friends and family above all others in all cases. For example, it 
would be ridiculous to will a world in which one would be unable to tend first 
                                                
14 Of course it is not transparent what it would mean for me to take as my end the expression 
of love. Nonetheless, if it is founded on sentiment and affection it does seems clear that Kant 
would consider it contingent. 
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to a stranger with life-threatening injuries who happened to be in the same car 
accident in which one’s beloved child received a skinned elbow. For to do so 
would be to will a world in which I preclude strangers from helping me, 
thereby irrationally threatening my own rescue in cases of accidental 
debilitation.15 Thus this kind of Kantian moral deliberation would certainly set 
permissibility limits as to the situations in which favoritism is rationally 
willable, but it would nonetheless leave some space for such favoritism. 
What this reveals is that taking such a maxim is weakly permitted—i.e., 
it does not directly violate the requirements of rational morality for 
imperfectly rational creatures. What it does not do, however, is provide any 
grounds of thinking that morality requires anything like the end of this maxim. 
To see exactly why this is we need to remember how Kant’s moral system is 
supposed to make its claims upon us—viz. solely in virtue of our rational 
nature. 
This does not mean that Kant was unaware of, or ignored, the 
contingent conditions within which our rationality must play itself out.16 As I 
suggested above I think Kant was quite alive to the limitations inherent in 
human nature, and so our tendency to be always morally lacking. However, 
                                                
15 The reason for the contradiction here is the same as the fourth example of non-beneficence 
(423). As we are dependent, needful creatures, we will always require the potential assistance 
of others. Accordingly, we cannot will a world in which such assistance is precluded to/from 
persons to whom one does not already have a special relationship. This may be slightly too 
strong; it is imaginable I suppose, that some humans have lived their entire lives without ever 
being among others with whom they did not have a special relationship (e.g., a very primitive 
tribe based on kinship). In such conditions it is perhaps imaginable that one could will a 
world that depends on special relationships alone to motivate others to help.  
16 The fourth example of non-beneficence I mentioned before only makes sense to the extent 
that our dependence on others is foreseeable as necessary for the maintenance of our 
rationality. Of course, this raises another question for Kant; namely, would beneficence be 
morally required of rational creatures who did not suffer the needs of interdependence as we 
do? If my fellow creatures were never in a position to help me, or if I were never in a position 
to require their help, would it really be impossible to will a world in which that help could not 
be proffered? I do not see that it would. 
  
128 
although those contingencies inform and structure the conditions within 
which rational choices have to be made, the actual foundation of all moral 
obligation—the ground of the ought—lies solely within our capacity for 
rational deliberation.17 As such, there is simply no room in Kant’s moral 
philosophy for a legitimate obligation—a legitimate ought—to be grounded in 
love or loyalty. 
This is exactly where we need to be most careful, and where there is the 
greatest potential for confusion for both Kant’s critics and defenders. What is 
at stake here is the nature of the complicated interaction between the wholly 
rational ground of morality and the contingent circumstances and contexts 
which provide both the conditions in which real practical deliberations must 
be made and the objects of our non-rational wants. This is where, according to 
one of Kant’s more sophisticated modern defenders—Barbara Herman—
autonomy (the ground of morality) interacts with agency (the exercise of 
rationality in the world). At this point I would like to turn to her discussion to 
see how she thinks these complicated interactions might play out in such a 
way that there is “space for the claim that connection itself could be partially 
                                                
17 In fact, the ought-ness of the ought, so to speak, is a result of our capacity to do evil. In other 
words, the fact that moral obligations present themselves to us as an ought rather than the 
automatic determination of the will (as with perfectly rational creatures like angels, or the 
most perfectly rational being—God) shows how it is necessary for us to integrate the demands 
of rational nature into the context of our wills’ many contingent objects. It is precisely because 
we are tempted to do wrong that the demands of morality are recognized as an “ought to do,” 
rather than a mere “will do.” If we were perfectly rational creatures the demands of morality 
would not really be demands at all; our wills would turn to them naturally and without 
possibility of contradiction. Thus the very fact that morality is a struggle for us—a struggle 
against heteronomy in Kant’s terms—shows that Kant’s thinking makes room for the 
contingent conditions of human existence. However, what his thinking refuses to do is allow 
these contingencies to infect the foundation of morality. The fact that the demands of morality 
are informed by the contingent conditions of the world in which humans find themselves 
does not mean that those demands are in any way dependent on those conditions. In differing 
conditions, the demands might have different forms or different objects, but the ground or 
source of those demands would remain always the Categorical Imperative alone. 
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dependent on or a function of moral value” (Herman [1991], 780) within the 
Kantian framework. 
 
Herman 
 
Herman explicitly addresses herself to the (potential) alienation felt by 
agents in response to the demands of a universalist (i.e., impartial) moral 
theory. She takes up the torch for the Kantian position against the kinds of 
complaints we saw in previous chapters from Bernard Williams. Herman 
thinks that this kind of criticism, that Kant’s moral theory cannot adequately 
account for the demands of “attachment,” is predicated on a mistaken picture 
of the nature of practical deliberation. She thus offers, in place of the model 
she takes Kant’s critics to be using (the “plural interest model”), an alternative 
(the “deliberative field model”), which she claims will make room for the 
demands of love and loyalty within a picture of integrated, mature moral 
“agency.” 
The problem is that the demands of love and loyalty (Herman refers to 
“attachments”) often seem to conflict with the demands of impartial morality. 
This can lead an agent who cares about morality to feel split or conflicted, 
unable to respond to one set of demands without offending the other. 
Especially insofar as impartial morality demands that the agent give up 
relationships that are centrally important to him, this can become a burden 
that threatens to undermine his very commitment to morality. Herman claims 
that the picture of practical deliberation these concerns presuppose is the 
“plural interest model.”  
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According to the first or plural interest model, where there is 
connection, there are those I care about, and the effect of my 
caring is to give their interests greater deliberative weight: for 
me. They matter more. And they matter more to me because I 
care about them. When I need to balance or weigh interests—
should I do some good for my son or his friend—my son counts 
more… 
 On the plural interest model, when morality contends 
with attachments it forces one against the grain, attacking the 
immediacy of connection. It would be natural to feel hostile to or 
alienated from the requirements of morality if they in this way 
denied a deeply felt claim of partiality.... The problem arises 
when it looks like “over here” is what I most care about, what I 
want to happen (and cannot not want to happen), but “over 
there” is what impartial morality demands. There is then deep 
conflict and tension. And when impartial morality wins, it is not 
only at the expense of what I most care about, it provides no 
deliberative space even to acknowledge my concerns. (Herman 
[1991], 782-3) 
 
This view’s proponents see practical deliberation as a kind of empty 
space into which flow various demands—both the demands of love and 
loyalty and the demands of impartial morality (and, perhaps, demands of all 
sorts, from simple bodily desires to complex aesthetic ones, etc.). The purpose 
of deliberative reason is to weigh these various demands against each other 
and to determine the course of action that best satisfies the demands of what I 
care about most. If in a given case the demands of love and loyalty conflict 
with the dictates of morality, the result is a feeling of alienation or 
conflictedness before these irreconcilable forces. 
According to Herman, this model suffers from a major defect—a kind 
of fundamental immaturity. This immaturity consists in a failure to fold 
together both the demands of love and loyalty and impartial morality into a 
fully human life that is informed by both. “Among the elements of a full moral 
theory we should find an account of how one is to integrate the requirements 
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of morality into one’s life.” Accordingly, she offers a different, better model of 
practical reason—what she calls the “deliberative field model.” 
 
According to this deliberative field model, the practical self does 
not have as its major task negotiating a settlement among 
independent competing claims. Insofar as one has interests and 
commitments, one is a (human) self. But a human life is not the 
resultant “bundle” of competing interests (among which is an 
interest in morality) One’s interest[s] are present on a 
deliberative field that contains everything that gives one reasons. 
Thus, in addition to interests and attachments, there are also 
grounds of obligation, principles of prudential rationality, and 
depending on the individual, a more or less complex conception 
of the Good. (784) 
 
According to Herman the key advantage of this model is that it allows 
for “the integration and transformation of the ends in light of one another, of 
one’s practical situation, and of one’s conception of place and importance 
understood the through regulative principles—aesthetic, moral, prudential—
one accepts” (785-6). This process of integration involves bringing the 
demands of love and loyalty or attachment within a single deliberative field 
by “normalizing” them “to varying degrees to the principles of practical 
agency, both moral and nonmoral” (789). 
The idea is that the demands of love and loyalty, or anything else, can 
only have a place within the sphere of practical reason—that is, can only 
appear within the scope of rational practical deliberation—once they have 
been processed into an intelligible form and thereby become subject to 
judgments. As Herman says, desires “do not give reasons for action: they may 
explain why such and such is a reason for action, or even why something can 
be an effective reason for action, but the desire itself is not a reason. One can 
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take the fact of a desire to be a reason, but that is just to hold that desire, or 
this desire, is good” (785).  
Consider a simple desire such as the desire for chocolate cake. By itself, 
as a psychological phenomenon, that desire does not supply a reason for 
acting. Rather, it can become a reason only insofar as I form a judgment. I 
could form a simple syllogism by first forming a maxim: I will obtain and eat 
chocolate cake in order to satisfy my desire for chocolate cake. I judge that it is 
good for me to satisfy a desire for chocolate cake. I conclude that it is good for 
me to obtain and eat chocolate cake. Thus, I have a reason to do so. 
For Herman, a desire is important (i.e., can enter into the deliberations 
of practical reason) only when conjoined to a judgment that fulfilling that 
desire is good. Her concern does not extend beyond reasons, thus for a desire 
to play any role whatsoever in her moral psychology it has to be “normalized” 
in this way and then integrated into the all-encompassing deliberation in 
which various reasons are considered in light of each other. 
Implicitly, however, this ends up representing action as proceeding 
merely from practical reason. For Herman, all that matters is deliberation—i.e., 
practical reasoning. When she addresses herself to the challenge that deep-
seated attachments represent to impartial morality, she sees this challenge 
entirely through the lens of practical rationality. These deep-seated 
attachments make themselves felt only as reason giving judgments within the 
“deliberative field” (i.e., that these attachments are good). The absolutely key 
thing to see is that her deliberative field—or the space of practical reason, or 
whatever else it might be called—presupposes the primacy of reasons and 
reason-giving. Attachments—the demands of love and loyalty—matter only 
insofar as they can generate reasons through judgments that they are good. 
  
133 
For Herman, the field itself, to stretch her metaphor, is flat. All psychic 
demands (be they the demands of impartial morality or of love and loyalty) 
enter the field through the normalization process—that is, they are or become 
reasons. These demands play themselves out on that field according to the 
“rules” of the game—what she calls “the principles of practical agency, both 
moral and nonmoral.” These rules define the game by defining the players—
through judgments yielding reasons (which in turn are defined by principles 
that describe what counts as a well-formed reason). The ultimate goal of the 
moral theorist is to describe these rules, and so ultimately define the game and 
the “victory” conditions (i.e., what action is best all things considered). 
It is certainly the case that under Herman’s model the demands of love 
and loyalty can generate reasons and so enter into her “deliberative field.” My 
point is that it is not in generating reasons that the deepest commitments affect 
the will. As I will argue in the next chapter, on an alternative (and more 
plausible) account of the will such demands can directly impact the will, 
because they are partially constitutive of it. On this picture of the will, it is 
larger than practical reason, and so deep-seated desires can affect the will 
directly without becoming reasons per se. 
I think Herman fails to account for the fact that the deepest attachments 
of human life flow out of volitionally constitutive core commitments and do 
not enter into the deliberative field as legitimate players (i.e., as reasons). 
Instead, they tilt the field itself. They are not judged; there is no judgment that 
they are good. They do not give reasons. Rather by shaping the will directly 
(i.e., tilting the field) they prescribe the very limits of the game. Far from being 
normalized by the principles of practical agency, they can prescribe the very 
scope of those principles, by setting the limits within which deliberation can 
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take place. They do not primarily affect the will by giving reasons, but define 
the horizons within which reasons can matter. In other words, their presence 
in human life defies the notion that reasons are always basic. 
 
It is here that we have finally reached the root of the disagreement. 
Kant and Herman, et al., are claiming that the very structure of practical 
rationality places real restrictions on what can count as a reason. On this view, 
since practical rationality is constitutive of moral agency, these structural 
features are the inescapable conditions of moral action. Once we see this we 
are supposed to understand that the demands of love and loyalty only have 
standing within deliberation to the extent that they can be made to participate 
within the structure of reasons. This means that whatever real moral content 
they have will need to be formulated in the terms of maxims to even enter into 
consideration. And since the possible permutations of consistent maxims are 
constrained by the nature of practical reason, so the scope of possible justified 
action is constrained. 
Fascinating though this notion is, I think it utterly misses the point of 
Williams’ example. Kant (according to Herman) has described the limits of the 
deliberative field by showing how practical reason requires its potential 
objects to be normalized within the formal structure of maxims. Even if this 
were true, however, this would not capture the deep intuition to which 
Williams appeals in the case of the wife in peril. 
The point of Williams’ example is not that the demand of love which 
motivates the man to save his wife can be justified or “integrated” within the 
deliberative field. The point of that example precisely is that deliberation is 
here inappropriate—this kind of deliberation is exactly “one thought too 
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many.” What is at stake in the deepest attachments is not justification within 
practical reason, but their capacity to undermine it altogether. 
The disagreement between Kant’s critics and defenders is very deep 
here, because the disagreement is a disagreement about the very nature of the 
will. For Kant, the will just is the faculty of practical reason. For Williams and 
others like Frankfurt, the will is in a sense more complicated, because practical 
reason is a constituent of, but not entirely constitutive of the will. Thus the 
structure of the will cannot be fully described only in terms of practical reason. 
The movements of the will need not always take the form of maxims 
describing valid means-end reasoning; sometimes, in cases like being moved 
to save a beloved wife, the will itself will be directly determined by the 
centrality of “what we care about” most (Frankfurt), those things which 
constitute the “ground projects” of our lives (Williams). 
There is a very important distinction to be drawn, inattention to which 
can produce a great deal of confusion on these issues. This distinction 
concerns the nature of justification itself as applied to these kinds of cases. 
What we need to understand is that the kind of “justification” on offer here is 
necessarily external to the deliberations of practical reason. Indeed it is 
perhaps misleading to speak of justification at all, in these sorts of cases.18 
The reason for this is that, as Kant points out and Onora O’Neill is 
especially keen to emphasize,19 the structure of reason—that is, simply, the 
                                                
18 To see this, we need only consider the question: is some unalterable feature of human nature 
justified? The question seems almost nonsensical, analogous to asking whether our having 
four fingers (instead of three, say) is justified. Even if this were granted this would be a 
strange kind of “justification.” In Part II of my dissertation, I basically argue that to be fully 
human, we must possess the kind of will that directly expresses the values we try to classify 
as demand of love and loyalty. Some of this argument is rehearsed below, but in a very 
truncated form. 
19 See especially Chapter Three, “Reason and autonomy in Grundlegung III”, in O’Neill [1989]. 
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giving of reasons—constrains and informs the possibilities of deliberation. 
Accordingly, on a Kantian view justification is necessarily limited to only 
those things that can be expressed in its own terms—in the terms of maxims. 
However, the suggestion that I think Williams is making is that there is a kind 
of determination of the will that bypasses, or more accurately undercuts the 
processes of deliberation. As more basic than rational deliberation, these 
determinations cannot be justified in merely the conventional way, precisely 
because they are the ground of the will itself. This is not to say that they 
cannot be justified at all, but such a justification would require an altogether 
different sort of argument. 
When we turn our attention to a case like the one of the man saving his 
wife, we consider it not only after the fact, but also, more importantly, in 
tranquility and divorced from the immediacy of the demand on his will that 
his love for her generates. In other words, the search for justification of the 
conventional sort is almost doomed to failure from the start, because the kind 
of “justification” on offer cannot be properly formulated from a deliberative 
perspective. The justification is nothing more than this: he could not have 
willed it otherwise. Not because he introduced a maxim describing his means 
and ends into his deliberative field and judged them consistent with the 
demands of the Categorical Imperative, but because his will was already 
determined in this direction prior (conceptually as well as temporally) to his 
deliberating. In other words, some of the demands of love and loyalty simply 
cannot be “normalized” as Herman would like, precisely because they operate 
outside the space of reasons, and thus outside the “principles of practical 
agency” as she understands them.  
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This is not to say that no reasons might be given for them, however. 
The reasons given, though, will necessarily be external reasons, reasons 
having to do with brute facts about the kind of creatures we are and the 
necessary structure of our wills. The justification, in other words, will be 
simply that it could not have been otherwise, given the kind of creatures we 
are.  
Now we are brought face to face with just how alien these demands of 
love and loyalty can be to deliberative reason. I want to be clear; it is not the 
case that the demands of love and loyalty cannot generate “normalized” 
reasons as well. Indeed in many cases they can and do; however, at their 
deepest level they operate “behind” or “under” deliberative reason altogether. 
They ground the will, by giving it determinate objects of central concern that it 
does not choose.20 
These points will be taken up, rearticulated, expanded and defended in 
Part II. At this point my main concern is to show how far the Kantian project is 
from actually considering the demands of love and loyalty as expressions of 
the deepest values in human life. Kant’s project, from the very start, is by its 
nature hostile to the demands of love and loyalty, because it simply cannot 
consider them without fundamentally altering the character of the values they 
express. As such, to the extent that these values are “normalized” they are 
eviscerated, and it becomes no wonder that they fail to find a satisfactory 
justification within such a system. 
 
                                                
20 This is not to deny the possibility that a disordered will might not very well attempt, and to 
a large degree succeed, at destroying its own ground through a conscious nihilism. 
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Heteronomy Revisited 
 
Of course, it is likely that Kant (and Herman) would respond to my 
claims about the love and loyalty undercutting deliberative reason by 
observing that even if this is how the demands of love and loyalty work upon 
the will, any agent whose will is determined according to these demands 
merely suffers from heteronomy of the will. Recall that according to Kant, the 
will is heteronomous when it “does not give itself the law, but [its] object does 
so because of its relation to the will” (441).  
The obvious question is how seriously we should take Kant’s notion 
that autonomy just is the abstraction from every “interest not belonging to” 
the will such that it “show its own commanding authority as the supreme 
legislation” (441). Specifically, do we not have reason to think that Kant is 
begging a very important question by assuming that the demands of love and 
loyalty do not truly belong to the will? In other words, to make sense of Kant’s 
understanding of autonomy, do we not just have to assume that the will is 
merely practical rationality itself? 
For Kant, the demands of love and loyalty seem to be properties of their 
various objects rather than properties of the subject (i.e., the agent). As he 
apparently conceived of them, these demands act upon the will from outside. 
To understand his distinction between heteronomy and autonomy, there must 
be a clear difference between what is internal and what is external to the will, 
and the demands of love and loyalty must fall outside of it. 
I suspect that much of the intuitive pull of the Kantian notion of 
autonomy lies in the apparently intimate connection between moral 
responsibility and choice. When we are acted upon by very strong passions, it 
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is as if the faculty of choice is substantially undermined so as to mitigate moral 
responsibility itself.21 In order to make sense of this, however, we have to 
understand these kinds of passions as external to our real selves—our free 
moral agency. 
Even if this is the case with passions like consuming anger, however, it 
is not at all clear that it is appropriate to consider the demands of love and 
loyalty in this way. Structurally speaking, the demands of love and loyalty are 
not “objects” that act upon the will. They do not act upon the will from outside 
of it, but are expressions of the will itself. The deepest demands of love and 
loyalty manifest themselves as what Frankfurt calls “volitional necessities,” 
and so proceed from and reflect the internal structure of the will.22 
Thus, the demands of love and loyalty should not be understood to 
threaten autonomy, because they are not “objects” of the will at all, but rather 
products of it. They cannot threaten the will’s freedom, because they 
themselves are the ineluctable consequence of having a human-shaped will at 
all, expressing the agent’s central volitional commitments, which are 
themselves (partially) constitutive of that will. 
As will I will argue further in the next chapter, it is a mistake to 
conceive of the free will as a will completely unencumbered by volitional 
commitments. For a choice to constitute a real choice—an expression of the 
volition of an agent—it must reflect the deepest commitments of that agent 
himself. In other words, moral choice—a choice legitimately subject to praise 
or blame—must be the expression of a stable will, a will constituted by 
                                                
21 Thus, we have the intuition that a “crime of passion” is somehow less blameworthy than a 
premeditated one. This is the moral underpinning of the temporary insanity defense, as well, 
but this topic is sufficiently convoluted to be well beyond the scope of our present discussion. 
22 This notion from Frankfurt is discussed and developed at length in the next chapter. 
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commitments to what the agent loves. Otherwise, the “choice” will be either 
arbitrary or impersonal. 
Autonomy conceived of as Kant conceived of it is radically impersonal. 
The execution of the demands of the Moral Law done out of a respect for that 
law (i.e., the only morally praiseworthy actions according to Kant) must 
necessarily be what any other rational agent should do in the same choice 
situation. The Kantian metaphor of the “Kingdom of Ends” captures this 
perfectly—in correctly giving himself the law, every agent also gives the same 
law to all other relevantly similar agents. Nothing signifies the essential 
uniqueness of any given agent, because qua moral agent, all agents are 
interchangeable.23 
I think it is a mistake to conceive of autonomy simply in terms of what 
all moral agents fully share; rather it is autonomy is best expressed in terms of 
what makes each of them unique. The demands of love and loyalty thus do 
not undermine the agent’s autonomy, but are an expression of part of what 
fundamentally grounds it. The confusion could only arise because Kant and 
his defenders beg the essential question of the relationship of practical reason 
to the will. The Kantians set up the question in such a way as to presuppose 
that autonomy proceeds entirely from the exercise of practical reason, and in 
so doing, they presuppose a moral psychology that does terminal violence to 
                                                
23 For Kant, all moral agents, in order to be moral agents, must fully share the formal capacity 
for practical reason. They obviously do not all have to have the same actual capacity. 
Furthermore, differences in the situations in which that rationality plays itself out may 
generate certain differences between significantly different classes of moral agents. In the 
famous fourth example of non-beneficence (in the Groundwork), contingent facts like our 
corporeality in fragile bodies have important consequences for understanding our moral 
duties, which may not affect other rational moral agents differently circumstanced (e.g., 
unembodied rational intelligences). See Herman’s discussion in “Mutual Aid and Respect for 
Persons” (Herman [1993]).  
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some of our strongest intuitions regarding the importance of attachment, 
loyalty, and love. 
Ultimately the strong intuitions that underlie our valuing of autonomy 
and disvaluing of heteronomy are a reflection of the fact that for an agent’s 
choices to be free, they must be his choices and not externally compelled. The 
agent must “give himself” the volition. The mistake in the Kantian picture lies 
in the undefended (and indefensible) presupposition that only pure reason 
itself authentically belongs to the agent.  
In the next chapter we will see instead that when acting on the deepest 
demands of love and loyalty, which reflect the internal structure of his own 
will, the agent’s acts are as fully authentic as any acts can be. To act through a 
volitional necessity is to make manifest the deepest structure of the will, it is 
indeed the purest expression of that which makes the agent the agent that he 
is. Nothing, especially not acting from mere respect for the Moral Law, could 
be more authentic, more self governing. 
 
The Formula of Humanity 
 
Thus far I have concentrated on what I take to be the most innovative 
aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy, namely his claim to have described, in the 
categorical imperative, the fundamental principle of pure (practical) reason. 
Ultimately, I have claimed, this leads to the collapse of the distinction between 
the will (agency) and practical reason. The perfect will, as agency (i.e., the 
autonomous actor acting in the world), is precisely and completely described 
in rational terms. On this model, the demands of love and loyalty can only 
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come into play insofar as they are reflected in maxims—i.e., “normalized” in 
Herman’s terms. 
The strength of this model—its internal rational coherence—is also, in a 
sense, its weakness. It depends on accepting a claim that what most matters is 
moral reasoning and that the very structure of that reasoning itself places real 
restrictions on what can count as a reason, and so ultimately determines both 
what is permissible and required. The advantages of taking such a position are 
manifest—if it could be brought off it would prescribe moral activity on pain 
of irrationality. Thus moral requirements would acquire something like the 
force of the conclusions of valid deductive proofs—they would be escapable 
only to the degree that one was willing to give up being rational. The 
disadvantage, of course, is that the whole project depends on a series of claims 
about metaphysics of morals that are nothing if not controversial. 
Faced with this, many philosophers have attempted to change the 
emphasis in Kant’s moral thinking away from metaphysical claims about 
autonomy towards his more determinate conclusions. Their attention is thus 
diverted from the formula of autonomy, “Always choose in such a way that in 
the same volition the maxims of the choice are at the same time present as 
universal law” (440), towards the formula of humanity, “Act in such a way 
that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of 
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means” 
(429). We have to remember, of course, that Kant thinks these formulations are 
logically interchangeable, that each entails the other. Nonetheless, 
highlighting the formula of humanity, the emphasis is changed from how one 
structures one’s willing to how one treats others. This gives rise to the Kantian 
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notion of “respect” for (the autonomy of) others, which has been perhaps his 
most important and lasting contribution to moral philosophy. 
 
Love and Respect 
 
I want now to look at how coming at Kant from this perspective affects 
our consideration of the demands of love and loyalty. In doing this I want to 
consider a bit of Allen Wood’s book, Kant’s Ethical Thought. In discussing 
Kant’s thinking about love and friendship, Wood writes: 
 
Kant thinks there is a basic tension in human nature between 
loving people and respecting them… Respect and love are not 
mutually exclusive: In rational philanthropy they even go 
necessarily together. But in our natural inclinations they make 
for an unstable combination. Love as inclination is based on the 
pleasure we take in another (or her perfections), but respect for 
others pains us by striking down our self-conceit. Love is an 
empirical inclination, however, it is not opposed to self-conceit 
and indirectly it is even an expression of it. (Wood [1999], 271) 
 
It is this tension that I want to explore. 
The formula of humanity is supposed to prescribe the nature of our 
interaction with all other rational (i.e., moral) creatures. The foundation of that 
interaction is always the respect that one is required, on pain of irrationality, 
to pay to the autonomy of others. Thus while it is certainly possible to take a 
variety of affective attitudes towards others, such as being attracted or 
disgusted, etc., morality requires that they always be treated with the respect 
due to moral agents, i.e., to rational ends-setters. Ultimately, what we most 
fundamentally owe another is rational respect, regardless of what we might 
feel towards him. Thus, any feelings we might have towards him, positive or 
negative, cannot justify any abrogation of what respect requires. 
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This is an important point because this requirement prescribes the 
moral core of interpersonal interaction. No other considerations can ever 
impact or detract from the requirement of rational respect. In all regards then, 
my conduct towards my fellow man is to be guided by this requirement, and 
no matter whether I love or hate him I must respect him. 
As Wood notes, this requirement is very much in tension with the 
apparent requirements of love. Respect requires a kind of distance; it forces us 
to cede to others the space in which to choose their own ends. Wood writes, 
“Perfect friendship requires mutual respect, which will be threatened by too 
much love, too much familiarity, too much openness” (282). Love is 
incompatible with respect precisely because it tends toward communion, the 
union of the lover and the beloved. Love breaks down the barriers between 
independent selves, causing us to lose sight of others’ independence. As such, 
it threatens to overcome the distance necessary to recognize another’s 
authorship of his own ends. 
This danger seems to arise from the notion that love “is based on the 
pleasure we take in another (or her perfections)” and so “it is not opposed to 
self-conceit and indirectly it is even an expression of it.” The idea here seems 
to be that because love is based on pleasure, to the extent that we give reign to 
our inclination to love we are merely gratifying ourselves—hence, expressing 
self-conceit. On the other hand, “respect for others pains us by striking down 
our self-conceit,” presumably by making clear to us that other rational 
creatures can (and do) set ends very different from our own. Respect 
implicitly acknowledges others as independent sources of value thereby 
diminishing the value that we instinctively ascribe to ourselves. 
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To fully understand the reason Kant takes such a strained view of love 
we need to be aware of a distinction he draws concerning types of love. For 
Kant, ‘love’ can either refer to “love as an inclination” or “benevolence from 
duty,” and it is only the latter kind of love which is “practical, not 
pathological” (399). Not only is the latter kind of “love” permissible, it is also a 
duty. On the other hand, Kant understands “love as an inclination” in terms of 
pleasure.24 I suspect that many will find this dichotomy unsatisfying. I doubt 
many people, philosophers or otherwise, would count “benevolence from 
duty” a species of love at all, but at the same time most would also think that 
love has to do with something more than merely “pleasure in the reality of the 
object.” Before I take this up, however, it will be useful to understand 
precisely what Kant thinks the problem with love “as an inclination” or 
pleasure is. 
Kant calls “love as an inclination” not merely a temptation, but 
“pathological.” The pathology lies in what acting on an inclination is 
supposed to do to the will.25 When the will is determined to act from desire it 
becomes “heteronomous,” such that it “does not give itself the law, but [its] 
object does so because of its relation to the will” (441). In other words, when 
motivated by a desire for pleasure the will is not free. It is being determined 
by something outside of itself—viz., the object of the desire. 
                                                
24 Allen Wood writes that in Kant “Love as inclination is based on the pleasure we take in 
another (or her perfections),… Love is an empirical inclination” (Wood [1999], 271). Wood 
refers us to the Second Critique where Kant writes that in desire “the determining ground of 
choice consists in the conception of an object and its relation to the subject…. Such a relation 
to the subject is called pleasure in the reality of the object…” (21). 
25 It is quite possible that Kant is using ‘pathological’ in its literal sense as well—i.e., as related 
to pathos or feeling. Nonetheless, since a will determined by pathos is morally defective for 
Kant, I think the other sense of ‘pathological’ is also in play here. I am indebted to Andrew 
Chignell for pointing out the sense related to pathos. 
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We must always remember that for Kant the deepest ground of morality is the 
freedom of the will. But the will is only free insofar as it is “a causality in 
accordance with immutable laws,” as a “law to itself.” Because the pure will is 
fully rational, it necessarily conceives of itself as law governed, and these laws 
must be a priori, both universal and necessary. In the Second Critique, Kant 
writes that when a will is determined by a desire for pleasure it “must be 
always empirical” because “we cannot know, a priori, from the idea of any 
object, whatever the nature of this idea, whether it will be associated with 
pleasure or displeasure or will be merely indifferent” (21). Pleasure cannot 
inform a universal and necessary law because the “subjective susceptibility to 
a pleasure or displeasure” can “never [be] known except empirically and 
cannot be valid in the same form for all rational beings.” Thus, it “lacks 
objective necessity, which must be known a priori”, and “such a principle can 
never furnish a practical law” (22).  
The idea is relatively straightforward—no given object will necessarily 
elicit the same pleasure response in all rational creatures. Whether or not a 
given person takes pleasure in any given object is contingent and can only be 
discovered empirically, by exposing that agent to it. Accordingly, pleasure 
cannot determine a free will because a will is free only insofar as it is 
determined by necessary and universal laws which it gives to itself. 
Conversely, any will determined by pleasure is unfree, and since freedom is 
the ultimate ground of morality, a will determined by pleasure is, at least in 
part, “pathological” and immoral. 
My chief concern here is that we understand that Kant’s moral outlook 
commits him to the proposition that respect is the most fundamental attitude 
we must take to others. Thus, to take an attitude towards another based on 
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love or friendship alone is to disrespect him. Further, what I owe another, as 
opposed to am inclined to give, is ineluctably a consequence of respect alone. 
For I cannot act morally towards another, except insofar as I recognize in him 
his “humanity,” i.e., as a cause of moral action, as a rational end-setter. 
I think this way at looking at love, and interpersonal relations 
generally, is mistaken. When I act out of love, to the extent that it is a real love, 
it does not seem accurate at all to say that I am acting for “the pleasure [I] take 
in another (or her perfections).” This is a wildly unrealistic, reductionist 
account of love, equating it with pleasure. Let us go back to the example of the 
wife trapped in the burning building. 
When the loving husband rushes into the building to save his wife he 
does this because he loves her. In other words, as an explanation of his action 
this fact—that he loves this woman—is a complete explanation. He does not 
do this because of the pleasure he feels in loving her, or in the prospective 
pain he would feel if she were lost. To try to reduce what is at stake in his will 
to a question of pleasure or pain seems to completely obscure what is at stake. 
The entire point of Williams’ claim that any sort of calculation would be “one 
thought too many” is that the husband’s will is directly determined to this 
action by his caring for his wife. 
This does not mean, of course, that love puts reason in complete 
abeyance (though it may appear that way for some lovers), for the husband 
must still make rational plans and choices involving the best way to achieve 
his ends, etc. Rather, the point is that his end—to save his wife—is in some 
way determined for him by his love for her. There is simply no deliberation 
(i.e., practical reasoning) involved in this “choice” of end, much less any kind 
of consideration of what respect, either for his wife or for the stranger, would 
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require. Such a calculation of the demands of respect would reveal an agent 
who really did not love his wife to the degree that Williams imagines. What 
we need to see, however, is that what moves him is not the pleasure he takes 
in her (or her perfections); it is simply his love for her. 
This will become clearer in Part II when we explore Frankfurt’s very 
fruitful thinking about love. What is at stake here, and what we need to 
understand, is that there is a genuine tension between love and Kant’s notion 
of respect.26 However, as I will argue below, it is by no means the case, as Kant 
supposes, that the good will is necessarily the one in which respect always 
wins out over love. The tension is at heart a reflection of Kant’s tendency to 
collapse any distinction between a perfectly good will and pure practical 
reason.  
Respect is the proper and inescapable end of considering another only 
in view of her rational powers. However, when I love a woman, I do not love 
her rational powers (though, speaking loosely, I might say that is one of the 
things I love about her), nor do I merely revel in my own pleasure. I love her, 
such that her good becomes for me like my own—because indeed it becomes a 
part of my own. To say this, however, is not merely to expand my self-conceit 
as Wood describes it—what is aimed at is still her good27—even as her good 
becomes inescapably linked with my conception of my own. 
Accordingly, when the husband rushes into the burning house to save 
his beloved wife, it is little different, with respect to his will, than if he were to 
                                                
26 This is a consequence of the structure of Kant’s conception of respect and may not 
necessarily be intrinsic to a broader, different conception. I will take up such an alternative 
understanding of respect below. 
27 Of course, it is my conception of her good, and I could be mistaken. Nevertheless, in a case 
like this one, a hasty exit from the burning house is clearly good for her, and thus it is 
transparently her good at which the husband’s action is directed. 
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do something dangerous or strenuous to save his own life. I cannot emphasize 
enough, however, that he is not acting as he does because of the pleasure he 
takes in her (though he might genuinely and legitimately take much pleasure 
in and from her), but because his will is determined towards her good by the 
very structure of his caring for her. Accordingly, to make his attitude towards 
her essentially one of respect is precisely to fail to express his own deepest 
convictions. It is, again, one thought too many. 
The conflict then is about the fundamental attitude it is appropriate to 
take towards those to whom one has special relationships. Following Wood’s 
Kant we would be led to conclude that towards everyone—loved one, 
stranger, or foe—our most fundamental attitude must be respect. On top of 
that respect, but never violating it, we might be thought to add layers of 
sentiment, emotional attraction or repulsion. However, Kant’s picture of 
morality simply requires that any duties we have towards others proceed 
from the motive of respect alone. 
While I am inclined to agree that we owe a certain kind of respect to all 
of our fellow humans, indeed to all of our fellow creatures, nonetheless I feel 
that taking, as most fundamental, the attitude of respect will oftentimes be 
horribly inappropriate. My most fundamental attitude towards my mother or 
my wife should not be one of respect; it should be an expression of a love so 
deep that it is constitutive of my very will. This does not mean that I cannot or 
indeed should not respect the “humanity” of my mother or my wife, but it 
does seem as if that respect is oftentimes a secondary consideration. Of these 
sorts of objects of my love, classing them together with the mass of humanity 
seems to radically undervalue them. It is almost a category mistake. 
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A Suggestion: Re-construing the Relationship of Respect to Love 
 
I fear that some readers may think I have rather undervalued the 
importance of respect. I want to be clear that the deep incompatibility I have 
been discussing thus far is a consequence of the nature of Kant’s 
understanding of respect. We must continually bear in mind that in Kant’s 
system the demand for respect is integral to his account of autonomy; they 
are, in a sense, the flip sides of the same coin. As I noted above, the demand 
for respect is intrinsic to rational agency in Kant’s system. 
The deep conflict might be resolvable to the extent that we offer a 
broader understanding of autonomy. If autonomy encompasses more than 
merely the agent as an instantiation of rational agency, we might be able to 
construct an account of the demand for respect that can integrate our 
intuitions about the (moral) importance of love. In the next chapter I am going 
to examine Frankfurt’s account of autonomy at length, so it will not be my 
purpose to do so here. Nonetheless, as a kind of preview I want to offer a 
suggestion (and that is all it will be at this point) of how autonomy and love, 
and thus respect and love, can be reconciled by rejecting Kant’s idea that 
agency is grounded in practical reason alone. 
As we have seen, for Kant the will can only be free insofar as it gives 
itself necessary laws; that is, insofar as it is determined by immutable laws 
that hold for all other rational wills. For Kant the will is essentially (and 
exclusively) rational and that rationality can only be fully expressed in a priori 
laws. Love is incompatible with autonomy precisely because it is “empirical”; 
it cannot underwrite necessary and universal laws. The question we have to 
ask now is simple: is Kant’s understanding of autonomy correct? 
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Let us consider Harry Frankfurt’s alternative understanding of 
autonomy. Rather than understanding the will to be essentially its rational 
nature, Frankfurt has a theory of the structure of the will as divided into a 
hierarchy of volitions or desires. First-order desires are desires for particular 
objects external to the will (e.g., the desire for food). Second-order desires are 
desires whose objects are first-order desires. A paradigm example: the desire 
for a cigarette is a first-order desire; the desire to not desire cigarettes (e.g., as 
part of a commitment to stop smoking) is a second-order desire. Frankfurt 
holds that autonomy consists in forming effective volitions according to one’s 
second-order desires. 
Frankfurt writes: 
 
…the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means 
(… roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More 
precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or 
have the will he wants… 
 It is in securing the conformity of his will to his second-
order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of the 
will… (Frankfurt [1971], 20). 
 
For Frankfurt, autonomy consists in having the effective will that one 
wants to have. It does not require that I want a particular kind of will (e.g., 
one that desires that it be determined by necessary and universal laws); it only 
requires that I be committed to having the will I do, in fact, have. There is an 
important proviso; the autonomous agent needs to be reflectively committed 
to his second-order volitions. For it is those second-order volitions which will 
determine which of his first-order volitions with which he “identifies himself 
decisively” (21). 
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A central idea of Frankfurt’s conception is that it is this decisive 
commitment to identify with some first-order volitions and to reject others that 
is at the heart of free agency. This notion of identification is not accidental. 
Who the agent is, what he is, is determined by what he identifies himself with. 
The process of identification, a commitment that “resounds” through his will, 
is at the core of his autonomy, because it is precisely the having the will he 
wants to have. 
Under Frankfurt’s account of autonomy, there is no problem 
reconciling love and autonomy. On that account a will determined by the love 
for some object is free just insofar as that determination is the one the agent 
wants to have. In other words, a will determined by love is autonomous just in 
case the agent wants to love what he does in fact love, if his love is expressive 
of his second-order volitions. 
We should note that this result is neither tautological nor trivial. It is 
possible, I take it, to have loves that one does not want to have. Someone, for 
instance, who grew up in an abusive home might still love his abusive parent 
(he might still have some complicated set of first-order desires towards the 
parent), even though he would say, on reflection, that he does not want to 
have such a love. Similarly, a jilted lover might wish that he no longer loved 
the woman who had left him, and yet I think we would be inclined to say that, 
at least in certain circumstances, he still loves her. In a third situation, 
someone might love something, such as kitsch, that he thinks is unworthy of 
love and wants not to love. In such cases, the agent is not free with respect to 
his loving, and accordingly if he were to act on these first-order volitions he 
would be acting with a divided will. He would be unfree in a manner 
analogous to what Frankfurt calls the “unwilling addict”—a person who acts 
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to gratify his addiction while simultaneously wanting not to have the first-
order desires which constitute that addiction. 
To freely love, then, is to identify with the desires that constitute that 
love. If that is the case, then somehow it is in my loving that I express who I 
truly am. On Frankfurt’s account the will itself is partially constituted by its 
“core commitments,” i.e., what it most cares about. For it is these core 
commitments, these higher-order volitions, which regulate and determine the 
agent’s free actions. The agent expresses his freedom in acting upon these core 
commitments, and so they can truly be said to constitute, at least partially, his 
identity and the ground of his free agency. Thus, loving is not only compatible 
with autonomy, but can itself be an expression of it. 
 
Now I want to note some of the ways in which this alternate account of 
autonomy seems superior. First, I think it is important to see how this account 
of the will lets us link love to the will at the deepest level. Thus it allows us to 
see love not as a mere contingent passion, but as issuing from the identity of 
the agent himself. I think this does the most justice to the phenomenology of 
deep loves, where the good of the object of his love seems to become so 
integrated in the agent’s self that an insult to the object is an insult to the 
agent. In other words, since freely loving X consists in desiring the good of X 
and wanting to desire the good of X, for something bad to happen to X is for 
one of my own desires, especially one I identify with, to be frustrated. 
Beyond how it feels, however, as a theory of the will this view has a 
significant advantage in how it construes love. Under a Kantian view love 
necessarily takes on a secondary role. On such view love does not—cannot—
determine the will freely (i.e., a will determined by love can never be fully 
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autonomous). Thus, on such a view my love is less about me, than about the 
object of my love. Yet in the deepest loves it seems as if my love issues from 
the very core of my being. It is at this point that we begin to descend (or 
ascend depending on how one looks at the matter) into the realm of poetry. 
But, I take it that the consistency of the metaphor that poets have used to 
express this point suggests something very important about the phenomena 
itself and to which the Kantian account seems woefully inadequate. 
Kant thinks that the pure will is essentially rational, thus it cannot be 
determined by anything less than a necessary and universal law and remain 
free. However, I do not think we have to follow Kant here. Although it is 
certainly the case that our rationality is an important part of our volitional 
structure, it does not seem to me correct to assume that my rationality alone is 
who or what I essentially am. In fact, insofar as my will is merely rational it 
must as well be in a sense anonymous, for whatever laws it gives to itself 
apply to the same degree to all other rational wills. There is nothing about my 
will that makes it mine besides the bare “I think” that Kant notes, in another 
context, attach to our cognitions.28 
Delving into the metaphysics of identity is obviously far beyond the 
scope of the present effort. However, I do want to suggest that the relationship 
of love to identity matters and supports the type of view I have sketched 
above. In short, if love can be an expression of a free will, then we can love 
another person without necessarily failing to respect her. On the account I 
have sketched, I am not limited merely to respecting her as another 
instantiation of rationality, but I am free to love her for what makes her who 
                                                
28 Williams discusses this idea of the anonymity of the Kantian agent in chapter 4 of Ethics and 
the Limits of Philosophy, (Williams [1985], 68-70). 
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she freely is—namely, the sorts of things that she loves, which make up her 
own core commitments. 
None of this, we should note, implies that either the rationality of the 
agent or that of his beloved is unimportant. A will constituted by 
commitments that are rationally incompatible is incoherent, and quite possibly 
wantonly unfree. We can and do subject our core commitments to rational 
reflection, and it is quite proper that we do so. On this view of love and 
autonomy rationality is important, it just is not alone the ground of all moral 
agency. The composite will, regulated by the requirements of rationality, but 
also expressing its internal structure as constituted by its higher-order 
volitions, is the true ground of agency. 
This then brings us full circle. We began by wondering if love was 
compatible with respect. I suggested before that our concern with respect for 
persons actually arises out of Kant’s concern for securing the autonomy of 
rational agents. Respect, for Kant, is a logical consequence of rational 
autonomy.  
The account I have offered reconciles respect and love, basically by 
rejecting Kant’s view of autonomy. It is important to note that I have not 
rejected the importance of autonomy, nor its position as the ground of 
morality (I can actually remain agnostic on the truth of the latter proposition). 
Rather, I have tried to suggest that love and respect can be brought together if 
we realize that respect does not require us to recognize in another merely her 
pure capacity for rationality. 
In fact, the view offered here suggests that respect consists in seeing 
another for what he actually is, what is expressive of his will. If Frankfurt is 
correct, while his rationality will be a central part of an agent’s will, it will not 
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constitute it entirely, nor will it necessarily be the most important thing about 
that will. Respect for another will require us to see the agent for what he is, 
and this will not be merely a formal property but will demand that we 
actually know something substantive about him, namely his loves and 
(especially his higher-order) desires. Obviously, much more can be said about 
the nature of respect informed by this notion of autonomy, but we must close 
for now.29 
My “suggestion” has taken us rather far afield. My purpose here was 
less to discuss the interesting interconnections of autonomy, respect, and love 
fully and more to offer the sketch of an alternative account that contrasts 
starkly with the Kantian picture. If we thought that a Kantian account of 
autonomy were the only one on offer, then we might be more willing to follow 
him in devaluing love. What I hope to have accomplished in this discursion is 
not a complete solution of the tension between love and respect, but to have 
strongly suggested that one is possible if we give up Kant’s assumption that 
only a will determined by a respect for the moral law alone can be fully free. 
The issues surrounding the proper understanding of respect go well 
beyond Kant exegesis proper. As I noted above, respect has become a central 
consideration in moral philosophy generally in, for example, contemporary 
liberal thinking following Rawls. Therefore, I want now to turn to one of the 
most important outgrowths of the Kantian project which is presently engaging 
moral philosophers—moral contractualism. 
 
                                                
29 Frankfurt’s discussions in “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, “Equality and Respect”, as well as 
Raz’s remarks in reply (“On Frankfurt’s Explanation of Respect for People”) show something 
about how such an account might go, but much more remains to be done in exploring this 
terrain. 
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 Moral Contractualism  
 
The project of moral contractualism seems to have developed, broadly, 
out of some of the issues Rawls has brought to the forefront of moral 
philosophy in the last 30 years. Other philosophers have taken up and 
expanded his original social and political project into the realm of normative 
ethics and metaethics. One of the more important of these philosophers is T. 
M. Scanlon, whose recent book What We Owe To Each Other, serves to collect 
and develop various strands in the developing project of moral 
contractualism, and whose work will serve as springboard for my discussion 
here.  
Comparing his own work to Kant’s, Scanlon notes that while “Kant 
sought to explain the special authority of moral requirements by showing how 
they are grounded in the conditions of our rational agency, I try to explain the 
distinctive importance and authority of the requirements of justifiability to 
others by showing how other aspects of our lives and our relations with others 
involve this idea” (Scanlon [1998], 6). Accordingly, Scanlon acknowledges that 
his view “is, in Kant’s terms, avowedly heteronomous.”  
Obviously, my goal cannot be a comprehensive examination of moral 
contractualism, within which there are now various live disagreements, or 
even just of Scanlon’s own detailed work. Rather, my comments here will be 
directed at what I take to be some of the most fundamental premises of the 
moral contractualist project, again asking the same kind of over-riding 
question we have considered vis-à-vis consequentialism and Kant: what can 
moral contractualism say about the demands of love and loyalty? 
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The core claim in the project of moral contractualism concerns the 
justification of moral principles that are binding on a group of agents. That 
claim is simply that judgments of right and wrong “are judgments about what 
would be permitted by principles that could not reasonably be rejected, by 
people who were moved to find principles for the general regulation of the 
behavior that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably reject” (4). 
Thus, what centrally characterizes the moral contractualist project is an 
attempt to find principles which are justifiable to all the parties involved. The 
essence of this test of justification is embodied in a requirement for those who 
oppose a proposed principle to provide reasons for their objection, which 
everyone else can accept as a reason. 
Moral contractualism draws on several strong intuitions, and its 
plausibility is directly proportional to the degree in which one is committed to 
those intuitions. These importantly include a claim about the primacy of 
reasons, and a thoroughgoing individualism. What ultimately matters 
according to this view is that representative (generic) individuals agree to 
principles binding them all, by accepting any principle against which there are 
no objectively compelling reasons. In other words, for a principle to be 
objectionable it must offend against the interests of a generic individual in such 
a way as to generate reasons against it that are universally available to all 
other agents.30 
                                                
30 Scanlon clarifies his position on page 171: “To avoid gridlock we must move away from the 
idea that each person’s life or each person’s happiness ‘matters’ to the question of an 
acceptable system of general principles of action. Acceptable principles could not require us, 
in deciding what to do, to consider how every actual individual would feel about it. And in 
deciding which systems of principles are ‘acceptable,’ we cannot envisage the reactions of 
every actual person, We can consider only representative cases, and take into account only 
those objections that a person could raise while recognizing the force of similar objections by 
others.” 
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Just as it is the case with social contract theories that no claim is made 
about actual constitutional conventions, so with moral contractualism there is 
no claim about the interests of actual specific individuals, variously motivated. 
On the contrary, what counts in this view are those reasons which are 
available to everyone, such that for a principle to count as objectionable, it 
must be so in virtue of reasons that an individual not in the position of one of 
those most directly affected can appreciate.  
On this view, as Scanlon says, “the idea of a reason [is] primitive” (17). 
This is very important because the constraints on what can count as a reason 
ultimately become constraints on the limits of morality. The central constraint, 
built into the core commitment, is that a reason cannot make reference only to 
the particularities of a given real individual’s desires, but must be available to 
all as a consideration shared by all generic individuals of a given class.  
 
I want now to return to our motivating question: what can moral 
contractualism say about the demands of love and loyalty? One thing we 
should note, off the bat, is that Scanlon is not committed to asserting that 
moral contractualism picks out all of what we refer to with the word 
‘morality.’ There may be loose uses of the word that attempt to pick out other 
situations in which behavior is guided by principles possessing some kind of 
authority that seems similar to the authority of morality, but Scanlon can 
claim that such uses actually operate under values outside his specific concern 
with rightness and wrongness. This being the case, there may be genuine 
values which the moral contractualist constraint on justifiability does not 
precisely pick out. Nonetheless, whatever these other values are, they cannot, 
in themselves, override the requirements of moral contractualism. In other 
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words, while there might be actions guided by genuine values either outside 
or on the periphery of morality proper, insofar as any of those values find 
expression in activities that contravene the requirements of the justifiability 
criterion, such activities are illegitimate and must give way before the 
requirements of morality as articulated by the justifiability criterion. 
Scanlon considers these issues under what he calls the “problem of 
priority,” which is “the question of how the morality of right and wrong is 
related to our other values and how it could make sense to give it priority over 
them” (160). Scanlon chooses to examine friendship, and how the particular 
demands of friendship (e.g., to favor this particular person over a similarly 
qualified stranger in the dispensation of some benefit) can be reconciled with 
the priority of “the morality of right and wrong.” 
Scanlon asks us to consider the following example: suppose that one’s 
kidneys have failed, and in an attempt to save your life one of your friends 
attacks a stranger and steals his kidneys to replace yours. Such a friend, claims 
Scanlon, would not be what we would be willing to call a friend at all, because 
friendship “involves recognizing the friend as a separate person with moral 
standing” such that a “person who only saw friends as having [moral] status” 
merely in virtue of being a friend, “would not have friends in [Scanlon’s 
sense]: their moral standing would be too dependent on the contingent fact of 
his affection” (164).  
This example is supposed to show “that friendship… requires us to 
recognize our friends as having moral standing as persons, independent of 
our friendship, which also places limits on our behavior” (165). In other 
words, “the conception of friendship that we understand and have reason to 
value involves recognizing the moral claims of friends qua persons, hence the 
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moral claims of nonfriends as well… [such that] no sacrifice of friendship is 
involved when I refuse to violate the rights of strangers in order to help my 
friend. Compatibility with the demands of interpersonal morality is built into 
the value of friendship itself” (ibid.). 
What we need to take out of this discussion is that idea that the moral 
claims of friends are only moral insofar as those claims are made qua persons. 
In other words, according to Scanlon, necessarily contained within the kind of 
friendship we “have reason to value” is the background assumption of the 
person-hood of all the parties involved, friend and non-friend alike. The 
requirements of morality concern their status as persons, not as friends, and so 
can only bind in virtue of that status. It should be clear, of course, that being a 
person just means being “someone to whom justification is owned in his or 
her own right.” 
We should instantly recognize this requirement as the same 
requirement made by Kant’s formula of humanity—namely, the demand for 
respect. The idea underlying this is that morality inescapably requires respect 
for all persons, irrespective of whatever feelings one bears them, positive or 
negative. The priority claim in Scanlon is supposed to reconcile the apparent 
conflicts between the demands of narrow morality and the demands of love 
and loyalty by somehow showing that the demands of love and loyalty, as in 
the demands of friendship in the example at hand, presuppose, or have built-
in to them, respect for persons.31 
Scanlon is very clear-eyed in understanding this feature to be 
necessarily characteristic of “friendship as we understand it, or with the 
                                                
31 “I believe that what I have argued here in the case of friendship is true as well of other 
personal relations whose demand many seem to conflict with morality, such as family ties and 
relation with other members of a team or cooperative enterprise” (166). 
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conception that we have most reason to value” (165). In other words, there are 
other possible conceptions of friendship (Scanlon cites Achilles and Patroclus), 
which would not necessarily have this feature; but, claims Scanlon, those other 
conceptions would either be alien to us, or we would not “have most reason to 
value” them. This presumably means that the only demands of love and 
loyalty that we have reason to value would have to have this feature (respect 
for persons), because of the nature of our more fundamental commitment to 
justifiability. This leads Scanlon to embrace a kind of relativism, as 
acknowledges that “the degree to which there is a conflict between the 
morality of right and wrong and the goods of personal relations depends 
greatly on the society in which one lives” (166). At the same time, however, he 
claims that we do have and value the sort of friendship he describes (where 
respect for persons is “built-in”) so that, for us (i.e., for those persons having 
this conception of friendship) the matter will always be resolved in favor of 
the priority of morality.32 
It should be no surprise that I will take issue with Scanlon’s conception 
of friendship in the same way that I took issue with Kant’s conception of 
love—namely, by doubting whether a respect for persons really is the most 
fundamental issue in the relationships which give rise to conclusive demands 
                                                
32 When I speak of relativism here, we must acknowledge that Scanlon is not necessarily 
committed to the notion that the “morality of right and wrong” is relativistic, but rather that 
the scope of the conflict between that “morality” and the “goods of personal relations” will be 
relative with respect to one’s society. It is not entirely clear how far down this relativism 
would go. In other words, what would be the status of the demand for justifiability in a 
society in which nobody had a pre-existing commitment to it, or for that matter, to the giving 
of reasons at all? I want to be clear, however, that I do not disagree with the truism that at 
their very deepest level, to some degree, the nature of our commitments is relative to the 
society in which we live. My main disagreement with Scanlon on this point is whether we live 
in a society in which the conception of friendship he has sketched (centrally involving a 
respect of persons) really does accurately capture what characterizes real friendship in our 
society. 
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of love and loyalty. As I noted above, there is a deep tension between the 
demands of love and the demand for respect. The requirement to see our 
loved ones, first as persons, and only then as the objects of our love, 
presupposes the primacy of our commitment to morality in a way I believe 
inconsistent with an ordering of the will that gives adequate space to the 
demands of love and loyalty. 
Scanlon himself specifically mentions Williams’ example of the 
husband choosing to save his wife from the burning building, but he seems 
rather unconcerned about it. He notes that the example merely gives rise to 
further questions about the priority of the demands of love and loyalty and 
their relationship to morality proper. As we have already seen, although he is 
willing to acknowledge that the demands of love and loyalty proceed from 
values that are worthwhile in themselves, Scanlon also holds that insofar as 
the demands of love and loyalty conflict with what morality requires, the 
former must give way. The reason for this is that the demands of morality—
specifically, the requirement of justification—are more basic than the demands 
of love and loyalty, because respect for persons is “built-in” to all our 
interpersonal relations, such that the demands of respect must trump all other 
demands when they conflict. 
Despite noting Williams’ example, I do not think Scanlon has properly 
appreciated its force. As I have tried to show above, the point of the “one 
thought too many” complaint is that justification is simply out of place in this 
context. The idea that Williams’ (and later Frankfurt, who embraces the 
example)33 is trying to get across is that for the husband there simply cannot 
                                                
33 See Frankfurt [2001], “Some Mysteries of Love.” 
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be any deliberation about ends in this situation. His will is directly determined 
by his love, in such a way that he simply must go after her. To demand 
justification for this action is simply to misconstrue its nature, because the 
movement of his will simply has very little, if anything, to do with morality. 
The moral contractualist might respond that this mistakes his project, 
because what is at stake is not the justification of any given action to others, 
but rather a justification of the principles guiding action. Thus, the moral 
contractualist will still maintain that any genuine value in the demands of love 
and loyalty can be accommodated in principles that everyone can accept, 
because recognizing the value of having loving relationships does not require 
one to actually refer to particular objects. Thus, generic individuals would be 
able to recognize the value of having loving relationships in general, and thus 
this fact could become a reason for rejecting principles that would undermine 
such relationships—all of this without making reference to particular objects 
(i.e., particular beloveds). 
I think this still misses the point, however. Because what is at stake is 
leaving open the possibility that an individual’s will could be determined in 
such a way that his commitment to morality would not necessarily be always 
overriding. This is of course connected with my claim above, that the valuing 
involved in the determination of the will that the husband experiences 
towards his beloved wife does not depend on her person-hood. I think 
Scanlon is simply wrong in claiming that respect for persons is built-in to all of 
the conceptions of special relationships we have reason to value, precisely 
because this fails to takes seriously the volitional requirements of love.  
A fuller clarification of these issues must await Part II when we 
examine the nature of the loving will directly; however, we can preview what 
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is at stake by considering another answer to Scanlon’s priority question. 
Scanlon evidently thinks our commitment to morality means that respect for 
persons is basic to all of our conceptions of interpersonal relationships that 
“we have most reason to value.” Is there an alternative view? 
Indeed there is; Frankfurt’s view of the place of morality seems to me to 
capture more closely what is at stake here. In a response to Barbara Herman’s 
complaint that he cannot account for the objectivity of moral values, Frankfurt 
claims that “we act morally when we are moved by love for a certain kind of 
world or a certain kind of life” (Buss and Overton [2002], 277). What we need 
to recognize here is the nature of Frankfurt’s novel claim. Frankfurt is 
basically saying that there is a more fundamental structural consideration than 
the requirements of morality, which is of course the structure of the will. The 
novelty of the claim, and I believe its deep truth, lies in the notion that our 
moral activity proceeds from a more basic volitional commitment to a 
particular kind of world or life. In other words, what is basic here is not 
respect for persons, but a particular structure of the will. 
As I will be at some pains to argue in Part II, it seems to me that the 
demands of love and loyalty, properly understood, are also determinations of 
the will. Our commitments to what we love are constitutive of the will in such 
a way that we are determined by them with respect to certain actions. Now 
this does not mean that the demands of love and loyalty will always over-ride 
the demands of morality, because to the extent that we are moral people we 
are also committed to (i.e., in love with) morality. Thus, the conflict that plays 
out will not, as Scanlon asserts, necessarily play itself out in the space 
determined by the requirements of morality (as described by his system of 
justifiability or any other), but in the space whose shape is determined by 
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what the given agent loves. The conflict will be analogous to the conflict in the 
will that occurs when two objects of my love are pulling me in different 
directions. 
The situation, then, is more like which obtains when the two people in 
the burning house are my wife and my daughter (instead of the stranger), 
both of whom I love unconditionally. In that case, the choice between them 
becomes almost debilitating, precisely because there is no sufficient reason to 
choose one over the other, and indeed could not be. What is at stake is a kind 
of schism in the will itself, where the nature of my loving commitments each 
demand unconditional obedience, but which both cannot be accommodated. 
The conflict then, is a conflict of loves, and if there is a resolution it is because 
one love wins out over the other.34 
Thus when the demands of love and loyalty conflict with the demands 
of morality what is at stake is a conflict of loves in the same way—my love for 
this particular person (or institution, etc.) versus my love for a certain kind of 
world or way of life. In a moral person sometimes, perhaps even the vast 
majority of the time, his love for morality will triumph over the love of a 
particular beloved; but, sometimes, it may come to pass that the love of the 
particular will override a consideration of the requirements of morality. In 
other words, Scanlon is mistaken in thinking that respect for persons is built-
in to all the conceptions of interpersonal relationships that we do actually 
                                                
34 It seems to me that in this situation the state of the will is very complicated. This could 
result in no action being taken at all, because my will, in the face of these incompatible 
requirements, simply breaks down, so to speak. Additionally, I might, rationally, conclude 
that the choice situation is ambiguous and then go after one versus the other for no good 
reason at all, but this also represents a kind of break down. The particulars of the case, for the 
particular husband and father involved, will be determinate. 
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value.35 Indeed, the proper expression of the value of those relationships will 
often require the they conflict with the requirements of morality. 
I think a kind of rescue case can make this clearer. Consider the stock 
example of being in a position to rescue the inhabitants of only one of two 
islands, when both are threatened (e.g., by some natural disaster) and it is 
impossible to get to both in time. If there are an equal number of persons on 
both islands, then whichever group that is not saved is generally not taken to 
have a valid moral complaint against the rescuer. Thus if there is one person 
on each island, if the rescuer flips a coin and rescues the person on island A, 
leaving the inhabitant of island B to perish, it is generally conceded that the 
person on B does not have a moral complaint against the rescuer. 
On the other hand, if island A has two inhabitants and island B only 
one, then it would seem that equal respect for persons would require the 
rescuer to go to island A. The reason for this is that if he goes to island B, he 
will seem to have wronged one person.36 Thus, it would seem the agent would 
be wrong to, for example, flip a coin to determine his action, because the 
greater number of persons on island A provide a sufficient reason for rescuing 
them, while giving equal respect to everyone.  
Consider the case if the single person on island B is the rescuer’s 
beloved mother. Seeing her danger he feels volitionally compelled to save her 
and does so. In such a case, he has not treated all the victims with equal 
                                                
35 As to whether they are built into all the conceptions we “have reason to value,” that is a 
sufficiently difficult question that I will leave it here unaddressed. In any case, I am content 
with the claim that the actual and real demands of love and loyalty towards which our 
intuitions aim (as brought out in Williams’ example) are embodied in the values we actually 
do place on our beloveds. 
36 Only one and not two persons are wronged because one of the two is “cancelled out” in 
some way by the person on island B who was rescued. The example presupposes generic 
individuals, and no pre-existing claim by any of them on the rescuer.  
  
168 
respect. At the same time, however, I think many observers would not 
consider the rescuer’s action to be wrong, certainly not in the same way had 
he gone to island B on account of a coin flip. Many of us would not only 
understand the rescuer’s action, but consider him to have done nothing 
blameworthy. I concede that others would think him wrong, of course, but I 
consider the example plausible enough, even for those who disagree, to show 
that we can and do have values attaching to particulars which are deeper than 
equal respect for persons.37 
Bear in mind that I am not suggesting that the fact that the person on 
island B is the rescuer’s mother gives him a better reason for going to B. Rather, 
I am suggesting that if his love for his mother wins out over his love for an 
impartial morality he is far from being a moral monster. While others might 
disagree, I cannot help but think that many would not only not blame him for 
rescuing his mother but would consider him in some way inhuman if calmly 
disregards her for the sake of cool impartial reason. The point is that the 
agent’s available reasons are not alone the ultimate deciding factor in 
evaluating good action.38  
                                                
37 I would not be surprised at all if intuitions would change where the numbers different. If, 
for instance, there were a thousand people on island A and still only the rescuer’s mother on 
island B, then we probably would be less inclined to view his saving only her indulgently. I 
do not wish to suggest that there is some precise equivalence where one’s deep attachment to 
one’s mother outweighs the claims on one other person, but not 999. It is sufficient for my 
point here if the reader at least takes it as plausible that in the two versus one case presented 
the rescuer has acted reasonably. I am indebted to Richard Miller for suggesting these types of 
examples. 
38 As an aside, I think that the virtue ethics tradition could encompass this sort of example, 
insofar as the rescuer who goes after his mother could be considered a man of good character. 
I am not suggesting that he necessarily will be so considered by all virtue ethicists, but it is 
certainly an open possibility within a virtue ethics type view in a way it seems not to be an 
open possibility in a rationalist Kantian or moral contractualist type view. Nonetheless, it is 
only an aside and it is not my purpose here to make this argument for virtue ethics.  
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I want to be clear here, this is not a claim that the demands of love and 
loyalty necessarily take priority over the demands of the morality. Rather, this 
is a repudiation of the reverse claim, that morality always takes priority over 
the demands of love and loyalty. The point is that the authority of both of 
these sorts of demands within the will, insofar as they determine action, lies in 
the strength of our love for the values that inform them. In other words, love 
(in Frankfurt’s sense of the constitutive commitments of the will), not 
morality, is what is basic. The conflicts between morality and the demands of 
love and loyalty play themselves out on a field whose contours are defined, 
not by morality alone, but by what we love (among which can and should be 
included considerations of impartial morality). 
The point of the example is not that the rescuer is necessarily doing the 
right thing in going after his mother. Rather, this case is meant to counteract 
the intuition elicited by Scanlon’s kidney-stealing friend example. There 
Scanlon claims that a friend willing to radically violate respect on account of 
friendship would not be the kind of friendship we have reason to value. The 
reason for that, according to Scanlon, is that respect is more basic than 
attachment within our concept of friendship.  
What the mother example shows is that respect is not always more 
basic, that there are attachments which can inform an agent’s actions without 
making that agent appear to be a moral monster. The power of Scanlon’s 
example lies in how strongly it elicits our intuition that we cannot so greatly 
wrong a stranger on account of a friend. It does not show, however, that we 
cannot legitimately “wrong” (at least from an impartial standpoint) someone 
else on account of a deep attachment. As I suggested above, not only do I 
think it likely that many would not disapprove the rescuer going after his 
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mother, I think many would find positively distasteful his failing so rescue 
her. I will be the first to admit that this does not settle the moral issue at hand, 
but it does show that we have powerful intuitions suggesting that acting on 
impartial respect is not always best. 
To claim, as the moral contractualist does, that morality is more basic, is 
to fail to appreciate the degree to which morality is dependent on a volitional 
commitment for its authority. Scanlon, in particular, should be sensitive to this 
because his claims so often make reference to the nature of our commitment to 
justification, with the full knowledge and recognition that people in other 
cultures and societies may have wholly incompatible commitments that do 
not include justification in terms of public reasons.39 Accordingly, he should 
recognize how the demands of morality, insofar as they have authority—that 
is, insofar as they are real demands—are such only in virtue of our volitional 
commitment to them and to the ideals they embody. It is the commitments of 
the will (generally including a commitment to morality) that are basic, not the 
demands of morality simpliciter. 
 
The plausibility of the foregoing, and indeed the plausibility of my 
argument for the legitimacy of the demands of love and loyalty as a whole, is 
wholly dependent on the plausibility of the picture of the will I am taking up 
from Frankfurt and Williams. Many of the considerations to which I have 
                                                
39 “If no one in my society understand friendship as having the moral content I have just 
described [i.e., respect for persons], then a relationship with others on this footing is not 
available to me. If everyone in my society sees the world as divided between ‘them,’ the 
outsiders to whom nothing is owed, and ‘us,’ who are bound by relations of blood, affection, 
and patronage, then I really am faced with a choice between actual ties with my fellow 
citizens—strong and warm, perhaps, if also fierce—and the requirements of morality, 
grounded in an ideal of relations with others that must remain purely ideal. I have tried to 
argue that we are not in fact faced with this choice, but it must be conceded that others could 
be.” (166) 
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repeatedly appealed in these last two chapters only have force insofar as the 
claims I have made about the structure of the will and the nature of authority 
(as volitional) are sustained. It is now finally time to begin Part II in which I 
will turn to a detailed examination of that picture of the will, and the 
relationship within it between the demands of morality and the demands of 
love and loyalty.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
Frankfurt and a Volitional Theory of Value 
 
 
In Part I, I tried to show how and why the conventional universalist 
theories of morality are deeply insensitive to the demands of love and loyalty. 
I argued that the demands of love and loyalty are directed at particularist 
values for which those theories can not adequately account. In Part II, I will 
turn my attention to giving an analysis of those values aimed at articulating 
the nature of those values and their central place within moral psychology, 
both descriptively and normatively.  
I have repeatedly appealed to Williams’ example of the man acting to 
save only his wife, trapped in with a stranger in a burning building, without 
pausing to consider whether he was justified in doing so. I want now to 
remind the reader of Williams’ conclusion which I quoted in the Introduction, 
as my discussion in this chapter will focus in large part on expanding on the 
very suggestive points he makes there. He writes: 
 
…But the point is that somewhere (and if not in this case, 
where?) one reaches the necessity that such things as deep 
attachments to other persons will express themselves in the 
world in ways which cannot at the same time embody the 
impartial view, and that they also run the risk of offending 
against it. 
 They run that risk if they exist at all; yet unless such 
things exist, there will not be enough substance or conviction in 
a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life itself. Life has to have 
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substance if anything is to have sense, including adherence to 
the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant 
supreme importance to the impartial system, and that system’s 
hold on it will be, at the limit, insecure.  
(Williams [1982], 18) 
 
The main issue at stake in this chapter is simply: what is entailed by 
this requirement that a life have “substance”? Williams gives us this highly 
intriguing suggestion that an agent’s commitment to impartial morality is 
structurally insecure because it is necessarily in conflict with other 
commitments which are intrinsically incompatible with it. Furthermore, these 
other commitments ground “allegiance to life itself.” However, as suggestive 
as this is, he leaves us wondering how exactly these “deep attachments to 
other persons” (and, I would add, deep attachments to other non-personal 
objects like institutions, traditions, or ideals) play themselves out within a life 
of “substance.” 
In some sense, this entire chapter—indeed this entire dissertation—is 
an attempt to understand what a life with substance is, what values it 
embodies, and what possessing those values entails by way of action and 
belief. To begin to answer this question, however, I will leave Williams and 
turn instead to an analysis offered by Harry Frankfurt. It is in Frankfurt’s 
rather radical work on the will, love, and especially what he calls “volitional 
necessity” that we will begin to find our way forward. 
 
Frankfurt 
 
Harry Frankfurt’s work in moral psychology, ethics, and the 
philosophy of agency over the past 30 years has been nothing short of 
revolutionary. Perhaps most remarkable has been his rethinking of what 
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constitutes autonomy and personhood by developing an extremely influential 
hierarchical model of the will. In his more recent work he has moved even 
further into the confused thicket of moral psychology, and sought to (re-) 
introduce important categories of phenomena which have been overlooked or 
de-emphasized within the (overly) rationalistic tendencies of what he has 
called the “pan-moralism” of most modern moral theories.1 These categories 
are essentially related to what we love and the way in which our wills, 
organized around our loving, are partially constituted by that loving. 
I want to begin by examining some of Frankfurt’s thinking on these 
topics, especially the nature of what he calls “volitional necessity.” I hope to 
show how the deepest loyalties generate demands of love and loyalty which 
are a species of these volitional necessities and further how such volitional 
necessities are an inescapable consequence of the expression of the sorts of 
volitional values which inform the deepest loyalties.  
 
                                                
1 “It seems to me that many philosophers, in their approach to the task 
of identifying and understanding the norms that most authoritatively 
govern human conduct, are excessively preoccupied with morality. In 
their efforts to clarify and justify the basic standard to which we must 
submit when we act, they tend to focus their attention more or less 
exclusively upon issues pertaining to the requirements of moral 
obligation. Varieties of practical normativity that appear to be non-
moral are either neglected entirely; or it is argued that in fact they are 
ultimately derivative from moral considerations, and that therefore 
their strictures concerning how we should act are just special cases of 
moral constraints. In my opinion, this pan-moralistic conception of 
practical normativity is mistaken. There are fundamentally 
authoritative practical norms that do not depend for their authority 
upon the requirements of morality. What I have particularly in mind 
are the requirements of love.” (Frankfurt [1998], 4) 
 
  
176 
Volitional Necessity 
 
This concept of volitional necessity was introduced by Frankfurt within 
an analysis of the relationship of freedom to necessity. Frankfurt was at pains 
to show how the contemporary “ideal of freedom,” through which we are 
“fundamentally committed to encouraging a steady expansion of the range of 
options from which people can select,” (Frankfurt [1999], 108) misses a vitally 
important point about the relationship between freedom and necessity. 
Namely, “as the ideal of freedom is more closely approached, the progressive 
reduction of necessity tends to undermine that ideal; and it also tends to 
undermine the ideal of individuality. For it is true both of freedom and 
individuality that they require necessity” (109).  
Recall that Frankfurt has a hierarchical model of the will. An agent has 
first-order desire directed at objects in the world (e.g. hunger) as well as 
higher-order desires directed at lower-order desires (e.g. the desire not to be 
hungry). An agent is free, for Frankfurt, just in case his actions reflect his 
higher-order desires, i.e., what he most cares about. It is these higher-order 
desires or commitments which (partially) constitute the agent’s will, because it 
is those commitments that determine who the agent most authentically is. 
Who I am is determined (in large part) by what I most love. 
According to Frankfurt the dependency between freedom and necessity 
is structural. It is only in virtue of a certain sort of necessity that an individual 
can exercise the faculty of choice in a manner that represents an authentic 
expression of his own will. The “extensive growth in the variety of a person’s 
options may weaken his sense of his identity.” The reason for this is simple: 
“without a definitive set of goals, preferences, or other principles of choice” a 
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person’s will itself will lack the kind of stability necessary for any given choice 
to be a genuine reflection of that will. His will itself will be in flux, and he 
“will be in a position to redesign his own will.” However, once that happens 
no choice “will be fully or wholeheartedly his own” and as such he “is not 
volitionally equipped to make truly autonomous choices” (110).  
The way in which this generates a necessity lies in the way in which 
such volitionally constitutive commitments determine the will. In other 
words, the agent’s higher order commitments will express themselves 
precisely in binding the agent, in a sense forcing him onto a certain path, not 
as an external compulsion that limits his freedom, but as an internal impulsion 
that expresses it. I will examine this in more detail below, but to understand 
why this works this way we need first to understand the volitional structure 
that generates this necessity. 
Without a stable core of higher order commitments by which he 
organizes his lower order desires, identifying with some and rejecting others, 
there can be no genuine choices. Of course, the individual may still act, after a 
certain fashion, pursuing the objects of various desires as they come to the 
forefront of his psychic attention. However, if this is the case there is no longer 
term plan or organization to his life; he becomes what Frankfurt earlier 
characterized as a “wanton,” buffeted by the changing winds of desires, 
driven from one object to another without an enduring self-conscious sense of 
self. His unity is merely the unity of concatenation. What he lacks is narrative 
unity, the unity of a life responding to reflective commitments to principles 
and ideals that guide, organize, and so provide meaning to his life. 
This stability is at the heart of genuine choice insofar that all such 
choices must be made in reference to some relatively fixed (in the context of a 
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given choice) identity determined by what one most cares about. Without 
such a fixity of his will, the agent’s “choice” would fail to reflect anything 
enduringly particular about his will. Thus the modern ideal of a steadily 
expanding range of options encourages a substitution of whim over truly self-
expressive choice. It is not that there is any kind of necessarily analytic 
relationship between an increase in the number of options and the decline of 
authentic agency. Rather the point is that the steady expansion of options 
tends to undermine the development of a self with genuine commitments (and 
thus a core identity) because it fosters a kind of flitting about, moving from 
one option to another and never acquiring the kind of understanding that can 
only come from long acquaintance and experience, of having to “live with” 
one’s choices. 
The key point that Frankfurt is after here is the idea that autonomy 
does not merely consist in the absence of outside compulsion, nor is it simply 
advanced by an expansion of options. Rather, autonomy consists in having a 
life organized around central volitional commitments, which themselves are 
not subject to easy change or alteration, and further that these commitments 
partially constitute the will. These commitments—to persons, institutions, or 
more abstract ideals, etc.—provide the ground upon which real choices, as 
opposed to the mere giving in to various inclinations or desires, can be 
advanced. “Unless a person makes choices within restrictions from which he 
cannot escape by merely choosing to do so, the notion of self-direction, of 
autonomy, cannot find a grip” (110). 
This notion of finding a grip is vitally important in understanding what 
is at stake here. For a will to be autonomous, i.e., the will of a (moral) agent, it 
must itself be grounded in commitments which themselves are not subject to 
  
179 
easy alteration. These commitments provide the core values by reference to 
which all the agent’s choices are made and managed, and as such represent 
the foundation for responsible agency itself. The agent is an agent only in 
virtue of these commitments, and his agency flows from them. Without them 
he would cease to be the person he is and would lose the very core of his 
personal identity and individuality. 
Of course, this does not mean that an agent’s core commitments are 
immutable and fully insulated from change. It is possible that these 
commitments could grow or decline. If some of them were to weaken they 
might be overthrown by new commitments growing out of changed 
circumstances. However, these changes will generally be slow and tortured; 
they certainly will not proceed out of capriciousness or whimsy.2 One thing is 
clear, however; these changes cannot be fully comprehensive; they do not 
throw the agent’s entire psychic economy into disarray. 
Rather, what seems to happen is that the agent becomes conscious, in 
ways he previously was not, of a deep incompatibility between several of the 
commitments he already has and with which he is wholeheartedly identified. 
In other words, even in the most extreme sorts of conversions—generally 
religious, but not always—there always remains a kind of core, stable 
commitments which not only survive the conversion, but might even be 
                                                
2 I may have given the impression that the controlling factor in such changes is temporal. 
Clearly this is not the case; although most such deep changes take time, it would be unwise to 
rule out the road to Damascus possibility. Oftentimes, the most profound deep alterations in 
our literature concern these sorts of religious conversions. This is of course a thicket within 
which it would be best not to delve too far, concerning as it does, for believers, the 
introduction of supernatural factors (e.g., Grace and/or Divine intervention). Nonetheless, 
whatever the ultimate causes of these types of conversions, it should be clear that the 
temporal results—the volitional reorganization—are not easy or painless. Even where the 
conversion, like St. Paul’s, is temporally quick, according to the agent’s own testimony, it 
presented these him with a severe psychic trauma which upset his entire way of life. 
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vindicated by it. In the most famous cases of religious conversion, for example 
those of St. Paul or St. Augustine, though radically different in so many ways 
(blinding and sudden in the former case, slow and tortured in the latter), the 
agent retains a core commitment through all the changes, be it the love of God, 
or the love of truth (which, of course, for these two come ultimately to the 
same thing). 
In other words, the conversion is itself predicated upon the stability of 
certain commitments which, in the light of changes in the agent’s 
epistemological landscape, underwrite the radical changes in will. For 
instance, in Saul’s case his conversion to Christianity was his response to a 
changed understanding of what he believed God required of him. Through his 
radical conversion his commitment to following the will of God remains; what 
changes is only his understanding of what that requires. Thus does he move 
from persecuting Christians to becoming one of them. 
The situation with Augustine is similar in this respect. For him the 
changes over the course of his life, the flip-flops from a libertine life to 
Manichaeism and ultimately to Christianity, were, as he characterizes it, in 
response to the philosopher’s love of truth. Confronted with problems he 
could not yet solve, the young Augustine moves between various 
commitments which seemed to him, at the time, to offer answers to his chief 
motivating concerns. However, even as he underwent these changes his 
commitment to seek out the truth remained the constant, guiding focus of his 
life. Whether or not he himself was correct in his ultimate analysis of what 
that commitment required, it is clear that subjectively this commitment 
remained unchanged throughout his life. 
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The same structural feature—the stability of a core commitment to 
some ideal like the truth—would hold for other, non-religious types of deep 
conversions as well. Copernicus’ rejection of Ptolemy, and Kant’s of Wolff, for 
instance, both answer to this description. Though some philosophers have 
been entirely too confident that a commitment to the truth must be the 
universal commitment of mankind, nonetheless I do think it is clear that some 
sort of commitment, whether it be to the truth or to some other object, must 
underlie all deep changes and conversions and remain constant through them. 
It is only by having this temporally extended set of commitments that anyone 
can be said to rise to the level of personhood and express agency. It is only 
against a background of stability that a change can be a “progression” and not 
merely a movement.3 
 
Now we are in a position to see that the importance of core 
commitments within structure of the will itself is what actually generates the 
necessity—the phenomenon that Frankfurt calls “volitional necessity.” This 
will help us to understand how volitional demands not arising from 
universalist moralities can nonetheless be volitionally normative. The 
necessity consists precisely in the way that such commitments determine the 
agent’s effective will. 
                                                
3 When I speak of a “progression” here I do not mean that it is necessarily progress towards 
the good or the truth, etc. Rather, I mean it is progress in the way that a character makes 
“progress” through a narrative. Though some modern writers have attempted to undermine 
this expectation of a progressive narrative (surrealism or aburdism are examples), nonetheless 
the normativity of the narrative remains (and indeed provides the necessary point without 
which the absurdism would be meaningless. Ultimately this is connected with my 
understanding of a good human life to be a kind of narrative, and that person identity 
(partially) consists in the unity of such a personal narrative over time, but such topics are well 
beyond our scope here. 
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Frankfurt introduces his discussion of volitional necessity with an 
example of a mother who has decided to give up her child for adoption 
because she thinks, all things considered, it will be better for herself. However, 
when “the moment arrives for actually giving up the child… she may find that 
she cannot go through with it—not because she has reconsidered the matter 
and changed her mind but because she simply cannot bring herself to give the 
child away” (111). What is happening here is that she is coming up against the 
“limits of [her] will.” What Frankfurt wants us to see is that it is not a question 
of belief or even desire—she has not changed in her belief that it would be 
better for her to give up the child, and perhaps she still desires (in some ways) 
to be free of him; rather, she cannot will the action. This limitation on her 
grows out of some core commitment within her will itself. 
In this case, perhaps very much against her antenatal desires, she has 
come to love the child. A devotion to the child has become a central 
commitment for her. Thus even though she may have the conscious belief that 
she ought to give up the child, she nonetheless finds herself incapable of doing 
so, because this would do violence to her incipient love for him.  
It is not that beliefs of some sort are not in play here. As the will acts it 
must necessarily act on and in light of beliefs about the world (and itself). 
Nonetheless, what this example is designed to show is that the incapacity to 
give up the child is not the result of an all-things-considered prudential 
judgment—indeed it is not a judgment per se at all—but rather a volitional 
incapacity, in which she discovers something about herself and her will 
(namely, that she loves the child).  
Accordingly, this is experienced by her “less as a defeat than as a 
liberation.” Although what we might call her “better judgment” is defeated by 
  
183 
her volitional incapacity to carry through its conclusions, nonetheless this 
incapacity is not an external imposition, but rather the means by which she 
comes to understand something important about herself. It is liberating 
precisely because it gives her real knowledge about what matters to her, and 
thus perhaps alleviates a great deal of doubt and anxiety. It is not a defeat 
precisely because it proceeds from her will itself—it is her “true” self breaking 
through, as it were.4 The key conclusion Frankfurt is driving at is simple: for a 
person in a situation like this woman’s, this kind of “necessity is 
unequivocally constitutive of his nature or essence as a volitional being” (113). 
Understanding volitional necessity is vital for understanding the true 
nature of agency. For our purposes here we should now be in a position to see 
that the demands of love and loyalty are in many cases precisely a species of 
volitional necessity. It is in virtue of the place that concern for the objects of 
these demands takes within the volitional structure of the agent that he feels 
these demands. These loyalties rise up within the agent himself; they are not 
external impositions, but internal imperatives rising from his integration of his 
deepest loves and loyalties into his very volitional nature. These loyalties are 
the type on display when Robert E. Lee, offered command of the Army of the 
Potomac responds, “I cannot raise my hand against my birthplace, my home, 
my children.” 
                                                
4 It is here again we recognize a key point from the previous chapter on Kant—practical 
reason and the will are not identical. Recall that it was Kant’s contention that the pure (i.e., 
fully moral) will should collapse into practical reason. What Frankfurt’s point about volitional 
necessity suggests is that this is impossible insofar as real human wills are partially 
constituted by their deep commitments. It is, of course, another thing to argue the moral 
point. Even if it is true that no real human will is, has been, or ever will be, free from these 
volitional necessities, this does not by itself show that it is unreasonable to require them to be. 
I make some greater effort to detangle these points below. 
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It was not merely that he favored war or Southern independence; 
indeed, before the war he was opposed to both. Rather, when the chips were 
down he discovered that he could not bring himself to act against what he 
perceived to be the interests of his native Virginia. I hasten to add here, that 
what I am interested in is not whether or not he was correct in his estimation 
of what his love for birthplace, home, and children required. Rather, the point 
at issue here is the state of his will as he contemplated acting. Though he may 
have favored the preservation of the Union, he simply could not bring himself 
to act against what he perceived to be the interests of the commonwealth he 
loved more. I believe this incapacity was not simply the result of weighing his 
preferences, but arose out of his “very essence as a volitional being.” 
This fatal moment is not a moment of rational deliberation at all, but the 
deepest expression of an agent’s will filtered through his understanding 
(accurate or not) of what the best interests of what he loves requires. What is 
important is that the agent recognizes that the volitional necessity reflects 
what is centrally important to him. It would be a mistake to think that if he 
does not have rational grounds for his commitments that they are not his or 
fail to be an expression of his autonomy. With respect to his autonomy what 
matters is that he embrace his commitments, that he claim them for himself, as 
expressive of himself, whether or not he has rational grounds for holding 
them. 
Understanding the deepest sorts of loyalty requires us to understand 
what is happening in cases like these. It is certainly not that all loyalties, all 
demands of love and loyalty, will rise to the level of volitional necessity. 
Nevertheless, it is important that we be aware that this sort of volitional 
necessity is the limit case, the embodiment of the deepest commitments in 
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human life. As I will argue below, it is my contention that possessing some 
sort of these deepest commitments is sine qua non for being a person and thus 
the ultimate limit of what any moral theory can require of us. 
It is particularly important that we see that the presence of such 
volitional necessities constrains and informs the very possibility of rational 
deliberation. They represent the limits to which deliberation can come but 
cannot press over. Before a real, conclusive demand of love and loyalty the 
will stands bound, and no decision or choice can overcome its internal 
determination. The only way in which the will can be moved off of this 
volitionally necessitated course of action is for the agent to cease to love the 
object of concern which informs that necessity, and that is not within the 
bounds of rational choice. “We cannot help loving what we love, nor can we 
make ourselves love by a mere act of will” (114).5 
The reason for this is the same as what we saw above. If I were able to 
reconstruct the nature of my will by merely choosing to do so, then my will 
would lack the stability necessary to make any particular configuration of the 
will authentically mine. Unless there is some enduring ground from which my 
choices proceed, as accurate reflections of what I care about, then my 
“choices” are little more than whimsy—they are not strictly choices at all. For 
a choice to be a real choice, it must reflect values which themselves are (to 
some degree) fixed and thus most authentically mine. Otherwise, they are like 
passing fancies and certainly do not manifest anything central to the agent’s 
identity. 
                                                
5 Frankfurt continues: “The value of loving for us derives, precisely, at least in part, from the 
very fact that whether we love is not up to us. The importance of loving would be lost if we 
could love something or cease to love it merely by deciding to do so. The self-fulfillment and 
freedom that love provides depend upon the very necessity that love entails.” 
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When we think hard about the nature of what we care about most—our 
families, our selves, the truth—I think it becomes apparent that there really is 
very little choice involved. I never made a choice to love my mother. This is 
not to say that a mature agent cannot repudiate any or all of these things; in 
fact, many have. It is a mistake, however, to think that because something can 
be repudiated by choice, that it must have been originally accepted by choice.6  
I can choose to repudiate the color of my hair. I can choose to dye it 
blond, or red, or purple. But the fact that I can make that choice obviously 
does nothing to show that I chose for my hair to be black, or, for that matter, 
even assented to that fact. In the case of hair color this may be unimportant. In 
the case of what I discover about my will, it clearly is not. 
Obviously, there are considerable differences between a physical 
property of my body and the constitution of my will. Nonetheless, the 
example does show how something can properly be said to be mine without 
my having chosen it. Further, the point of similarity is deeper than it might at 
first appear. We are so used to thinking that the will simply is the faculty of 
choice, that we tend to use ‘will’ and its cognates almost interchangeably with 
‘choose’ and its cognates. Thus we have expressions like “fire at will” which 
means more or less the same as “fire whenever you choose.” We speak as well 
of the “willing accomplice” or being forced to so something “against my 
will.”7 These colloquialisms notwithstanding, it should nevertheless be clear 
                                                
6 This is the mistake that has infected some notions of social contract theory, leading to an 
implausible weight being placed on consent, especially in the guise of something like Locke’s 
notion of “tacit consent.” 
7 The Stoics’ idea of freedom—that my will can never be dominated except insofar as I allow 
it—shows the ambiguity of the notion of being forced to do something against my will. In fact, 
I cannot do something against my will. I can be forced to make choices I don’t want to make, 
or act in a manner I would not have chosen otherwise, but this is rather different from actually 
doing something against my will.  
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that Frankfurt’s use of ‘will’ as a term of art is meant to make a clear 
distinction between the faculty of choosing and the will. 
It is important that we recognize this divergence between choosing and 
the determination of the will. Choosing is an exercise of practical reason. 
Moral philosophers have tended to concentrate almost entirely on the exercise 
of practical reasoning, and accordingly they have generally come to view 
practical reasoning as the whole story of practical normativity. Frankfurt’s 
examples clearly show, however, that other aspects of the will are normative, 
aspects which may have nothing whatsoever to do with morality. 
When, as we saw in the last chapter, Herman talks of the deliberative 
field model and the need to “normalize” one’s “interests” into reasons, she is 
implicitly following Kant’s thought that the only truly autonomous action is 
fully reason-guided. The question of what we should do can be (in principle, if 
not always in fact) settled by an appeal to the available reasons. While they 
would certainly acknowledge the presence of powerful desires that affect how 
an agent actually does act (even at times preventing him from acting as he 
would rationally choose to do without those desires), it seems as if these 
philosophers are not adequately sensitive to the degree to which the field of 
an agent’s possible action is pre-determined by the higher-order commitments 
he has. In supposing that reasons (and thus reasoning) are basic to practical 
normativity, they fail to appreciate the degree to which our actions are 
determined by volitional structures lacking any kind of independently 
rational basis.  
Those structures are what they are merely because we love what we 
love, and we all know that while some instances of loving may be reasonable, 
others are not. Ultimately, it is these loves, and the volitional necessities they 
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inform, which define the very scope of our practical reasoning. Contra Kant 
(and his myriad followers) this suggests that reasons are not always 
fundamental in (morally significant) agency, that deep attachments can move 
the will independently of the judgments they may also inform. 
 
What I have just said here is rather radical, and liable to be 
misunderstood; therefore let me make clear what I am not saying. I am not 
saying that practical reason is unimportant or that the giving of reasons is 
unimportant. Further, I am not proposing that we replace the role of practical 
reason, within practical agency, with volitional commitment. Rather, instead 
of substituting one set of “rules” for another, I am suggesting that a full 
account of practical agency requires us to acknowledge that practical 
rationality is not the only modality in play in the determination of 
autonomous human action. Rather, it is one of potentially many volitionally 
constitutive elements whose interaction determines an agent’s ultimate action. 
What this means is that our commitment to the canons of impartial 
morality itself is ultimately a commitment structurally similar to our other 
volitionally constitutive commitments. This very surprising conclusion is 
endorsed by Frankfurt; he writes in reply to another essay of Herman’s that 
his “own view is that we act morally when we are moved by love for a certain 
kind of world or a certain kind of life” (Buss and Overton [2002], 277). Thus 
our commitment to morality is founded on love—and enforced by volitional 
necessity—in a manner similar to our particular volitional constitutive 
commitments to our own specific objects of love and loyalty. The conflict that 
sometimes arises between the commitments then cannot be settled by 
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integrating them into a single deliberative field, because it is not a matter of 
weighing reasons—deliberating—at all. 
Rather, for a given individual it is a matter of coming to grips with 
what most matters to him; what he loves most. Oftentimes this will be a (self-) 
discovery, whose precise outcome he could not have predicted beforehand. 
He will find out what he can and cannot do, by where the limits of his will are 
drawn in consequence of his deepest, constitutive volitional commitments. It 
may turn out that he is most committed to the ideals embodied in the 
principles of impartial morality and so is constrained to act in accordance with 
them by limits of his will. It may also turn out that other of his commitments 
overwhelm his commitment to the principles of impartial morality—and by 
the same sort of volitional necessity he is driven to accede to demands 
informed by these other commitments. 
Of course, this working out of the limits of his will is filtered through, 
and informed by, the giving of reasons and the making of judgments. The 
agent will make judgments about what his loves require of him, and he will 
feel their demands play themselves out in the world. Thus the agent will 
generally have reasons of some sort for what he does; it is not the case that the 
presence of volitional necessity obviates the need for reasons or reasoning. 
Nonetheless, his actions are constrained by the scope of his volitionally 
constitutive commitments, and his deliberations occur within the boundaries 
set by those commitments. 
Of course, this does not mean that such deep commitments are fully 
insulated from reflection. Agents will naturally reflect on both the 
compatibility of their deep commitments with each other and on what deep 
commitments they ought to have. This sort of reflection will not be the 
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everyday stuff of moral decision making, which is guided by the character one 
has, not one’s facility at practical deliberation. Character is determined by 
these sorts of volitional commitments, and a good character is precisely one 
that is volitionally committed to the right sorts of ends (i.e., one that loves the 
right “kind of world” or “kind of life” whatever that may be).  
One consequence of this way of thinking about practical agency is that 
it completely transforms many of the oldest and most problematic questions 
of metaethics. Perhaps the deepest question of metaethics is simply: why be 
moral? The sorts of answers that philosophers have sought to give to this 
question have tended to turn on making claims about what rationality 
requires, or at least what is reasonable. Indeed, as we have seen, part of the 
deep appeal of Kant’s moral project is his promise to show how morality is the 
inescapable consequence of rationality and thus to be avoided only on pain of 
irrationality.  
However, these sorts of answers to the question—whether Kant’s or 
other attempts to show the reasonableness of morality—have ultimately failed 
to convince. Their claims to ground morality in what is reasonable have 
floundered on the shoals of skepticism, both epistemological and moral. This 
skeptical question undermines the moral project precisely because it generates 
a false expectation of what sort of answer will be adequate. This challenge will 
not be met with an argument whose conclusion flows apodictically from the 
pure tenets of reason alone. 
What Frankfurt’s analysis of practical agency suggests is that the 
challenge will be met only by pointing out the strength of our commitment to 
morality—namely, that we love a certain moral ideal. Moral skepticism, as he 
says, “is not a problem of truth. It is a problem about confidence” (Buss and 
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Overton, 277). Thus the only “justification” of morality we can give to the 
moral skeptic is to show him that and how much we love it. The why is lost, and 
the demand for a conclusive reason to be moral is as inappropriate as the 
demand for a justification of my love for my mother or my wife. At some 
point the loves which partially make up who I am just are, and have no further 
justification than that I am who I am.8 
 
I suspect many will find this deeply unsatisfying. The natural rejoinder 
is to this is to observe that even if what we love does somehow determine the 
ultimate limits of the will, nonetheless one might observe that the question of 
what we should love remains unanswered. Thus, even if love is a (perhaps, the) 
centrally important determinant of the structure of the will and thus what we 
actually do, nonetheless the same moral questions can now be reformulated 
into questions about what volitionally constitutive commitments we ought to 
have. 
It is a mistake, however, to think that the question about what we 
ought to love is the same sort question that philosophers have traditionally 
understood when trying to understand what we ought to do. The reason for 
                                                
8 Frankfurt is especially revealing in the following passage:  
 
Many philosophers and other people think it is important to find ways of 
demonstrating conclusively such things as that it is reasonable to tell the truth, and to 
refrain from murdering people, and from inflicting pain gratuitously. They are not 
satisfied with the fact that many of us are moved lovingly—as a matter not of choice 
but of volitional necessity—by ideals of straightforwardness and of consideration for 
others. 
But why are they not satisfied by this? If someone tries to interfere with my 
children, I will try to fight him off. If someone tries to interfere with our efforts to 
bring about or to sustain the kind of world we love, why should we not be as 
confidently disposed to fight him off? We do not need any knockdown reason for 
knocking him down, other than the reason that he is trying to damage something we 
love (Buss and Overton [2002], 277). 
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this, of course, is that what we love is not fully up to us, while, at least as 
traditionally understood, what we do is. To a large degree we are passive with 
respect to what we love; we discover those loves as facts about ourselves and 
thus come to observe the shapes of our own wills. The deepest and best loves 
are essentially a response to the value of the most lovable (i.e., the best) of 
objects.9  
Of course, it should also be pointed out that the limits established by 
volitional necessity are just that—limits. These limits will not always, or even 
commonly, be challenged. Furthermore, for the vast majority of people a love 
of the truth and “ideals of straightforwardness and of consideration for 
others” will also be volitionally constitutive, and living up to those ideals will 
generate more or less all of the practice of morality we would want. 
In other words, volitional necessities set the limits within which the 
conventional deliberations of morality take place (for a given agent), and do 
not always or even commonly override them. In fact, the volitional necessity 
arising from the agent’s commitment to those principles will itself determine 
his compliance with them. As such, the demands of love and loyalty will not 
simply run rough shod over all the conventional principles of morality, 
precisely because the wills which are partially constituted by commitments to 
their own love and loyalties are also partially constituted by a commitment to 
those very principles. The main point, echoing Williams, is that the 
commitment to the principle of morality will not necessarily be always 
                                                
9 This point about the receptivity of love is a very old view, of course, and one apparently 
advanced in several Platonic dialogues, e.g., the Phaedrus. My central concern here is the draw 
the deep distinction between the way love operates in the will and the way so many 
philosophers have conceived of practical reason. It is certainly not the case that loves are 
permanently fixed, they can grow, fade, and be cultivated. However, they are certainly more 
resistant to change, the express that resistance through volitional necessities, than the reasons 
which inform the deliberations of practical reason. 
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overriding and will sometimes be rejected by an agent whose will is shaped 
by love. 
It may help if we consider this under a slightly different description. 
Generally it is held that ought implies can. In other words, it cannot be a moral 
requirement to do the impossible. For there to a binding ought, it must be 
possible to achieve its ends; otherwise, the ought is vacuous. Of course, this is 
exactly what happens with questions of what we ought to love. Sometimes it 
may be impossible—volitionally impossible—for me to love some object, or 
perhaps more pressingly, not to love some person or some thing that I do. I 
simply am not completely free with respect to my loving. 
Nonetheless, there is more wiggle room here than I might have seemed 
to imply. Frankfurt himself notes that the fact that one cannot “rigorously 
demonstrate which ideals are” proper to have “should not be taken to entail… 
that our volitional necessities must merely be acknowledged as givens—that 
is, accepted passively as brute facts with respect to which deliberation and 
rational critique have no place” (Frankfurt [1999], 116). While it is true that I 
cannot simply choose to love or not to love, I can make choices which will 
affect my loving. In other words, I can potentially set out to change the 
conditions in which my will is forced to operate, and in so doing what I care 
about may change over time. These choices will often be the result of a 
rational examination of what is entailed by our having various moral ideals—
of “a certain kind of world or a certain kind of life”—to which we are centrally 
committed.10 
                                                
10 This is analogous to somebody afflicted with an unrequited love. Such a person might 
decide that he needs to avoid places and situations that remind him of his beloved (and act on 
that decision). Over time we would expect that his love would change accordingly. That is not 
the same as deciding to stop loving, however. 
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Some of our examples above answer exactly to this description. It was 
by coming to realize how his existing volitional commitment to the truth led 
to God that Augustine came to love God. That commitment, in turn, grew to 
encompass more and more of his will until it overcame everything else, so that 
he saw all of his commitments through the lens of his commitment to God. 
Again, whether he was right or not about the nature of these commitments is 
not important; the fact that they did arise and completely determined the 
nature and scope of his agency is. 
Thus it can, and will, come to pass that we are required to examine how 
our ideals interrelate and interact and how they may be potentially in conflict. 
When they are, I may be forced to give up one or the other of them in response 
to this conflict and which of them I give up will manifest my true character. 
When the requirements of an impartial moral ideal to which I am committed 
conflict deeply with the requirements of my love for some other object what I 
ultimately do will reveal what I love more. 
As Williams implied in the quote with which we began, it is not simply 
a matter of justification as conventionally understood at all. Rather it is the 
case that for a will to be committed to anything at all, it must, to some degree, 
be committed to objects that are particular to it—objects of love and loyalty.11 
Once we see that it is the love of the world or way of life informed by 
principles of morality which underwrites the agent’s moral activity we realize 
that those principles cannot be fully regulative of that love. They can shape 
and guide action, in just the same way that the conflicting demands of any 
                                                
11 The particularity of these objects does not preclude other agents from possessing similar 
commitments, just as my siblings also love my mother. However, without going into anything 
silly like a comparison of our respective loves for her, I think we can still say that the place in 
each of our wills that our love for her takes has unique content of various sorts based on our 
differing experiences, etc. 
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objects of the agent’s love can require him to rethink and modify his actions 
and beliefs with respect to them. However, such principles are generally not 
the agent’s ultimate commitment, because his agency itself is founded on 
special commitments that make him who he is, and make his life valuable for 
what it is. He can of course share his commitment to morality with others, but 
his agency arises from the particularity of the constitution of his own will.12 
  
I think we are now in a position to appreciate why the demands of love 
and loyalty are directed at values which cannot be accounted for within the 
framework of the universalist theories. These values are precisely those which 
find expression in the types of love which eventuate in volitional necessities. 
To possess these values is precisely to love in a certain of way—
wholeheartedly, disinterestedly, and without reservation.13 It is a love directed 
above all at the good of the object of that love. 
It is presumably true that one could love the demands of impartial 
morality in a similar way, such that one could be driven by volitional 
necessities to act as a universalist theory might demand. It is not my purpose 
to deny that possibility. Rather my point is that while this analysis of 
volitional necessity can encompass those demands of morality within a certain 
kind of demand of love, the converse is not true. The proponents of 
universalist moral theories cannot accord the proper value to the demands of 
love and loyalty. 
                                                
12 It is possible to have an agent most committed (i.e., in love with) a world informed by the 
principles of some abstract, impartial morality alone, but such individuals would probably 
seem inhuman, devoid of mercy and sympathy—Lycurgus instead of Solomon.  
13 “To say that a lover is disinterested means simply that he desire the good of his beloved for 
its own sake rather than for the sake of anything else” (Frankfurt [1999], 168). 
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This deepest sort of love is as valuable as it is precisely because it is not 
subject to the same sorts of justificatory requirements as other values. Its value 
inheres in the fact that it is so fully expressive of the agent’s will that he 
himself cannot escape from it. It is precisely this relative immutability—this 
stability in the face of skepticism—which makes these values the core of the 
agent’s being. Without them, his agency dissolves away. It is precisely his 
confidence in his love for what he loves that gives him the foundation on 
which to stand, which makes for a life worth living. 
This is why the ultimate issue is not the knowability of reasons for 
acting, but the confidence that an agent has in his own volitional 
commitments. Deep skepticism undermines agency precisely because it 
elevates an epistemic difficulty into the will. It vitiates the agent’s capacity to 
act by making him believe that all of his actions have to have particular kind 
of justification in fully grounded reasons. The skeptic’s inability to act thus 
reveals a kind of inability to love in the right sort of way, and so reveals a 
defective will (at least with respect to certain values, though not necessarily 
all). 
The deepest demands of love and loyalty are the expressions of a self-
constituting love. They press beyond conventional questions of moral 
justification. Again, however, this does not mean that they have to be beyond 
examination, but it does mean that a deep skepticism about them can 
undermine them to such a degree that they cannot survive in the same form. 
In other words, to demand justification—to believe that it is appropriate to 
seek a moral accounting of the deepest convictions of love—is already to 
devalue them. It is to fail to see how their value inheres in precisely the depth 
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of the agent’s commitment to their objects. This truly is “one thought too 
many.” 
 
(Re-) Connections 
 
Before closing this chapter, I thought it might be useful to connect some 
of the foregoing observations to some of the concerns raised in the limited 
literature on loyalty that we examined in Chapter II. Specifically, I want to 
draw connections with my discussion of the two central figures in the 
philosophical examinations of loyalty we considered in Chapter II: Andrew 
Oldenquist’s and Josiah Royce’s. 
Recall that in his article “Loyalties,” Oldenquist made the following 
suggestive claim: in “terms of the logic of the reasons they provide, loyalties 
are a third category of the normative, distinct from both self-interest and 
impersonal morality…. Loyalties are part of what make our societal worlds go 
around, but they cannot be understood if we try to turn them into either 
impersonal duties or sophisticated egoism” (Oldenquist [1982], 176). Further, 
“our wide and narrow loyalties define moral communities or domains within 
which we are willing to universalize moral judgments, treat equals equally, 
protect the common good, and in other ways adopt the familiar machinery of 
impersonal morality” (Ibid., 177). 
Fascinating as these suggestions are, Oldenquist did not adequately 
develop and substantiate these claims. However, their similarity to claims I 
have made arising out of the Frankfurtian analysis is hardly coincidental. As 
Oldenquist understood it, loyalties represented a separate “category of the 
normative.” When rearticulated in terms of volitional necessities we can see 
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how this is possible. Oldenquist clearly recognized how deep loyalties could 
become normative without being in any way derivative from duties arising 
from impersonal morality. We see that this is possible insofar as loyalties are a 
response to commitments which partially constitute the will.14 
The normativity of these volitionally constitutive commitments is very 
important. There is a sort of general presumption that the only significant 
normativity is moral normativity. The norms of universal morality are opposed 
to the contingency of desire or whim, etc. as fundamentally more serious and 
more important. What we need to acknowledge is that the normativity of 
morality within the will has the same status as the normativity of any other 
deeply held, volitionally constitutive commitments. Thus, deep attachments 
and loyalties are just as normative as the requirements of impersonal morality 
(which is, insofar as it is effective within the will, just another a form of love as 
well). 
Oldenquist’s second claim—that loyalties define the scope of 
impersonal morality—is strikingly reminiscent of Frankfurt’s account of how 
volitional necessities define the limits of the will. Again Oldenquist’s 
arguments are reaching in the proper direction and adumbrating the right 
conclusions, but it is through the application of the Frankfurtian model that 
we can see how the conclusion can be supported. Oldenquist clearly was onto 
something important, and the congruence of his claims with the consequences 
of taking seriously the importance of love in the will provides further support 
for it. 
 
                                                
14 Of course Oldenquist speaks of loyalties in terms of the “reasons they provide,” while I have 
claimed that to some degree reasons are transcended by volitional necessities.  
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There are similar resonances with Royce. Recall that in the Philosophy of 
Loyalty Royce claimed that loyalty, “fixes our attention upon some cause, bids 
us look without ourselves to see what this unified cause is, shows us thus 
some one plan of action, and then says to us, ‘In this cause is your life, your 
will, your opportunity, your fulfillment’” (Royce [1908], 21). What he seems to 
imply here is that it is precisely through a loyal commitment to some 
“superpersonal” cause that I come to have a self. Thus, the object of my loyal 
commitment is not external to me, but actually constitutive of my will. In 
other words, it is only insofar as I am able to commit myself loyally to some 
cause that I even have a will at all. Therefore, when I act in accordance with its 
demands it is not as if I am acted upon by something external to my will, but 
rather I fulfill my own willing loyal commitment to a cause. “[U]nless you can 
find some sort of loyalty, you cannot find unity and peace in your active 
living” (23). Thus loyalty (to a cause) is what binds one’s life into a coherent 
whole—that makes it a life. 
Royce attempts to sustain this claim with a neo-Hegelian metaphysics 
which need not detain us here. Rather my interest is the striking congruence of 
Royce’s observation with the claims I have advanced out of the Frankfurtian 
model, specifically the connection with the claim that core commitments are 
partially constitutive of the will. The key point of connection is the idea that 
what it is to have a self is to have deep commitments.  
Royce even goes so far as to claim that the particular object of one’s 
loyalty is relatively unimportant at least insofar as it does not conflict with 
other loyalties, i.e., is not “destructive of loyalty in the world of my fellows” 
(Royce, 56). The value of loyalty for Royce is not dependent on the value of 
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that to which one is loyal. Rather loyalty itself is valuable in itself, precisely 
because it is the means by which I come to be the self that I am. 
This again closely tracks some conclusions Frankfurt draws about love. 
“Loving is valuable in itself, and not only in virtue of the value of its objects. 
Other things being equal, our lives would be worse without it” (Frankfurt 
[1999], 173). This is because the very “act” of loving represents a growth in the 
lover. His life becomes more valuable in consequence of his loving; “without 
loving in one or more of its several modes life for us would be intolerably 
unshaped and empty” (Ibid., 174).  
I certainly do not expect to have proven my case with these appeals to 
Royce and Oldenquist. Rather, what I hope to have done is much more 
modest. My intention was to draw connections between the analysis of the 
demands of love and loyalty and independent claims advanced by very 
different thinkers coming at these problems with very different backgrounds, 
inclinations, metaphysical commitments, and philosophical methodologies. 
Nonetheless, they arrive at importantly similar conclusions. Obviously, my 
hope is that this unity is derivative from the unity of the truth about the 
phenomena under examination. I suspect that these similarities are anything 
but coincidental. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have tried to lay out an analysis, drawn and adapted 
from Harry Frankfurt, which provides a framework for understanding the 
demands of love and loyalty within a sophisticated understanding of moral 
psychology. I hope to have shown how the demands of loyalty grow out of 
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volitional structures which are themselves the result of possessing a certain 
kind of commitment or love. I hope also to have shown how the values that 
inform these demands of love and loyalty are deeply embedded within the 
nature of the will itself and must be understood in those terms.  
In the next chapter, I turn my attention in a different direction, toward 
the question of how a will—a self—comes to be. My concern with 
development grows out of the recognition that if agency flows from our 
deepest volitional commitments, and if those commitments cannot all simply 
be chosen, then we need to understand where they came from in order to have 
a handle on the nature of human agency. Later, in Chapter VII, I will utilize 
the model I have adapted from Frankfurt in this chapter, along with the 
developmental story I will describe next, to show why particular loyalties are 
important to being a certain sort of self and why those loyalties are an 
inescapable pre-condition for having a life with “substance” expressive of a 
human-shaped will of the sort we value. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
A Developmental Account of Moral 
Psychology 
 
 
In the last chapter I tried to show how the demands of love and loyalty 
could manifest volitional necessities directly reflecting structural features of 
the will. In this chapter I will move in a different direction. Much of my 
discussion thus far has focused on what I have characterized as unchosen 
loyalties—the demands of love and loyalty arising from commitments to 
objects such as one’s parents, children, community, country, etc. I now want to 
ask: if the commitments that underlie these demands are unchosen, whence 
did they come? It is in attempting to give an answer to this question that I 
believe we will make some progress towards understanding the sense in 
which these sorts commitments are necessary components of a human life 
with “substance.” 
 
Lear 
 
To begin answering the question whence unchosen loyalties come I am 
going to introduce a discussion by Jonathan Lear which offers us some helpful 
tools. I wish to state quite clearly from the beginning that my project is very 
different from Lear’s and there are many facets of his argument from which I 
  
203 
demur; nonetheless, I think his concern with Freudian developmental empirical 
psychology points the way towards giving an account of developmental moral 
psychology. My hope is that in articulating the features of the development of 
moral psychology we may come to better recognize the central role loyalties, 
especially to unchosen objects, play within our wills. 
Lear is a psychoanalyst as well as a philosopher, and he has sought to 
inform the philosophers’ debates with insights he claims from Freudian 
psychoanalysis. Lear claims that there is a deep continuity between the 
Socratic philosophical project and Freudian psychoanalysis.192 In a fascinating 
little book, Love and Its Place in Nature, Lear wants to introduce a Freudian 
conception of love into philosophy, especially as it relates to the way in which 
egos develop, and in so doing he expects that this will transform several 
important questions in moral psychology. 
 
Modern philosophy in general has a tendency to investigate the 
structure of the human soul in isolation from how that structure 
came about. The thought is that philosophy is only concerned 
with what the structure of the soul is: how this structure 
developed is a topic for psychology. The problem with this 
reasoning is that if the individual is by nature a response to a 
good enough world, we may be unable to determine the 
structure of his soul is if we remain ignorant of the conditions in 
which it came into being. (Lear [1990], 186) 
 
It is only by asking how the soul, or will,193 develops that we can come 
to understand what it essentially is. If we recognize that the mature will is in 
                                                
192 Lear writes: “Psychoanalysis” is a word which, even without our translating it, Socrates 
would have understood. In fact, Socrates invented philosophy by devising his own peculiar 
brand of psychoanalysis. Through an examination of one’s own soul, Socrates believed, the 
truth would emerge and it would set one free. (Lear [1999], 183) 
193 Lear seems to freely interchange ‘soul,’ ‘ego,’ and ‘I’; I will continue this, sometimes 
throwing in ‘will’ for good measure. This is, of course, not to claim that all of these terms have 
precisely coextensive referents. I hope context will supply any needed disambiguation. 
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part a reaction to the world in which it comes into being and finds its shape, 
we can begin to see how important it is to understand the relationship of the 
internal structure of the will to the external structure of the world. If the 
structure of the will is somehow in part a reflection of the structure of the 
world, then we can begin to understand how loyalty to those structures can be 
an authentic expression of that will. Before we can get there, however, I want 
to examine the Freudian groundwork of Lear’s discussion from which I will 
then borrow important concepts to motivate my own significantly different 
project. 
 
Before I begin let me reiterate that it is not my intention to take up 
Lear’s account of Freudian psychology wholesale. I can remain somewhat 
agnostic towards its accuracy while nonetheless borrowing some of the 
fruitful concepts Lear develops out of it. As I indicated above, my goal is not a 
developmental empirical psychology, but a developmental moral psychology. 
Chronologically, within the life of a given individual, the development of a 
moral psychology is presumably subsequent to the first stirrings of the psyche. 
Of course, the latter is the necessary ground for the former and will naturally 
affect it. Nonetheless, in taking up some of Lear’s arguments I believe my 
purposes in investigating the unambiguously moral aspects of development 
can be served independently of his more strictly psychological (and, perhaps, 
pre-moral) purposes. 
Lear introduces an important distinction I find very useful.  
 
The attitude of holding someone responsible is one that one can take 
toward oneself or others. In holding oneself responsible one is 
essentially taking a third-personal stance with respect to oneself 
and deciding whether one’s character, actions, thoughts or 
feelings are worthy of praise or blame…. Accepting 
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responsibility is essentially a first-person relation. In accepting 
responsibility I acknowledge who or what I am. (Lear, 66-7). 
 
 
This distinction essentially involves the attitude one takes towards 
certain aspects of oneself. As Lear explicitly characterizes it here, holding 
oneself responsible is an attitude of appraisal—deciding whether something 
about oneself is “worthy of praise or blame.” In accepting responsibility, on 
the other hand, what is at stake is not a judgment of the worth or value of 
some aspect of oneself, but rather one’s ownership of it. In other words, to 
hold responsible is inevitably to take a kind of external stance, even if one is 
doing this towards oneself, whereby one judges something or someone 
against some external standard. To take responsibility is to firmly stake a 
claim of ownership—to assert the mineness of some action or property. 
Lear introduces this distinction in the context of his discussion of 
Freud’s treatment of a patient who represses certain emotions by holding 
herself responsible for them and instead of taking responsibility for them as 
her own. However, this distinction comes up again in a more abstract 
discussion towards the end of the book of what he calls the “other Oedipus 
complex.” The question is why Oedipus, whose fate seems to have been 
determined for him before he was born, ultimately accepts responsibility for 
his actions. Lear writes that Oedipus: 
 
…in accepting responsibility for his acts, is claiming that the 
truth that ultimately matters is, as he says of his blinding, that “I 
have done it by my own hand.” Whatever the gods ordained, 
Oedipus says, the fact is that I did it. Oedipus is in effect 
claiming a part of nature for himself. He treats himself as a locus 
of activity and in that way demands to be distinguished from the 
rest of nature…. Now, Oedipus may also hold himself responsible: 
for he may take up an observational stance with respect to 
himself and judge his acts to be praiseworthy or blameworthy. 
In holding himself responsible, Oedipus is claiming to be a fit 
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subject of ethical or aesthetic evaluation…. In accepting 
responsibility, Oedipus is making an altogether more elemental 
claim: “these acts are my acts.” Oedipus thus constitutes himself 
as an agent, a locus of activity. (Lear [1990], 170-1). 
 
 
There is a lot going on here, but what I want to focus on now is the 
notion that it is by taking responsibility for something which he did not 
choose that Oedipus makes himself “a locus of activity.” It is this act of 
claiming responsibility for something which he himself did not make—of 
something that pre-exists—which gives substance to his agency. For it is in 
this claim—of asserting that these action are his—that he manifests himself a 
cause in the world (a “locus of activity”) and not a mere plaything of the gods. 
Here Lear is filling out his fundamental claim that a soul develops in 
response to the world. The internal structure of the soul is a reflection, 
through the psychological act of identification, of the world, which it 
“devours.” 
 
Psychic structure, Freud realizes, is created by a dialectic of love 
and loss. The structure of the mind is an inner recreation of the 
structure of the loved world. Mental structure develops with the 
infant’s increasing appreciation that the loved world exists 
independently of him and is not immediately responsive to his 
wishes. (160). 
 
The developmental account here is meant to explain something 
extremely mysterious—namely, how a pre-psychological entity (an infant) 
comes to possess a genuine human psyche. The infant begins in an 
undifferentiated state, unable to recognize his own independence from the 
world. However, the world turns out to be not perfectly responsive to the 
infant’s needs and wishes and out “of the ensuing frustration and 
disappointment, I am born.” 
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With a suitably attentive mother an infant’s needs will be almost 
instantly satisfied. And yet, no matter how sensitive his mother is, at some 
point she will fail to feed him exactly when he hungers, and he will begin to 
perceive that his hunger does not automatically call forth the “good breast” 
(as Melanie Klein called it) to satisfy that hunger. It is in these very first 
frustrations that he will begin to perceive his independence from the world 
and thus begin to differentiate himself from it.  
The process continues as in response his “recognition” of his 
independence from the external world the infant begins to invest the world 
with a very basic form of love—identification. By identifying with parts of the 
world the proto-psyche attempts to pull the receding world into itself. The 
world is “receding” insofar as its non-compliance with his desires manifests 
its independence from them. The structure of that world becomes written into 
the structure of the developing psyche through this psychological process of 
identification. It is key to see that this identification is a psychological process—
“not merely a neurophysiological” one; it is active, not passive. It is out of the 
“swirl of drive activity” (the most basic psychological drives which Freud 
called “primary process”) that this development occurs. However, it is 
inevitable that this primary process, “from the perspective of the already 
developed I, looks like magic” (Lear, 163).194 That is, from our present 
                                                
194 In all of these discussion about the psychology of infants, etc. there is complication of which 
we must be aware. There is surely a sense in which the infant, at his stage, cannot possible 
recognize anything. Not only does the infant have no precedent for this new fact, he has no 
precedent for the process of recognition itself. And yet, somehow or other this, or something 
like it, must come to pass. So it may be that we must always speak loosely or metaphorically 
as we attribute complex psychological states and processes to nascent psyche which cannot 
have possibly expressed them. The whole point of this sort of bootstrapping argument is that 
it is in the struggle of the nascent psyche to achieve this complexity that the complexity comes 
to be. In the end, though, it may necessarily be magical from our perspective, where magical 
here means that we are not only unaware of the processes that underwrite it, but may 
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perspective, looking back on our own development, it appears almost mystical 
as something recognizably like a mind seems to come out of something that 
looks, at best, merely animal. 
Of course not just any world will facilitate this process of identification. 
It must be a “good-enough world,” where the infant’s physical needs are 
sufficiently met, but just as importantly his psychological needs are satisfied 
as well. In a world that is unresponsive to the infant’s developing psyche, he 
may be permanently stunted. The responsiveness necessary is not only, or 
even most importantly, the care of his physical needs. His need for love is just 
as pronounced, and perhaps even more pressing, than his need for milk.195 
What is required is that the world of the infant appear continually more 
complicated and sophisticated to him; it is the proto-psyche’s attempt to 
“metabolize” this increasingly complicated world, though identification, that 
eventuates in its own increasing internal complexity. Furthermore, perhaps 
the most important part of that complicated external world is the love it 
showers on the infant by way of his mother. It is maternal love which drives 
the infant’s developing psyche as that psyche is caught in a process where it 
attempts to take in that love and respond to it. 
This “dialectic of love and loss” (love and frustration) motivates the 
increasing sophistication of the nascent psyche—the interplay between the 
less developed soul of the child and the mature soul of his mother, as she 
lavishes her love and care upon him. The child’s soul literally comes to be by 
                                                                                                                                       
necessarily unable to grasp the essential nature of that development from the inside (this 
despite the fact that everyone of us must have gone through it). 
195 The classic examples are those children warehoused in orphanages in the old communist 
block countries (especially Romania), whose physical needs were minimally supplied, but 
whose need for love was tragically unmet. These children, when revealed later, were 
psychologically much “younger” than their chronological ages, and radically undeveloped 
intellectually and emotionally.  
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taking into itself the love it receives from the world, by actively identifying 
with that world and thus reconstituting within itself the structure of that 
world as lovable and loving. Love here is a fundamental psychological force, 
the most fundamental psychological force and indeed underwrites the very 
existence of the soul. 
 
Love… fuels a dialectic of development. Psychic structure can 
continue to develop because the world outstrips my ability to 
appreciate it. As I develop in complexity, so does the world as it 
exists for me. The internalization of structure can thus continue 
at ever higher levels of complexity and refinement. (177). 
 
 
At this point, having summarized Lear’s very suggestive account of 
psychological development, I want to take a step back. As I indicated at the 
outset of this discussion, my true interest is not in the earliest steps of 
psychological development, but in the development of a moral psyche. 
Obviously, this happens after the kinds of processes Lear is describing, but as 
his own appeal to the Oedipus case suggests there are fundamentally similar 
issues and concepts in play in the development of the more mature stages of a 
psyche that are proper to moral psychology and moral philosophy. 
One part of Lear’s discussion I have under-emphasized (compared to 
the role it plays in his exposition) is the importance for Freudians of primary 
process—the “swirl of drive activity” which is the earliest manifestation of the 
(proto-) psyche. On Freud’s understanding the drives that make up primary 
process continue to exist and make themselves felt even after the development 
of a mature psyche. Indeed, a great part of Freudian psychoanalysis consists 
precisely in the integration of these drives (the id) into the analysand’s 
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conscious life.196 It is in this context that the Oedipus case comes into play, in 
that the “second Oedipus complex” consists in taking responsibility for this 
drive activity and integrating it into one’s life. 
It is precisely here that I break with Lear’s project and turn my 
attention in a different direction. My interest is not in the way in which such 
primal drives are integrated into the agent’s life, but in what I see as the 
analogous way in which the sources of value the emerging agent finds in the 
world are written into his developing moral consciousness. In other words, 
the powerful suggestion of Lear’s that I want to follow is this signal insight 
that what the soul is, it is precisely because of the manner in which it has 
“metabolized” the sources of value in the world around it, constructing its 
own structure in light of and in response to these values. I think this process is 
again driven by love, but a love more sophisticated than the psychological 
process of simple identification (namely, a kind of loyalty). 
In the last chapter I noted Frankfurt’s thought that autonomy itself 
must find a grip in the fact of the agent’s limitation within “restrictions from 
which he cannot escape by merely choosing to do so.” One obvious question, 
which Frankfurt never addresses, is from where these restrictions come. I 
think a lot of the resistance to this notion comes from a suspicion that the sorts 
of restrictions in play—founded in unchosen volitional necessities—are 
external or illegitimate impositions. To a certain mindset used to the 
celebration of freedom and choice, the idea that there are these sorts of 
                                                
196 Of course, the integration of the super-ego is also part of the goal. Freudians have often 
understood mental health to consist precisely in the successful integration of the id and super-
ego into ego, the unification of all the parts of the soul into the agent’s conscious 
understanding of himself. 
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inescapable restrictions, and further that autonomy itself is grounded in them, 
is difficult to accept.  
My hope is that understanding how a moral psyche develops will 
alleviate some of these concerns by showing how such restrictions are the 
unavoidable consequence of the advent and growth of moral consciousness. 
As I have already indicated, I believe that this process works in a manner 
analogous to that discussed by Lear. For moral consciousness to develop it 
must somehow internalize values from the external world, and I believe it 
does this precisely by a process of taking responsibility for the unchosen. 
One of the most important things to notice about this developmental 
process is that for the process to be successful the world must be (at least 
partially) accommodating. The world must make a place for the nascent 
personality to develop into. Like the earlier dialectic described by Lear, this 
dialectic between the developing agent and the world requires the world to 
appear continually more complicated and challenging. At first, of course, the 
world in question is, at least for the child, little more than his parents (even just 
his mother). Gradually, however, the world, including both its expectations 
and rewards, begins to encompass a larger field. 
When the child is born the accommodation afforded to him is primarily 
formal. Society takes note of the child and makes a space for him by 
immediately recognizing his personhood in law and custom. In gaining a 
name, and a birth certificate, the child is given legal personality and the first 
and central subset of his rights in positive law. Of course in reality this a kind 
of legal fiction, but it is an extremely important fiction.197 
                                                
197 Of course my description of this process partakes of the details of our contemporary 
western world. However, I do not think the details (birth certificates, etc.) are particularly 
important here. Rather what is important is that accommodation is made in some way. 
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As some consequentialists have argued it seems almost perverse to 
grant rights to a newborn. It is difficult to imagine what external functionalist 
criteria of personhood (e.g., rational activity, etc.) a newborn could possibly 
meet. Nonetheless, society rightly makes this gift to the newborn of legal 
personality, not because he is capable of exercising it, but in part precisely 
because he is not. This gift is the first step in a long process by which the 
external world makes a place for the child to grow into, by giving to him more 
than he can handle and making demands on him that he cannot as yet meet.  
As the child ages and gains new competencies over himself and the 
world around him, the accommodation takes the form of particular roles 
which are opened to him. This is the everyday stuff of parenting; as the child 
ages the parent is forced to accommodate his increasing personality. He is 
gradually given more lee-way and more choices. Indeed, the child will 
demand more freedom and responsibility over himself and the world around 
him, and the wise parent will of course use the child’s desire for independence 
to help him grow. But this is and must be a gradual process. Nonetheless, as 
new roles and opportunities are opened to the child the world also begins to 
make new demands upon him. 
Some of the very first of these demands are of course bodily self-
control. The child is instructed that his body is under his will, and indeed one 
of the first steps in the development of the will is precisely the bending of his 
body’s voluntary processes to it. What is key, however, is how new demands 
                                                                                                                                       
Whatever the particularities of a given society’s customs and traditions, etc. may be, I think it 
must be a universal practice of mankind that some sort of accommodation is made, even if at 
first it is only the parents or even the mother who makes it. Additionally, I will speak of 
mothers and parents, but of course what is vital is not that the adult “care-givers” be 
biologically related to the child, but that they invest him with their love. Generally parents 
will do this better than others, but this obviously need not be the case. 
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are gradually placed on the child by the world. As he ages the world begins to 
hold him responsible for meeting its demands. The world, in both his family and 
in society at large, demands of the child that he step up to new responsibilities 
not of his own making and makes him subject to both praise and punishment 
in accordance with his responses. 
The beginning of this process is training, indeed it is close to 
conditioning. Demands are made, and enforced by the world (generally by 
parents). In our society the enforcement can take the form of punishment, but 
mostly it is a sort of encouragement, which is to say, an offer of (more 
demonstrative) love. This can seem (and be) a rather mechanical process, 
similar to training an animal (e.g. housebreaking a puppy). Over time, 
however, and in all societies that produce morally mature agents, the nature 
of the process must fundamentally change from training to education. 
This distinction between training and education is vitally important. 
The demands the world makes in the process of education require of the child 
not merely that he meet those demands mechanically, but that he begin to 
understand that he is being held responsible for meeting them. To the extent 
that moral education is successful, the child acts not out of a desire to avoid 
punishment but from values taken up and internalized. They are written into 
the child’s will by his coming to care about those values. At first, this caring is 
filtered through his love for his parents and his attempt to emulate their 
commitment to these values, but over time I believe a significant transition 
occurs. The child begins to see himself not merely in the context of what is 
demanded of him; rather the values the world imposes on him eventually 
become available to him first-personally. This transition occurs precisely to the 
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extent that he begins to accept responsibility for the roles in which he finds 
himself and the demands the world makes on him. 
In other words, the development of a moral psychology proceeds along 
the same sorts of lines as Lear’s description of the “second Oedipus complex.” 
The values which society imposes by holding the developing child responsible 
become embedded in his will by his coming to care about them: at first 
concomitant with his loving of his parents, etc., but eventually for their own 
sakes. These demands are external to him and are imposed on him. Over time, 
however, the values to which these demands are responses are directly 
written into his will as he comes to care about the ideals which they represent. 
As such, these values become his, and he is rightly able to claim ownership of 
them, even though he received them from the world. What matters in making 
them his is not that they be entirely unique to him, of his own original 
composition, but that they be willed by him, as expressive of some of the 
central commitments that constitute his will. 
My narrative has moved quite quickly and may leave a mistaken 
impression that I think this process is easier or faster than any parent knows it 
to be. Of course the changes I am describing take place slowly over the course 
of years. Additionally, different individuals respond differently and develop 
at different rates and to different degrees. However, underlying the 
particularities of any given child’s development is the universal necessity that 
this process take place to some degree or another. For it is this transition from 
being held responsible by others to accepting responsibility for the demands 
and duties entailed by various ideals, moral and otherwise, that is the very 
hallmark of maturation. It is this maturation that is sine qua non for the 
achievement of agency and genuine autonomy. 
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My central claim here is homologous to Lear’s but applied to a different 
(and more morally significant) stage of life: the mature will (i.e., the ground of 
moral agency)  develops out of a developmental response to a good-enough 
world. The will comes to be precisely by claiming for itself, through accepting 
responsibility for it, a part of the world not of its own making. New social 
roles, with their various demands and privileges, gradually open to the child, 
and as he takes them up and comes to identify with them he pulls into his 
own will a reflection of the values they entail.  
This need not be, and most often is not, a conscious process. Neither, of 
course, is it mechanical. It proceeds not through simple identification but 
rather through the more sophisticated modalities of loving. These include the 
embracing of high and romantic ideals and in seeing that even when society 
fails to live up to those ideals they remain powerful within the wills of those 
who commit themselves to them. Further, these various lovings are mutually 
intertwined, and love for one sort of thing (e.g., a person) often leads naturally 
to loving a different sort of thing (e.g., beloved’s ideals). Thus do successful 
parents pass on their values and traditions, not by imprinting them, but by 
cultivating a love for them in their children. 
The good-enough world is precisely the world that both offers 
appropriate opportunities and makes appropriate demands. The demands 
(the world’s holding responsible) facilitate the opportunities (the child’s 
taking responsibility). A world that is insufficiently demanding will naturally 
delay or even prevent this process, which is to say, delay or prevent the 
development of genuine selves. Thus the world cannot be too responsive, else 
the child will lack the kind of frustrations which develop character and 
resolve. At the same time the world cannot be too recalcitrant or the child may 
  
216 
lack the opportunities he needs to find his own individuality and personal 
responsibility. 
Recall that the Frankfurtian model of the will holds that the will is itself 
significantly constituted by its deepest commitments. Who we are is literally 
determined by what and how we love. If this is the correct understanding of 
what it is to have a self, a fuller understanding of who we are requires an 
understanding of how we come to love what it is that we come to love.  
My suggestion here has been that human beings grow out of a loving 
response to a loving world. We love because we must. To some important 
degree we love what we love because the world in which we are raised writes 
its values into us by articulating the demands to which we are held 
accountable and for which we each must ultimately take responsibility. As 
such, the sort of volitionally constitutive central commitments which ground 
our most important projects, including and especially our commitments to 
morality, are precisely the ones taken up and internalized from the external 
world in this way. 
This is different from a kind of training model that depends only on 
positive and negative reinforcement (reward and punishment). While rewards 
and punishments may be useful at first, especially for a young child, in the 
end they will not shape the soul through love in the way I think necessary to 
underwrite a morally mature agency. While such methods might eventuate in 
someone who refrains from doing the “wrong” thing, such an agent will not 
be motivated by his love for the values (moral and otherwise) which give 
meaning and structure to his world. As such he will be more of an automaton 
than a genuine agent. 
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Of course many people never fully manage moral maturity. The 
psychopath is quite simply an individual who has never taken responsibility 
for what is demanded of him by the values his society embodies.198 Even some 
who do not become criminals nonetheless fail to make the full transition. Their 
pathological tendencies are kept in check by external force or the successful 
threat of external force. But the truly socialized human being, the mature 
moral agent, has succeeded in internalizing his society’s values, precisely 
because he has taken them up and made them his own by taking 
responsibility for them. It is not just that he externally conforms to what they 
require, but that he expresses them through his very will, in how he lives his 
life and conceives of his commitments to those around him. 
This means that a self cannot be made; personality cannot be 
mechanically imposed. Ultimately, the mature agent cannot not merely 
comport himself externally to society’s demands, he must take them up as his 
own. He must claim value out of the external world by embracing those 
values—as embodied in his care for specific persons, institutions, ideals, etc.—
as the objects of his loving. It is only by doing so that he finds a self. 
Paradoxically, it is also by doing so that he himself becomes a source of new 
value as an authentic bearer of social value within his will, constituted by his 
higher-order commitment to them. 
It should now be clear why the self cannot be self-created. The self must 
develop in reaction to and in a relation with an accommodating world. The 
will develops by loving the world and thus partially recreating the world’s 
structure within itself. It should also be clear that this process is, to a large 
                                                
198 This is true whether the cause of this failure is something for which he can be rightly held 
responsible or not. Mental illness may prevent his successful accepting of responsibility, but 
so may an overly permissive or otherwise defective community and/or polity. 
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degree, unchosen. Because what is at issue is the development of the will 
itself, it cannot be the case that the will is choosing what it loves. Rather what 
it finds itself loving begins to establish the contours of what choices are 
available to it as it matures. 
Frankfurt’s conceptual point, that autonomy requires necessity, is 
another way of saying that the will cannot choose its own structure, because 
for a choice to be a genuine choice it must be a reflection of the pre-existing 
structure of that will. The developmental account I am offering here attempts 
to explain how the ground of autonomy—a stable pre-existing structure of the 
will—must come out of the unchosen loving wherein the developing will 
takes in the values of the world. The structure of the will must develop as a 
reaction to and in a relation with the structure of the external world. The 
concrete manifestation of that external structure are the people and 
institutions within it and the ways in which they express their loves and 
ideals. 
The necessity is manifest in the way in which these successfully 
internalized values will express themselves in the agent’s actions and 
conception of himself as an agent. They will shape his will and thus articulate 
the limits of his will. They will provide the boundaries against which he will 
find himself bound and are the sorts of values that underpin the kind of 
volitional necessities that are at the heart of the practical success of our 
restrictions against crimes of all sorts. I will argue further in the next chapter 
that it is these kinds of necessities, informed and generated by volitional 
structures reflecting successful socialization, that are truly at the heart of most 
of our daily avoidance of evil. 
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It is absolutely vital that we recognize that this is not a mechanical or 
deterministic process. I am not claiming that a developing self is merely an 
imprint of the world in which it finds itself. It is fundamentally necessary that 
the developing will itself be fully implicated in this process through its 
willingness to take responsibility for values which it did not ultimately 
choose. Unless the agent is subjectively identified with his society’s values 
they will seem to him external impositions rather than the proper expression 
of his own nature as a moral creature. 
This subjective identification, this taking responsibility, is achieved 
precisely by the agent’s falling in love with parts of the world. Again, little of 
this process will be conscious and indeed much of it cannot be. For it is 
precisely through the integration of a love for parts of the external world (e.g., 
parents) that the developing will comes into being. The consciousness of 
falling in love—and of subjecting that growing love to critical evaluation—is 
only available to agents who have achieved a fundamental level of maturity, 
and even then it is far from transparent to the person undergoing it. 
The content of the developing agent’s love will be complex and mixed. 
As I have suggested his love for external values (be they moral, aesthetic, 
religious, etc.) will often (though not always) be mixed with his love for his 
parents. I doubt most agents will have a clear conception of the origin and 
precise structure of their own loves, nor do I think it is particularly important 
that they do. For it is in this complicated and rather messy commingling of 
loves that a unique agency and personal identity takes form.  
Ultimately, the complexity of value-laden external world will be 
reflected in the agent’s will insofar as he comes to identify with and take 
responsibility for those values, making them his own. This may take the form 
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of falling in love with a vision of a particular way of life (e.g., a religious or 
moral vision) or the intricacies of some particular social role (e.g., as a highly-
trained craftsman), but clearly it is will be different for almost everyone. 
Nonetheless, there is a kind of minimum adoption of external values that 
makes it possible even to have an agency capable of valuing—i.e., capable of 
expressing value through its internal structure. The content of that minimum 
is fixed to some degree by human nature (and will probably include a kind of 
mere morality—against murder, stealing, etc.), but I suspect it will also vary 
both between and within different societies and moral communities, as 
differing levels of volitional development will be necessary to gain purchase 
on different societies’ diverse social and moral public norms. The more 
complicated and richer a society’s public norms are, the more complicated a 
fully mature agent’s will within that society would have to be.  
This kind of falling in love with external values is in some sense pure, 
because it is only apparent to the agent what has happen after it has 
happened. Nonetheless, if it occurs as it should the agent will be subjectively 
identified with his loves and recognize their objective value. However, 
achieving this sort of self-awareness is precisely the challenge that philosophy 
has always faced, and to which, it might be supposed, the vast majority of 
human beings (including philosophers—this one not excepted) never attain. 
 
My argument has thus far aimed at one thing: to show how an 
understanding of what is required in order for a moral will to develop in a 
child validates Frankfurt’s notion that true autonomy requires necessity. 
Further I have claimed that this (volitional) necessity is a consequence of, and 
expresses, the loves the child gains through his childhood which he does not 
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explicitly choose. I suspect that many will be unimpressed; they will observe 
that even if my developmental story is granted this does nothing to show that 
one’s childish commitments should continue to hold sway over the will of an 
adult. In fact, might it not be observed, does not the next stage in 
maturation—full adulthood—consist precisely in exposing the commitments 
one has from childhood to a critical evaluation which almost inevitably results 
in the rejection of some of them? 
It is of course true that one’s childhood commitments ought to be 
examined critically to some degree. At the same time, however, it is also a 
truism that one cannot take up a critical attitude to everything. Nonetheless, 
the important point for my purposes is that this examination must necessarily 
take place against the background of certain fixed commitments, to the truth, 
for instance, but also necessarily in light of the other sorts of loves which 
constitute mature human beings. As I argued in the last chapter, following 
Frankfurt, there is a degree to which certain commitments must be free from a 
certain kind of doubt in order to be the very sort of commitments they are. As 
he noted, for many deep commitments, including the commitment to a moral 
ideal of a certain kind of world or certain kind of life, we are ultimately faced 
with a question more of confidence than of truth. 
Thus, this sort of doubt is best viewed not as an epistemic problem, to 
be solved with greater knowledge. Rather, the “solution” or, better yet, the 
proper response is a volitional response, a response constituted by a firmer 
commitment, a more expressive, wholehearted love. Doubt undermines 
agency precisely by convincing the agent that he must have more grounds for 
acting than just his love; but this in itself is a failure of love and a failure that 
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can only be redeemed through a redoubling of love, with an increasing 
awareness of both the value of that love in itself and of its object. 
This does not mean that the morally mature agent is completely 
unreflective with regards to his deepest commitments. In fact, he cannot be 
fully unreflective concerning them and still take responsibility for them in the 
right sort of way. Being deeply committed to something does not preclude 
reflecting on it, and indeed to fully take responsibility for it will require the 
agent to have some knowledge of his volitional structure and how his deep 
commitments fit together. The mature moral agent cannot (or at least should 
not) have a will marked by deep inconsistencies in what he loves, for then his 
will is perpetually divided and his agency is weakened. It is only through 
reflection on his commitments that the agent can achieve this kind of maturity. 
My view does not even imply that the mature agent needs to be free 
from doubt concerning his deep commitments. Rather the point is that he 
must move past his doubts and not be paralyzed by them. Oftentimes moral 
courage is expressed precisely in moving past doubts (sometimes, but not 
always, rationalizations of acting contrary to what one suspects is the right 
thing to do). That is why it becomes more an issue of confidence than truth. Of 
course committing oneself wholeheartedly does not guarantee one freedom 
from error (and one can wholeheartedly do evil), but some sort of deep 
commitments is necessary to even begin to express agency. Deep commitment 
to (i.e., loving) the truth seems to me such a commitment. Ultimately, I suspect 
there are other such necessary deep commitments involving at minimum the 
sort of mere morality I suggested above (though there will presumably be 
some variation between moral communities as to what is required to be full 
participants within them). 
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If the general outline of what I have been arguing is correct, then there 
are very real limits on what can count as a good-enough world to facilitate the 
development of morally mature human beings. Thus to the extent that we 
would cultivate beings like ourselves, and more importantly beings 
possessing the sorts of values to which I have been addressing myself, we 
simply cannot help but maintain a world where our most central religious, 
moral, aesthetic, etc. values are written into the fabric of social roles and 
discourse. These sorts of moral values, even though they find their best 
expression internalized in the wills of agents, must be publicly expressed and 
manifested else they will never become so internalized. 
The obligation to provide for a good enough world becomes incumbent 
on everyone who has a stake in the continuance of society. Most obviously 
parents must publicly commit themselves to certain ideals because the 
beginnings of the child’s moral consciousness is intertwined with his love for 
his parents. Without the parents’ public commitment to these sorts of ideals it 
would be extremely difficult for their child to come to love them. (It is not 
impossible, of course, because children can learn from others besides their 
parents. However, it is vital for the child to learn to love the ideal at the knee, 
so to speak, of someone whom he loves.) 
However, these obligations are clearly not limited to parents alone. 
These are society’s values, they are the public religious, moral, aesthetic, etc. 
values that give content and shape to a society, and all who share them have 
an interest in their propagation to new generations. Thus, in virtue of their 
public nature it is intrinsic to the possession of those values that he who loves 
their object must be committed to their preservation within society. To possess 
moral maturity is to possess, volitionally, these values. However, if one 
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possesses those values then one must express them, otherwise they are 
vacuous. Thus, the public manifestation of those values is an ineluctable result 
of having them in the right sort of way. 
It is precisely because the child’s will develops in reaction to and in 
relation with the external world that the inhabitants of that world are required 
to display and be publicly committed to ideals. In other worlds, the structure 
of the world which is “metabolized” by the child and becomes the pattern for 
the structure of his own will is determined by the publicly available actions, 
attitudes, and beliefs of society at large. Thus to the extent that the world is to 
contain this necessary structure of public value, the members of society 
committed to those values will find that the natural expression of those values 
consists in their public display. This is more or less just what it is to have a 
genuine moral community in which individuals share and express social 
values through their manifestation of precisely those values as embodied in 
the volitional commitments which inform their activities. 
Thus a commitment to values has internal to it a commitment to their 
public display and expression. The practical upshot of this is that a 
commitment to the possibility of value necessarily will take the form of active 
loyalty within a society to the persons, institutions, and ideals wherein values 
are embodied. Thus, I claim, to have (moral) values entails caring about value 
itself and thus being committed to the preservation of the social structures that 
make its inculcation in the young possible. Therefore, public loyalty is an 
important consequence of moral maturity in the life of a shared moral 
community. 
A natural question arises concerning those who reject a society’s 
particular values. Is such a person incapable of achieving moral maturity? I 
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think the answer to that question is necessarily complicated and dependent to 
some important degree on the particularities of individual cases. However, as 
I have suggested above I do think there are certain values a commitment to 
which are necessary to have any kind of morally mature agency—
commitments at least to the truth and some sort of mere morality. Further, I 
think that in richer and more complicated societies more commitments will be 
required to fully participate within them. 
This is not a trivial claim. There is I think a deep antinomian and even 
nihilist tendency in human nature. That tendency can take stronger and 
weaker forms, from the violent anarchism of the 19th century (dramatized, for 
instance, by Dostoyevsky in The Demons) to the kind of malaise and moral 
complacency that has seemed to characterize “decadent” societies like ancient 
Babylon and Rome. The processes of moral maturation that I have been 
discussing require public loyalty to shared public norms; without them moral 
agents will tend to be compromised from the beginning and the negative 
(egoistic) tendencies of human nature will find expression in the 
underdeveloped wills of those agents. 
This does not mean, I take it, that an agent must be fully loyal to every 
particular facet of his society or that he cannot agitate for changes. All human 
societies are imperfect in some way and indeed always will be. Reflection on 
the requirements of justice will naturally lead to the recognition that certain 
changes are desirable. It is fully consistent with my view that a morally 
mature agent will come to recognize this and become a meliorating influence 
in his society. Nonetheless, the mature agent will favor precisely that—
melioration—not destructive recreation. As such, some sort of public loyalty 
to the defining values of that society will be required even of the agent who 
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wants to change it (e.g., values like a commitment to the truth and some sort 
of mere morality). After all, the love of such an agent for justice is itself 
predicated on having a will that can be constituted by love, and if my 
argument is correct, that requires maturation within a moral community 
which is able to provide a structure in which authentic moral development is 
possible. 
As I indicated above, confidence in and loyalty to the public norms and 
values of one’s society will not insulate an agent from (moral) error. However, 
if I am right that human nature sets definite limits on what can be a “good-
enough” society for moral maturation, then it will be the case that the morally 
mature agent will already implicitly have the resources for self-correction. For 
if the commitment to (at least) the truth and a certain level of mere morality is 
required for even possessing a human-shaped will then reflection on gross 
injustice (for instance) will necessitate action in accordance with that love for 
the truth and morality. Because the ground of the will is love there is a kind of 
self correction built into loyalty insofar as the loyal agent will be committed to 
the conditions that make love possible—i.e., a good enough world. 
Royce suggested that one’s loyalty must never destroy another’s 
loyalty, that underneath all was a loyalty to loyalty. I think the insight Royce 
has incompletely captured is an implicit recognition that human nature and 
the public structure necessary for “good-enough” moral development have 
within themselves the seeds for self-correction. The loyal agent is not 
indefeasibly committed either to every single contingent public norm of his 
society or to the perfect stasis of that society within some imagined perfect 
past. What he is committed to is the maintenance of the kind of society that 
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does properly foster the development of agents committed to the truth and the 
natural good. Thus, even the reformer must remain loyal to some degree. 
This may not apply, however, to societies that are not “good-enough” 
in the relevant sense. A sufficiently unjust society may forfeit the loyalty of its 
members just insofar as it is unjust. A commitment to maintaining deep 
injustice will conflict with the fundamental volitionally-constitutive 
commitments to truth and mere morality. An agent characterized by such 
inconsistent commitments will have a conflicted will, and his agency itself will 
be seriously compromised. In this case, paradoxically, loyalty may very well 
entail disloyalty to intrinsically disordered public norms. If the injustice is 
radical enough loyalty may even entail the destruction of that society.  
Loyalty to deep injustice would be disloyalty to the ideal of the sorts of 
public norms necessary to develop truly morally mature agents. Therefore, 
loyalty to such norms would be destructive of the deep loyalty that is, I have 
claimed, foundational for human society itself. The agent in a society with 
such intrinsically disordered public norms then has a reason (from loyalty to 
the truth and mere morality) to display his opposition to those disordered 
norms. This, however, does not undermine the claims I have made for loyalty, 
quite simply because it is ultimately private loyalty to some higher end that 
motivates this public disloyalty. 
However, I think these cases are unusual. A fully mature agent who 
embarks on such a revolutionary course should be very reticent and never 
forget how extreme social upheaval can have unforeseen consequences that 
radically undermine the possibility of realizing the very justice and truth that 
his deep commitments drive him to attempt to achieve. I think there ought to 
  
228 
be a kind of prejudice in favor of loyalty to one’s society as it exists, but a 
prejudice that can ultimately be superceded in extreme cases. 199 
 
In a recent essay on Frankfurt and “love’s authority” Lear makes the 
following observation: “Frankfurt’s central idea about love’s authority is this: 
The lover, in acting against the dictates of his love, ultimately betrays himself” 
(Buss and Overton [2002], 279). When we combine this with Frankfurt’s notion 
that our moral activity itself proceeds from “love for a certain kind of world or 
a certain kind of life” I think the connection between mature active loyalty and 
the developmental story I have been telling becomes clearer. 
If our moral activity comes out of our volitionally constitutive 
commitment to a certain kind of moral ideal, and that requires the kind of 
dialectic between developing will and world that I have described above, I 
think it becomes plausible to understand why external loyalty is ultimately a 
loyalty to oneself. Because the internal structure of the will of a mature (moral) 
individual is a reflection of the structure of the world in which he attained 
maturity, an internal requirement of consistency—loyalty to oneself—will be 
reflected in the reverse direction as loyalty to the moral superstructure of the 
external world. Because the inside reflects the outside, so to speak, loyalty 
inward will be externally manifested in loyalty outwards. Thus, private 
loyalty to oneself becomes public loyalty. 
Loyalty to persons, institutions, ideals, etc. will proceed necessarily 
from the possession of a moral consciousness. Because what it is to be 
                                                
199 The legal aphorism that hard cases make bad law is surely relevant here. Although I want 
to leave open the possibility of these extreme cases (e.g., the anti-bellum South or Nazi 
Germany), I do not think we focus our attention chiefly (or even substantially) on such cases. I 
think it is much more important for us to get a feel for how loyalty would work within a 
“good-enough” world. 
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possessed of a moral consciousness has internal to it a concern with its own 
preservation, a recognition of the nature of how one’s internal values are 
necessarily connected with public values will lead to a recognition of an 
internal demand to conserve the public structure of value.  
Moral maturity consists in having a will that embodies these values. 
Having such values entails valuing them as such and valuing them as such 
entails caring for their propagation (because they are intrinsically social, 
public values). Finally, caring for their propagation (because that involves the 
complex dialectic of love and loss described above) requires public loyalty to 
them and the moral community they inform and embody. 
On the picture I am painting, ideals (moral and otherwise) exist both 
internally in agents and externally in the world. It is precisely because these 
ideals have internal to them their own preservation and propagation that they 
generate an internal demand for external loyalty. As we come to recognize this 
through an examination of the developmental process, I think we can come to 
see how important the stability of public values are for the inculcation of value 
in future generations. The very structure of human moral development 
requires it. 
In light of these considerations, I hope it is now becoming slightly 
clearer how the notion of a life with “substance,” with which I began Part II, 
will have particular and inescapable requirements for how the will of a 
morally mature human agent must be structured, and thus how the external 
world must be structured to accommodate this fact. On the other hand, 
however, these structural requirements are quite broad and do not prescribe 
all the particular cultural formations of our or any other culture. What they do 
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describe is how any human culture must possess certain limiting public 
moralities and commitments which will serve as school of virtue in its young.  
Although I do not believe human flourishing requires Western 
civilization as we know it, I do believe that, because of the way in which the 
development of a (moral) consciousness centrally involves learning to love a 
certain kind of (moral) ideal, any given culture, including our own, has an 
internal necessity towards its own preservation and propagation, embodied in 
the volitional structure of its members. Thus, to have fully a life of “substance” 
in our culture and civilization requires a commitment and loyalty to it, 
precisely because the substance of such a life is partially embodied by the 
same complicated public/private values that embody that civilization and 
culture. 
Thus, I return to a particularism about values. This particularism is not 
a relativism, however. Human nature will prescribe inescapable limits to what 
sort of social structures will make possible the development of the kind of 
wills capable of moral striving. Within those limits, however, much diversity 
is possible and indeed desirable, precisely because this diversity will point the 
way towards understanding what the limits of human nature are and thus 
who we are as human. 
However, within a given sophisticated culture like ours the 
appreciation and preservation of the religious, moral, aesthetic, etc. ideals that 
inform that culture will require the education of souls—i.e., the dialectic of 
love between developing soul and external world that I have tried to describe 
in this chapter. As such, the more developed the values a society embodies, 
the more important it becomes for the maintenance of those values that there 
is a level of public stability and confidence in them. Without that sort of 
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stability it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the vitality of that society 
and the values it embodies. Without a straightforward love of these sorts of 
values, moral agents will find their very agency undermined and the 
possibilities for true moral striving, for lives of genuine worth, increasingly 
lost to relativism, apathy, and despair.200 
 
In this chapter, I have tried to describe the highly complicated 
interrelationship of intra-volitional structure and the structure of the external 
moral and social world by discussing how an understanding of the nature of 
the development of the will prescribes certain limits to the world. I hope this 
has suggested that the demand for the justification of our loves and loyalties is 
aimed in the wrong direction. The justification goes no further than that such 
demands are the inescapable consequence of having a will shaped by love. 
In the next chapter, I will try to make good on my promise at the end of 
the last chapter to integrate the insights of the hierarchical model of the will 
with the developmental concerns that have been my focus in this chapter. I 
will discuss certain difficulties in the Frankfurtian account that only an 
understanding of the deep inter-relationship of will and world can resolve. 
Finally, I will tie together a variety of loose ends and attempt to show why my 
concerns in these last two chapters point directly to a more fruitful 
understanding of the genuine nature of loyalty. 
                                                
200 Again, this does not entail a mindless conservatism of whatever happens to be the case. It 
does, however, entail a thoughtful conservatism, in which the values and interests of both the 
past and future members of that society (to borrow a thought from Edmund Burke) are 
important considerations and worthy of protection. Ultimately, however, the demands of a 
commitment to truth and mere morality will naturally guide the morally mature agent in 
pursuing the melioration of social imperfections. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
A Developmental Argument for Loyalty 
 
 
It is now time to return our discussion to the questions at the heart of 
this dissertation. In the last two chapters I have introduced several new tools; 
now I want to utilize those tools in constructing a positive argument for my 
conception of loyalty. Along the way I will address several remaining 
objections and articulate in greater detail the importance of the developmental 
account in understanding the structure of a human shaped will of the sort we 
have reason to value. 
In Chapter V I discussed Frankfurt’s theory of the will. I believe that 
Frankfurt’s theory offers the best hope for understanding what is really at 
stake in the deepest sorts of human loyalties. These are the loyalties in which 
the implicit connection between the agent’s acts and identity are brought into 
relief. I argued there that the deepest loyalties in human life are those which 
involve values so deeply embedded in the agent’s will that the actions which 
express those loyalties are essentially acts of self expression. 
The focus of Chapter VI was on how such selves come to be. Taking up 
and expanding on Lear’s discussion of the development of the nascent psyche, 
I argued that the moral psyche—the ground of moral agency—comes about in 
an analogous way, through a dialectic of love between the soul of the 
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developing agent and the loving and lovable world he inhabits. This fact, the 
deep intertwining between the individual’s soul and the world in which he 
came to be, points us towards seeing past a potential misconception. For if the 
moral self and the world in which it develops remain in this sort of dialectic, 
then the self-expression of loyalty is not merely a kind of subjectivism. There 
is a specific non-self-regarding content to these deep loyalties, a content which 
embraces the moral structure of that loving and lovable world with which the 
individual soul is in dialectic. 
By ‘dialectic’ here I mean just to emphasize the way in which the values 
in question, as I argued in the last chapter, are both public and private, societal 
and intra-volitional. The dialectic in question occurs between the individual’s 
will and the external value-laden world whereby the individual takes up or 
“metabolizes” social values through his coming to care for them. In so doing 
he “writes” them into his soul insofar as they become the same sort of 
volitionally constitutive commitments discussed earlier. 
It is about this connection, between loyalty as self-expression and its 
role in mediating between the internal structure of the will and the external 
structure of the world, that I want to be particularly clear. I think this is where 
my approach has the most to offer, for this is where it should be the most 
apparent just why gaining an understanding of the nature of volitional 
development is so important.  
This connection may not be entirely clear on its face, precisely because 
these two aspects of my argument are designed to meet different issues. My 
focus on the constitution of the will is aimed at the phenomenological, 
subjective side of our deepest loyalties. What it shows is that the felt 
importance of these loyalties is not merely superficial but rather reflects 
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something important about the role that loyalties actually play in the 
volitional life of the moral agent.  
We tend, rightly, to regard an emphasis on the felt quality of certain 
experiences with suspicion. Indeed, this sort of complete absorption in a felt 
experience is commonly seen as a sign of immaturity. One need only think of 
teenagers’ common complaint that others just do not understand them, 
because those others do not know what it is like to feel as they do. This sort of 
solipsistic “argument” tends to be immune from criticism; of course one 
cannot precisely feel someone else’s emotions. Nonetheless, part of moral 
maturity, indeed maturity of any sort, involves getting beyond being 
overcome by one’s feelings. 
The fact of a feeling, with its attendant subjective felt significance, is not 
enough to justify its importance, all things considered. We commonly meet 
with individuals absorbed in their feelings who strike us as fundamentally 
shallow and unserious. My purpose here is not merely to pick on such 
unfortunate souls but to make a simple (and obvious) point: the subjective 
feeling of importance is not enough to justify a loyalty. Therefore, if my 
argument for the deepest loyalties of human life turned merely on their felt 
importance, then it would have little more weight than the plaintive cry of the 
teenager’s “you just don’t get it!” For us to take them seriously loyalties must 
not only have great felt importance, they must embrace serious values 
important beyond their subjective appearance. 
I would note in passing that the relationship between felt importance 
and volitional constitution goes both ways. It is a feature of Frankfurt’s model 
that, as a formal model, it does not really place limits on what sorts of 
commitments can be volitionally constitutive. In the case of the teenager it 
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may very well be that his commitment to the fortunes of his favorite band 
“rises” to the level of a volitional necessity in terms of its felt importance. 
What this reveals, however, is not the importance of that band but the poverty 
of the fan’s soul. His will actually may be constituted by such frivolous 
commitments, but obviously that does not, by itself, justify such 
commitments. Indeed, it only makes us realize just how uninteresting he is. In 
other words, as we ought to expect, the degree to which the agent embraces 
the frivolous as subjectively important to his life only reflects the degree to 
which the will and self at the ground of his agency is fundamentally 
immature, impoverished, and uninteresting.1 
This seems to point to a deficiency in Frankfurt’s model insofar as it is a 
model of rational free agency. The single most important feature of that model 
is Frankfurt’s claim that free agency consists only in acting in accord with 
one’s higher-order, volitionally constitutive commitments. It does not really 
seem to matter what those commitments are. In other words, Frankfurt’s is a 
formal model, in which rational free agency is a product of having a certain 
volitional structure independent of its content. 
I think the deficiencies of this formalism can be brought out in two 
ways. I have already adverted to the first in the case of the frivolous 
commitments of the teenager. The second lies in the vulnerability of the will so 
conceived to deliberate external subversion. 
Remember that Frankfurt’s original goal was to give an account of 
freedom of the will. He wished to understand that freedom as consisting in 
                                                
1 I am not suggesting that a commitment to music, or even to some particular performers, 
need be necessarily immature in this way. Nonetheless, I think most of us have met someone 
(or indeed been) like the teenager in my example. Any sort of overwrought commitment to 
some frivolous end may be substituted to see the point. Certain sorts of Gothic and Romantic 
literature come to mind in this regard (the sort mocked by Jane Austen, for instance). 
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being guided by higher-order commitments to which the agent is reflectively 
and wholeheartedly committed. Freedom (partially) consists in not being 
compelled by (first-order) desires over which one does not exert reflective 
control. However, Frankfurt never truly addresses where these higher-order 
commitments come from and surely this poses a prima facie problem. 
Although it seems that Frankfurt is right to claim that freedom partially 
consists in the absence of internal compulsion—possessing self-control over 
one’s first-order desires—freedom just as clearly also requires the absence of 
external compulsion. However, it is not clear that Frankfurt’s model 
conclusively rules out a case in which an agent’s higher-order commitments 
may be forced on or implanted in him. Why might not an agent be reflectively 
committed to higher-order desires which were somehow externally 
introduced into his will? If that were the case, it seems unlikely that we would 
consider him free even though the shape of his will would meet Frankfurt’s 
criteria. 
It might be objected that this is impossible, that the nature of reflective 
commitment precludes this. I do not see why this should necessarily be the 
case. It might be impossible to introduce a single higher-order commitment in 
conflict with others that the agent already has. However, why would it be 
impossible to completely remake a given agent’s set of higher-order 
commitments through some sort of extreme psychological treatment (or 
perhaps one day through some intervention in the physiology of his brain)? So 
long as this set itself were not internally incoherent the agent would be able to 
subject these higher-order commitments to rational reflection and 
deliberation. He could reflect on those commitments and would not be aware 
of any disturbing conflicts. Indeed he could come to acquire other
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commitments congruent to (or at least consistent with) them, and he would be 
utterly unaware of any abrogation of his freedom. 
In my example I am supposing that the agent’s entire set of higher-
order commitments (or a large fraction thereof) are directly introduced into 
his will by an external agent. This may seem so far-fetched as to fail to present 
a genuine objection. However, extreme psychological manipulation is 
certainly possible. We need only consider a Stockholm Syndrome case like 
Patti Hearst. In that case, through physical and mental intimidation a 
kidnapping victim ultimately came to sympathize and identify with her 
kidnappers. She began to take on the kidnappers’ values and even to 
participate in their crimes. By whatever particular modality this came about, it 
seems right to regard this as an external compulsion. It is very implausible to 
consider her reaction truly autonomous in the way it would need to be to 
underwrite an authentic expression of the victim’s will. 
I think it is important to note that there is nothing in the content of 
these particular commitments that make them incompatible with autonomy. 
In other words, it is reasonable to suppose that the kidnappers themselves 
possessed sufficient autonomy to be morally culpable for their actions.2 It does 
not seem to be the case that one cannot autonomously hold such 
commitments. 
We should keep in mind that Frankfurt’s model is in some important 
ways very limited. He purports to give a structural account of the will that 
                                                
2 This potentially leads to a tangled thicket of issues concerning the relationship of autonomy 
and moral culpability. For my purposes here I am assuming that one can autonomously 
choose to do evil, and thus be morally culpable for it. Now it may be the case that someone 
choosing evil is ipso facto incompletely autonomous. Nonetheless, even if there are relevant 
degrees of autonomy, it is seems to be the case that there is some level of autonomy necessary 
for moral responsibility which evil-doers meet. 
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explains volitional autonomy. The problem is that the bare structure of a free 
will as he develops it is compatible with that will having, even at the higher-
order, commitments introduced by an external interest. It is precisely because 
the model is limited to a structural description of volitional freedom that it is 
vulnerable to this kind of manipulation. 
If there is nothing about the particular content of these commitments 
that distinguishes their autonomous instantiation in the kidnapper and their 
non-autonomous instantiation in the victim then there must be some other 
grounds for our intuition that in cases like these the kidnappers are acting 
freely and the victim is not. My suggestion is that we need to look at how 
these commitments come about in a given agent’s will. It is the nature of the 
process whereby they are acquired that distinguishes the two cases. 
In the case of the kidnappers I think we would want to say that their 
criminality was an authentic expression of what they cared about. If we were 
able to examine the wills of the people in question I suppose that we would 
find that their actions are consistent with ends that they themselves identify 
with, and that those actions reflect (dis-) values that they autonomously hold. 
In other words, their criminality would presumably be consistent with their 
past lives and reflect the structure of their wills.3 
In the victim’s case, however, her new commitments are radically 
discontinuous (we may suppose) with the constitution of her will prior to her 
abduction. They are radically discontinuous with what we might suppose she 
most cared about previously. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that she could 
                                                
3 Actually, I want to prescind from the particulars of this case, because they are not so 
important for my purposes; suffice it to say that whatever was the case with the actual 
kidnappers of Patti Hearst, it is perfectly possible to imagine kidnappers with the sort of 
volitional constitution I am here describing. 
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have autonomously developed these new commitments. As I have argued 
earlier, because one’s volitional commitments are the very ground from which 
one’s agency proceeds, it is impossible to choose to completely remake one’s 
will. Truly autonomous choices must proceed from one’s central 
commitments. Of course one’s central commitments can change and evolve 
over time, but a complete remaking of them seems impossible. 
I wish to prescind from the exact details of the Hearst case, because 
what matters for seeing my point against Frankfurt’s formalism is not the state 
of her particular will. What matters is that we can see that his formalism 
cannot adequately explain a case of this sort whereby the agent’s will seems to 
be so remade that it is highly discontinuous with her previous (autonomous) 
will. We need some other account of why there seems to be a radical violation 
of autonomy in this sort of case; why the mental, emotional, and physical 
pressure that eventuates in such a change is inherently coercive, even if the 
agent later seems to be committed to values of her tormenters. 
My developmental model focuses our attention on how values are 
legitimately taken up into the will through the dialectic of love and loyalty I 
have described. What matters there is that the dialectic is precisely a 
developmental process, whereby the nascent agent’s very will is in the process 
of forming in reaction to and in relation with the public values of the good-
enough loving world in which he is maturing. In the coercive case we have 
commitments being imposed through a kind of violence that threatens and 
destroys the agent’s pre-existing commitments. In the developmental case, the 
development, to be successful, must be inherently loving (broadly speaking) 
and thus is not intrinsically destructive or violent in the same way. The 
developing agent does not have pre-existing higher-order commitments to be 
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destroyed but is in the very process of acquiring those commitments for the 
first time. 
What all of this suggests is that Frankfurt’s account is incomplete 
insofar as we hope to have a full understanding of autonomous agency. As a 
strictly formal model it is consistent with an obvious case of coercion. Thus, it 
seems to me the question of how an agent develops his higher-order 
commitments is vitally important. An agent’s will is free not merely if his 
higher-order commitments are internally coherent and reflectively his own, 
but also insofar as they are not implanted within his will by external forces. 
This then is why I place so much weight on the developmental account of 
moral psychology. It is meant to describe the natural generation of freely 
acquired higher-order commitments that may still be unchosen.  
These commitments are freely acquired insofar as the agent himself 
comes to take responsibility for them—claiming them for his own agency. 
They are nonetheless unchosen insofar as this is a developmental process such 
that the nascent agency in question is in no position to choose the 
commitments, as it is literally coming to be through them. To speak of such an 
agency choosing is to mistake what it is that choosing consists in. For, as I 
discussed previously, such a nascent agency has no stable ground from which 
to make choices, no stable core of volitionally constitutive commitments from 
which a genuine choice can proceed as reflective of a self. This is precisely 
because that nascent agent is undergoing the dialectical process whereby such 
commitments are first instantiated. The etiology my account describes shows 
how genuine higher-order commitments can grow out of an unchosen ground 
yet nonetheless be the foundation for a real volitional freedom. 
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In light of these two distinct but related objections to the bare 
formalism of the Frankfurt view, I hope the value of the developmental model 
will become more apparent. For developmental considerations offer a way out 
of some of the problems while nonetheless preserving the features of the 
Frankfurt model that are central to my concerns about loyalty (viz., the 
determination of the will according to volitional necessities). The 
developmental model addresses the first concern (the problem of frivolous 
volitional commitments) by showing how a mature moral agency is the 
product of a dialectic with a “good enough” moral world. Loyalty occupies a 
central place in this dialectic for it is the means by which the individual 
acquires public values and makes them his own. 
Now this does not mean that a good-enough world will completely 
supply the content of the mature agent’s will. I do think it is perfectly possible 
for mature agents to have frivolous commitments at the periphery of their 
wills. So it is possible to have a morally mature agent committed to something 
that may seem to have little objective value, such as the fortunes of a favorite 
rock band. However, these cannot be the central commitments of his will 
insofar as he is able to participate in his moral community.  
In other words, the good enough world does not prescribe the full 
structure of the will of the mature agent (and indeed we should not want it to, 
for otherwise we would be left with moral automatons more than moral 
agents). Rather, the good enough world will prescribe the central 
commitments that make socialization possible—e.g., commitment to the truth 
(broadly speaking) and some sort of mere morality. These, in turn, make our 
other commitments (trivial or serious) possible, for they underwrite the 
possibility of social engagement and discourse. To meet the objection to 
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Frankfurt, the agent’s response to the good enough world does not need to 
rule out trivial content; it just needs to rule in these sort of grounding 
commitments that make the moral life possible. 
When we realize that the mature will can only come to be within such a 
dialectic we can begin to see that substantial limits are placed on the content of 
such a will. These limits force the developing moral agent to transcend the 
limits of his narcissism, precisely because the values which they represent are 
public values woven into the fabric of a shared social life in which the 
discourse and practice of morality is intrinsic. In other words, the price of 
participation within this shared moral life is precisely the development of a 
will in which the same values which inform that social life become internal 
structural components of that will. 
The shared social life of public morality is only possible because the 
agents which inhabit it have successfully internalized its basic constitutional 
forms. I think the artificiality of so much modern moral philosophy brings this 
into stark contrast. When we turn our attention to moral choices as we actually 
make them we ought quickly to realize just how far our choices are already 
limited. So many bare possibilities that might be thought available in the 
abstract consideration of the seminar room are simply not really possible as 
real world choices. 
What I mean by this will be clear after a moment’s consideration. Let us 
begin by examining why morally mature agents in stable moral communities 
do not exemplify so many of the little vices which are often rampant in areas 
where public morality has broken down. Consider something as simple as 
littering. No doubt various arguments could be constructed to show an agent 
genuinely undecided on the question that he ought not litter—that the 
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ultimate disutility, even to him personally, of a cluttered environment 
outweigh the present utility to him of dropping the sticky candy bar wrapper. 
However, it should be obvious that having been convinced of such an 
argument or similar ones is not the reason most people do not litter. 
For a well brought up—i.e., morally mature—moral agent it simply will 
not enter into his mind that one of his options for disposing of the candy bar 
wrapper is to drop it on the ground. It is clearly not the case that at some point 
in his life he reviewed the arguments for and against and formed a standing 
intention not to litter. It is much more basic than that: it is that certain actions 
simply are not possible for him, because they are inconsistent with social 
norms he has so internalized that doing such things would be deeply alien to 
his character.4 
I cannot help but think that moral philosophers do not give nearly 
enough consideration to this phenomenon in their discussions of moral 
motivation. For I believe that the reason I do not murder people who annoy 
me is often very similar to the reason I do not litter—neither option ever really 
enters into my mind. This is of course not to claim that murder is of equal 
moral import to littering. Rather, the point is that in the practice of moral life, 
lived moral existence in the shared social world, what regulates our moral 
existence is rarely, if ever, a conscious, reflective commitment to the good 
(even when we have such a commitment). What regulates the activity of life is 
a standing disposition to act in certain ways because the scope of possible 
                                                
4 Obviously, extreme circumstances might change this. If he sees a child fall into a pond, he 
will hopefully forget his anti-littering instincts long enough to jump in after him, even if that 
means the candy bar wrapper hits the ground. 
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action is already circumscribed by the nature of our wills as formed within 
society.5 
It is this fact, that the scope of moral decision making is already highly 
circumscribed by volitionally internalized social norms, that is of signal 
import in considering the relationship of the structure of the will to the 
developmental model of moral psychology. For the developmental model 
articulates how this comes about, how an agent’s will takes on these internal 
constraints in the process of normal development. Insofar as that will takes on 
the structure of public norms through development in a good-enough world, 
those norms will then condition and inform both his dominant action guiding 
dispositions and the scope of possible deliberation. It is these public norms 
that will define the scope of readily imaginable possible actions in 
determining just what will even enter the mind of the agent. Further, to the 
extent that  we are able to understand the organizing features of the social 
fabric we will understand what sorts of values need to be volitionally 
internalized in order to ensure moral maturity. 
Without a consideration of these developmental aspects no model of 
the will can be faithful to the nature of human wills as we find them abroad in 
the world. In particular, no formal model that is completely agnostic about the 
content of the will can ever hope to be a true representation of the sorts of 
                                                
5 Bernard Williams alludes to this idea that certain things never enter into one’s mind as a live 
option under the title “deliberative silence.” In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy he notes: 
 
An effective way for actions to be ruled out is that they never come into thought at all, 
and this is often the best way. One does not feel easy with the man who in the course 
of a discussion of how to deal with political or business rivals says, “Of course, we 
could have them killed, but we should lay that aside from the beginning.” It should 
never have come into his hands to be laid aside. It is characteristic of morality that it 
tends to overlook the possibility that some concerns are best embodied in this way, in 
deliberative silence. (Williams [1985], 185). 
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wills that we actually do value and thus wish to understand. For what we 
ought to be most interested in are the wills of agents who are morally mature; 
that is, of agents who successfully inhabit and engage the social world we 
have reason to value (namely, our own). 
What explicit consideration of the developmental model shows us is 
that individual agents cannot be understood independent of the environment 
of moral maturation. Indeed, individual moral agents are to a large degree 
incomprehensible without such social context. Most modern moral theories 
tend to take the agent as a given (though what is given is variously 
understood). Kant sees the agent as a will, an instantiation of pure reason that 
is a cause within the “noumenal” world. The utilitarian sees him as a bundle 
of pleasure-seeking desires. Rousseau sees him as driven by amour propre and 
the desire for recognition. Though the details of the theories vary widely, they 
each tend to base their reflections on motivation and moral duty on fully 
formed moral agencies.6 
Indeed contemporary moral theories often classify the sorts of issues I 
am here discussing as pre-moral. They are the given on which the moral 
philosopher works and to which he applies his reflective moral theory. As 
such these sorts of issues are generally considered not worth discussing. I 
think this is a mistake because it treats these developmental issues as if they 
were merely brute, which the moral theorist can then refashion for his own 
purposes. Such an attitude ignores the fact that the processes of development 
                                                
6 Rousseau is something of an exception to this, of course. In Emile he explicitly considers the 
problems attending a moral education, and in the Second Discourse he has a sort of 
developmental model for the species. Nonetheless, I do think it fair to say he does not really 
concern himself with a full-fledged developmental moral psychology. 
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will determine, to a large and perhaps decisive extent, the real scope and 
nature of moral activity in the world of lived experience. 
What the developmental model allows us to see is precisely that the 
result of moral maturation within a loving and lovable social world has 
inescapable consequences for the shape of the wills of the agents who develop 
in it. This shape is determined by the way in which development within a 
social world results in the internalization of that world’s values as volitionally 
constitutive. In other words, when an agent reaches moral maturity his will 
has already been greatly formed; he possesses a variety of volitionally 
constitutive commitments which reflect the nature of the social environment 
in which he matured and to which he will then naturally be loyal. 
As I have repeatedly emphasized, loyalty is both the means for, and the 
product of, this moral maturation process. It is a means insofar as the nascent 
moral psyche itself comes into being by internalizing the external social values 
through loyalty to them (perhaps beginning with the most basic kind of 
loyalty—identification—but moving beyond any sort of mechanical process to 
a volitional one). It is an important consequence of this process that a will 
formed in this way will naturally “express” itself through the agent’s public 
affirmation of the social values internalized during development. Ultimately, 
the most reflective agents (which are not necessarily the best, by any means)7 
may progress towards reflectively embracing those values through something 
like a will to believe. In other words, loyalty lies at the very heart of the 
                                                
7 I tend to agree with Williams that the relationship between reflection and moral knowledge 
can be negative, that reflection can destroy knowledge (see note 9 below). Whether that is a 
bad thing or not is another matter. However, irrespective to the question of that relationship, 
it is often the case that reflection is the enemy of confidence and conviction, than an over keen 
ability to reflectively examine all sides of an ethical issue may eventuate in paralysis or a sort 
of nihilism. 
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possibility of a social and moral order because in loyalty mature agents are 
tied together, and through loyalty the young are able to take up their places 
within that order through the processes of moral maturation. 
This does not preclude a kind of tempered rebellion at certain points. 
Teenage rebellion is a cliché, but of course reflects an underlying 
psychological and moral reality. To accept fully the social values into the will 
in a manner that will underwrite genuine rational agency many people seem 
to need to push them away for a while, to find their “own” way. In a stable 
and self-perpetuating society most of these people come back to the very 
values they apparently rejected, but they do so perhaps with the advantage of 
a space that allows them to claim them for their own—to take responsibility 
for them—by seeing them from the “outside.” Before they gained that “space” 
through this sort tempered rebellion they may have felt themselves victims of 
a “cookie-cutter” morality; with the benefits of that space they can come to 
identify with those values without feeling compelled. 
This sort of tempered rebellion is often important in generating 
individuality. It is in pushing back the demands that the world makes that the 
individual comes to express his own unique will and agency. Even the two 
year-old’s emphatic “No!” serves an important purpose in helping him to see 
himself and his action as independent sources of value. Ultimately, some such 
independence is at the heart of moral responsibility. Nonetheless, in the end, 
the communal good, and thus the good of individuals, is only possible to the 
extent that this tempered rebellion gives way to an integration of the public 
values within the agent’s will. 
Of course this need not deny the potential creativity of the agent. Public 
values do change (for better and for worse) and these changes are often 
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wrought by individuals demanding greater recognition of their individuality. 
Thus, nothing in my view requires public values to remain firmly fixed. 
However, it is important that there remain a kind of core of shared public 
values which are fixed and which ground the very possibility of shared moral 
community. These include the kind of values that are necessary to negotiation 
and compromise, etc. In the long run, I think they will also have to include 
commitments to the truth and the sort of mere morality I mentioned 
previously.  
The upshot of these simple observations is actually quite important. No 
social order, however conceived, can long endure, and remain a repository of 
moral value, without an active and public loyalty expressed by its mature 
members and inculcated in its children. Therefore, any moral theory that fails 
to pay consideration to the demands of loyalty in the maintenance of moral 
community is, at best, myopic, and at worst, positively pernicious. 
Even if it is not the intention of the authors of such theories, the effect of 
the common sort of moral theorizing is quite often detrimental to the 
maintenance of moral community. The constant search for principles of 
justification grounded in putatively independent principles of the good (e.g., 
pure practical rationality or pleasure maximization, etc.) can deeply 
undermine the processes of moral maturation. Because they force the agent to 
seek justification only in terms of abstract (generally universally quantified) 
principles, they radically undervalue the degree in which the real moral life is 
lived and shaped in the context of volitional commitments unconsciously 
acquired through the processes of moral maturation. In other words, it is 
simply not the case, as one might suppose from so much moral philosophy, 
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that the key to acting morally is the constant justification of one’s actions (or 
even one’s character) by reference to putative principles of the good.8 
There is something intuitively very wrong in the picture that many 
modern moral theories often seem to paint of moral reflection. The agent 
whose focus is always on the good alone seems deeply inhuman somehow. I 
noted in Chapter II Michael Stocker’s discussion of the apparent 
incompatibility of so much of modern moral theory with the plain reality of 
lived ethical lives that are centrally focused on particular attachments, 
friendships, and loves that the agent simply does not justify according to 
external principles of the good.  
One of the key advantages of trying to understand the development of 
moral psychology is that it forces us to recognize this fact. When we are 
clearly dealing with developing moral psyches in the process of becoming 
agents we are more readily able recognize the dependency of the individual 
will on the social context of the loving and lovable world. When we consider 
just how much the developing psyche must achieve in order to attain the 
status of a free agent, we are brought to see the degree to which that 
complexity must arise from some clearly external source, for the resources 
simply are not there for it to be self-generated. Finally, by taking the process of 
maturation to be one in which the public social values of the world are 
connected to the developing psyche through his loyalty to them, we can come 
to recognize how deeply embedded the moral agent is in the social discourse 
                                                
8 I take it that hardly anyone would believe that every individual action would have to be so 
justified, but I do think that most moral philosophers would think that one must have, at least, 
standing intentions, reflectively justified according to such principles, for regulating moral 
action. See as well note 3 above concerning Williams’ notions of “deliberative silence” 
  
250 
and practice of morality, independent of which there is no moral meaning nor 
the possibility of a full moral life. 
Thus, if the advent of moral agency is only possible through a kind of 
loyalty to the public values of society, then moral philosophy, whose ultimate 
value must lie in how well it serves the practice of moral life, cannot 
legitimately undermine that loyalty. For with the undermining of loyalty 
comes the undermining, intentional or not, of the very possibility of stable 
moral community. In other words, what is at stake is not merely loyalty to 
some given, contingent moral community. What is at stake is the volitional 
structure—including the internalized public norms—necessary for 
maintaining and perpetuating any sort of moral community whatsoever, e.g., 
commitment to at least some sort of bare morality governing social interaction. 
No actual moral community necessarily commands absolute loyalty just 
because it exists, but loyalty to some set of shared public norms is necessary 
for any moral community, including the potential ones imagined by a 
reformer. 
 The chief “liabilities” of loyalty as a moral phenomenon—that loyalty 
is putatively unthinking and merely dog-like, that it is often unjustified 
according to independent moral principles of the good—are in fact great 
strengths insofar as the inculcation and maintenance of moral community is 
concerned. For only insofar as agents are almost instinctively loyal will they 
uphold the public norms that make possible the survival of the moral 
community in the face of both internal and external threats and the self-
perpetuation of that community by inculcation of those public norms in the 
young through the very developmental processes I have been at pains to 
describe. Loyalty provides the ground condition for community as opposed to 
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the mere collection of moral agents. For loyalty binds agents together in a 
public structure that has reasons and interests greater than the mere 
aggregation of the reasons and interests of its constituents. If it is true that 
moral agents need a moral community in order to be moral, then it is the case 
that loyalty to community is necessary for the very possibility of a lived moral 
life. 
This is by no means to imply that the proper course is to abandon 
moral reflection and moral philosophy. Rather it is a warning to those 
engaged in moral philosophy that it is a mistake to think that only those 
volitional commitments which can be justified explicitly in terms of external 
principles of the good are proper to an ethical life. The very substance of a 
sustained ethical life, much less sustained moral reflection, is parasitic upon 
the stability of the moral community and thus upon the stability of the 
volitional commitments of those who make up that community to uphold it as 
a moral community.9 
 
At this point I think it would be well for me to address an objection that 
readily arises towards my emphasis on development. The objection can be 
stated simply: exactly why should the modality whereby a moral self comes to 
be continue to have moral significance for the adult self? In other words, why 
                                                
9 In his Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Bernard Williams arrives at a very “un-Socratic” 
conclusion: “that, in ethics, reflection can destroy knowledge” (Williams [1985], 148). He does not 
therefore argue that we must stop moral reflection, because the loss of ethical knowledge is 
compensated for in other ways—e.g., knowledge about other areas of human life. 
Nonetheless, he argues that what is required is confidence, and that moral practice can be 
founded on a confidence that does not depend on epistemological certainty concerning moral 
knowledge. Williams is quite dismissive of moral theory as such, arguing that moral theory, by 
stressing obligation, militates against other forms of the ethical life, embodied in “practical 
necessities” of other sorts. Hence, the “limits of philosophy” (particularly moral theory) in 
articulating the ethical life are quite real. 
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is the means by which an individual comes to possess a fully responsible 
moral psyche not simply like Wittgenstein’s ladder—to be kicked away once 
ascended? Indeed, might we not be tempted to remark with St. Paul, “When I 
was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but 
when I became a man, I put away childish things”? Why then, even if the 
outline of my developmental story is granted, should the consequences of that 
developmental story continue to bind the mature agent? 
Consider this analogy: one child might learn the rudiments of 
arithmetic by manipulating pennies under the guidance of his teacher; another 
might learn the same by counting oranges with her mother. Let us say that 
each child has mastered (in some sense) the truth of the proposition “2 + 2 = 
4”; in that case, is not the modality by which the mastery was achieved 
irrelevant? Can not each child now, in principle, put away the pennies or the 
oranges, and apply the algorithm to anything?10 
That in principle is of course at the heart of what is at stake. We tend to 
think that what matters in the addition case is that there be some principle or 
algorithm, etc. whose truth is fully independent of any given instantiation of 
it. Thus, while it may be contingently true that an individual’s understanding 
of the principle is achieved through practice with some particular instantiation 
of that principle, nonetheless the truth of that understanding is not dependent 
on that instantiation, but precisely must transcend it to constitute a true 
principle. The truth of “2 + 2 = 4” lies not in any objects and would be true 
even if there were no objects.  
                                                
10 Scott MacDonald first phrased the objection to me in this way. 
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Why should not moral principles be the same? If, for the sake of 
argument, some principle—e.g., “one ought to be loyal to one’s family”—is 
true, what possible difference could it make that I learned this in a family in 
which my loyalty never had much purchase beyond my parents, while 
someone else learned it in a family encompassing a myriad of cousins, great 
aunts, and extended relatives seemingly beyond number? Should not an 
analysis of such moral principles prescind from the particular and embrace the 
universal, precisely because that is what makes them principles? 
Thus, we might think that just as the truth of the arithmetical 
proposition is independent of how any given person came to know it, so is the 
truth and moral force of any moral proposition independent of how any given 
moral agent came to embrace it. What matters is not how the agent came to 
have a mature moral self, but that he did, for it is precisely in virtue of 
possessing such a self that he is a moral agent, an independent participant in 
the sphere of moral discourse. In fact, the extent that the agent remains caught 
up in the particular modality of how he came to understand some moral truth 
might itself be thought to be the degree to which he has failed to understand it 
fully. 
It is important that we recognize that this objection has force because of 
two key assumptions, namely that the moral self is an independent source and 
bearer of value and that morality has purchase on that self through its 
subsumption under universal moral principles. If it were the case that the 
individual moral self were not so very independent after all and that morality 
did not necessarily have moral purchase on selves simply through their 
subsumption under universalist principles, the force of the objection would 
drain away. 
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Of course, the model of the self I have advanced fits this description of 
the fundamental embedding of the agent in the moral community. In the last 
chapter, I essentially argued that the values which generate a mature moral 
self through the developmental process of taking responsibility are public 
values. Their publicity should be understood as two-fold (which are really two 
sides of the same coin): first, they must be public for them to be effective in 
forming the nascent moral self through the dialectic of love. In other words, it 
is only because they are abroad in the world that the developing self is able to 
claim them for himself, i.e., able to integrate them into his developing soul by 
identifying with and then taking responsibility for them (through loyalty to 
them). Obviously, if they were not public they could not participate in this 
dialectic, for the developing self would have no access to them. It is precisely 
in virtue of their publicity that they can be effective objects of loyalty for the 
developing psyche. 
The second sense of their publicity lies in how they manifest 
themselves once integrated into the developing self—i.e., once the agent has 
achieved maturity. If they have in fact been integrated (it is perfectly possible 
for him to reject many of them) then they will manifest themselves in his social 
behavior. For these values to have become integrated into his will through 
loyalty they must be what the agent most cares about. Accordingly, to the 
extent that his actions reflect the structure of his will—i.e., to the extent that he 
most expresses his genuine autonomy—he will publicly manifest these values. 
If the developmental account that I have tried to give is on target, then 
many of the values that inform the will of any given agent will have to be 
public values of this sort, because that agent’s will is itself partially a product 
of those values (i.e., they have been “metabolized” by the agent in taking 
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responsibility for them). I have in mind here values of all sorts, from the 
unambiguously moral (e.g., the prohibition of murder) to the social (e.g., 
civility in social discourse) to the aesthetic (e.g., an appreciation for opera). 
What this suggests then is that even as integrated into the soul of the mature 
agent these values will retain their publicity. Indeed that they are the values 
that they are—values that inform and maintain communities—requires that 
they be intrinsically public. Thus, even when such a value constitutes what a 
given agent most cares about—and so is most authentically his—nonetheless it 
remains a shared commodity, the common possession of all who are loyal to 
it. A public value is at large in the world, and while it is certainly made 
effective in the world through individuals, it transcends any of them.11 
The Frankfurt-derived view of the will introduced in Chapter V and 
developed above provides further evidence against the notion that moral 
principles are effective—i.e., actually determine the will—through something 
like subsumption under a universally quantified proposition. I argued, 
following Frankfurt, that the will acts most authentically when it is 
determined to action by what it most cares about and the agent’s actions 
reflect the internal structure of his will. As I noted in Chapter V, Frankfurt 
himself goes so far as to claim that he believes “we act morally when we are 
moved by love for a certain kind of world or a certain kind of life.” 
                                                
11 Although it is true that most of my discussion of the developmental argument as concerned 
it application by parents to children, and apparently involves a smaller, more familiar sphere 
that I am discussing here, I think it is obvious that the kind of values that parents teach their 
children are public values of the sort I am here interested in. So when a child is taught not to 
take candy-bars at the grocery store he is being taught an instance of a much larger public 
value. To the extent that he successfully integrates a commitment of that sort in his will as a 
developing agent, then the public norm against stealing has effective force in his actions, and 
conditions the scope of possible actions in his practical deliberations. In some non-trivial way 
the values of the family are the values of the successful society, since, as Aristotle argued in 
the Politics, the family is both the first society and the foundation of all others. 
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In other words, morality has purchase on our souls through our love 
for and loyalty to it, not merely through some abstract notion of duty. When 
we are motivated by a concern for morality we are in fact expressing our love 
for and loyalty to “a certain kind of world or certain kind of life.” Now the 
content of our understanding of that world—i.e., what makes it the world or 
life that it is—may seem to concern only universals. However, insofar as it is 
actually effective—insofar as morality actually motivates the agent—it does so 
because he cares about it; he loves it. 
I think many moral philosophers have a tendency to think of morality 
as essentially involving a process of deliberation whereby we discharge 
universally quantified propositions to determinate, individually instantiated 
conclusions. The universally quantified propositions have a form similar to 
the following: (where ‘x’ ranges over moral agents and ‘y’ over actions) !x"y 
(in conditions C, x should do y).12 Thus, my acting morally consists in 
subsuming myself under this principle—i.e., instantiating myself as the ‘x’. To 
act morally, then, is to reason properly, to recognize myself as a member of the 
set over which ‘x’ ranges, therefore to conclude that I should do y, and then 
actually to do y. 
I do not want to claim it is impossible to reason and act thus. However, 
I think that such a coldly rational conception of morality is simply inaccurate 
in the vast majority cases. When our wills are actually determined to act 
morally it is seldom because we have arrived at the conclusion of a deductive 
argument of this sort. Rather, we become convinced (correctly or not) that 
                                                
12 This formula is meant to be very general, but not comprehensive—in particular, of course 
there may be more than one moral action (or perhaps none). It need not necessarily 
perspicaciously capture the form of every moral principle, nor does it rule out doing more 
than what morality demands. Rather, I only mean to suggest that moral principles tend to be 
understood under such a kind of universal quantification, mutatis mutandis. 
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something we care about is threatened and we are moved to act accordingly.13 
What we care about can and does vary widely, but even for the most sincere 
consequentialists and Kantians, I want to suggest when they actually act they 
generally do so because they are motivated by a kind of love.14 
Whatever is the case with morality proper, the account of loyalty I have 
developed certainly works this way. When acting on a truly deep loyalty—i.e., 
when determined to act according to a Frankfurtian “volitional necessity”—
the agent acts from his love for a certain value. Further, the sorts of values 
towards which loyalty aim (family, community, religion, etc.) tend to be 
public values integrated into the agent’s will through his development in the 
way I outlined earlier. Accordingly, loyalty simply does not determine the will 
through judgments instantiating universally quantified propositions. 
It might help to consider a particular case of loyalty—for instance, my 
loyalty to my mother. On the conventional model, if this loyalty has moral 
value then something like the following general proposition will be true: one 
ought to be loyal to his mother. This is the kind of proposition we examined in 
Chapter III and that Goodin and Pettit have in mind in their analysis of 
“duties of special concern”—it is a relativised duty whose “content is 
identified by back-reference… [with] a pronominal device, to the bearer.” As 
before, this proposition can be formalized with a universal quantifier: !x (x 
ought to be loyal to x’s mother). If I embrace such a proposition (i.e., hold it to 
                                                
13 Frankfurt’s observation on this topic rings very true: “If someone tries to interfere with my 
children, I will try to fight him off. If someone tries to interfere with out efforts to bring about 
or to sustain the kind of world we love, why should we not be as confidently disposed to fight 
him off? We do not need any knockdown reason for knocking him down, other than the 
reason that he is trying to damage something we love” (Buss and Overton, 277). 
14 I know this point will be hotly contested; I shall have more to say about it below. What this 
claim essentially amounts to is a claim about how effective volition is regulated in by the 
structure of higher-order desires. 
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be true) and understand that I am a member of the set over which ‘x’ ranges, 
then I will conclude that I ought to be loyal to my mother. Arriving at such a 
conclusion, I might then take steps to make it effective in my actions. The 
normative force of my acting in accordance with the perceived duty here 
derives from the universally quantified proposition and my subsumption of 
myself under it. It does not derive from anything intrinsically particular about 
this woman or my will, except insofar as she stands in a certain formal 
(extrinsic) relationship to me. 
If loyalties are best understood as a special class of universal moral 
duties, we would expect them to have a form similar to this (at least to the 
degree of being apt to formalization in some sort of universally quantified 
proposition).15 However, the view of the will I have advanced throughout this 
dissertation denies that this is the right analysis of my loyalty to my mother. 
My loyalty to my mother grows out of my love for her, not my respect for a 
universally quantified principle under which I have subsumed myself. In 
other words, the normative force of my acting from the loyalty I owe her is a 
result of my will being oriented in a particular way—namely, in being 
partially constituted by my love for her. When I act out of such loyalty I give 
expression to the fact that her good is so deeply implicated in my will, that 
acting contrary to my perception of her good is simply (volitionally) 
impossible. 
It is absolutely vital to see the distinction here: in the one case my 
loyalty to my mother is analyzed as an instantiation of an independently 
holding principle whose truth and moral force is wholly independent of my 
                                                
15 The scope of the universal quantifier may be limited in certain ways. For instance, the 
proposition that formalizes such a duty may go beyond pronominal back-reference to include, 
e.g., conjunctions which specify membership in certain groups, etc. 
  
259 
recognition of it. In the other case, my loyalty to my mother grows out of the 
place my love for her has in constituting my very will. Thus, in my view it is 
simply not the case that my loyalty to my mother grows out of a process of 
reasoning at all.  
On this analysis my acting from loyalty does not represent the 
conclusion of an argument whose first premise is a universally quantified 
normative principle and whose second premise is my recognition of myself as 
a member of the set over which that quantifier ranges. Rather, it is an 
expression of the deepest structure of my will, which issues directly in action 
in consequence of a perceived threat to something (someone, in this case) I 
care deeply about. If she is in danger and I rush to save her my actions are 
probably not the result of any kind of deliberation at all, but the necessary 
consequence of having a will formed by and through my love for her. Thus, 
my commitment to the proposition “I ought to be loyal to my mother” is not 
merely an instantiation of my commitment to the general principle “everyone 
ought to be loyal to his mother.” In terms of how my will expresses an action 
that embraces it, the normativity of the particular proposition is independent 
of that of the general one.16 
Now it might be objected that I have just offered a kind of general 
principle (regarding the force of volitional necessity) in contradiction to my 
assertion that general principles are here inappropriate. This is not correct, 
however, because my point concerns the force of loyalty in determining how 
the agent actually acts. In other words, such a principle is descriptive of how 
                                                
16 This does not preclude the possibility that the general principle that everyone ought to be 
loyal to his mother is true as well, in fact I think it probably is. Rather the point is in how my 
loyalty effectively determines my will in such cases. If there is moral value in the universal 
statement it will be captured only in a will disposed to love the ideal it embodies. 
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and why the agent acts but is not normatively determinative of those actions. 
The central point is that an agent compelled to act by a volitional necessity (to 
save his beloved mother, for example) does not act on any principle 
whatsoever. Although I can describe the class of actions in terms of a 
principle, his agency is not founded on any sort of deliberation from 
principles. That is the key point; when acting on the deepest sort of loyalty an 
agent’s actions are not motivated by the conclusion of a deliberative process in 
which the agent recognizes himself as properly subsumed under some 
universal moral principle.  
This is true even for a moral theory that does not require perfect 
deliberation for every act (e.g., rule utilitarianism). Overall traditional moral 
theories require at least the justification of some standing intention or policy 
(rule, etc.) from a deliberative standpoint by applying a universal principle 
(e.g., pleasure maximization) to individual circumstances. My central claim is 
that the deepest loyalties in human life simply do not work that way; they 
make no essential reference to some set of universal principles. They are what 
they are simply because the agent loves what he loves. The “justification” of 
such loyalties lies not in their tendency to conduce to some favored state of 
affairs (or to describe the structure of practical reason, etc.) but in the fact that 
they are necessary to ground the very possibility of (moral) agency itself.  
Now we can see is how misleading the analogy to learning arithmetic 
really is. In that case, the force (i.e., truth) of the particular instantiations (that 
these two oranges added to those two oranges, makes a total of four oranges) 
is entirely parasitic upon the truth of the general proposition “2 + 2 = 4.”17 
                                                
17 Of course, I am speaking loosely here and not purporting to be making any claims about 
arithmetic. Perhaps, strictly speaking, the truth of any instantiation of arithmetic, including 
the adding of two oranges to two other oranges to yield a total of four oranges, is parasitic 
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Thus, once the child learns the principles of addition, he may put away the 
childish things of the oranges, pennies, or fingers. On the other hand, in the 
case of the deepest loyalties, the normative force of the particular lies not in its 
instantiation of a universal, but in its particular content—that I am loyal to my 
mother, this particular woman here, whose love for me became integrated into 
my very will as I developed to become the kind of creature who could love her 
back. 
Thus, insofar as the agent embraces the values in which he was formed 
there can be no question of kicking the ladder away because the “ladder” 
becomes integrated within the will of the mature self. The central point here is 
that the normative force of loyalty that lies at the heart of agency is not 
derivative from any sort of universal principle independent of the volitional 
structure of the individual agent. In the case of arithmetic the particular 
modality whereby the student comes to understand the principles of addition 
are irrelevant to the force (i.e., truth) of those principles. The principle of 
addition would remain true in the absence of any particulars. 
However, the force of loyalty (i.e., its role in bringing the agent to act) is 
intrinsically dependent on the particular object to which it is attached. This is 
simply because the normative force of loyalty is dependent on the structure of 
the will from which it proceeds, specifically the volitionally constitutive core 
commitments of the agent. What drives the agent to risk his life to rescue his 
beloved mother from danger has nothing to do with any principle whatsoever; 
it is how his will must move in reflection of its deepest constitution, directly 
manifesting in action what he most cares about. 
                                                                                                                                       
only the nature of some set of numbers and the some property of that set or its members and 
not the proposition “2 + 2 = 4.” Indeed this latter proposition might depend for its truth on the 
same facts. Nonetheless, I take it the point is clear enough. 
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The “ladder” cannot be discarded precisely because his mature will is 
itself constituted by the “rungs.” That is, his will is itself partially constituted 
by his loves as formed through loyalty. These include his commitments to 
family, community, religion, etc. They are not dispensable precisely because 
their force is not parasitic on the truth of some more general principles, which 
the developmental process has revealed to him (though there may be general 
principles which describe these things that are true independent of him). 
Rather their normative force in the agent’s life derives (even consists in) their 
particularity as loves and loyalties to individual, specific objects. Without 
those specific objects his love will become etiolated, his agency flattened, and 
perhaps even fatally undermined. 
Consider for a moment that the object of my love for my mother is not 
merely whatever creature that happens to stand in some formal relationship to 
me, viz. the woman who gave birth to me. Rather, the object of my love for my 
mother is a particular, rather short, Asian woman that lives at such and such 
place and occasionally sends me Chinese cookies in the mail. It is true, of 
course, that she also satisfies that formal description, but my love for her is not 
directed at her under that formal description. I think that is clear enough if we 
consider that some other woman entirely might have stood under that formal 
description (e.g., a woman who gave me up for adoption, but whom I never 
knew), but that would not substantially change my volitional commitment to 
this particular short Asian woman (provided, of course, that our subsequent 
relationship was substantially the same, e.g. because she was the one who 
adopted me). 
My deepest loyalties are directed at unique objects which form part of 
the content of my will through my deep love for them. I have literally come to 
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be, to have the will I have, on account of those loves that have formed in the 
developmental processes I have discussed above. Therefore, there can be no 
question of dispensing with these loves (and their particular objects), without 
dispensing with the very will, the very volitional structure, that informs the 
volitional necessities. As such, the normative force of my loyalties in bringing 
me to act lies intrinsically and inescapably in the particulars of my 
development, in the particular objects of my love and loyalty. 
None of this is to say that the mature self cannot repudiate such 
values—of course, an agent can repudiate many of the values that go into 
constituting himself. However, in so doing he is consciously re-making 
himself, and whether or not that is good or noble depends on the particulars 
of both what he rejects and what he comes to affirm.18 I want to stress, 
however, that the possibility of a deracinated agent who deliberately 
repudiates the values in which he was formed does not invalidate the analysis, 
for it can accommodate his “new” will as having much the same structure (i.e., 
constituted by deep, higher-order commitments) even though its content is 
very different. 
One thing we certainly ought to note is that the deracinated agent is not 
more free or autonomous simply because he chooses to repudiate the values in 
which he was formed. For the agent who embraces and takes full 
responsibility for some of the public values which inform his society can do so 
just as autonomously as the one who repudiates those values.19 For what is 
                                                
18 In other words, we cannot make the evaluation in purely formal terms. We would have to 
examine the particular public values of his society. Nonetheless, if I am right that there are 
real limits on what constitutes a “good enough” world—limits set by human nature—then eo 
ipso there will be some aspects of his society that are good, no matter how bad it is. 
19 Indeed, I would be inclined to think the agent who deliberately embraces some of his 
society’s public values is acting more autonomously to the extent that his take responsibility 
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most important in this analysis is that the values the agent embraces be 
embraced as his own, freely integrated into his own will. Furthermore, even 
the most deracinated agent cannot fully extract himself from the public values 
of his society because they are encoded in the very possibility of sociability 
and social discourse (e.g., in language, the norms of social interaction, 
compromise, etc.). 
This point re-emphasizes the importance of understanding 
development as a prerequisite for understanding the nature of moral maturity, 
for mature moral agency is founded upon a stable core of volitional 
commitments. The developmental model allows us to understand both how 
that volitional core arises in the first place and the nature of some of its most 
important content. Since the will is formed in dialectic with the public values 
of the loving and lovable social world the developing agent inhabits, it is the 
case that many of the social norms which inform that world will be written 
into his will through loyalty. This is so simply because the nature of their 
publicity requires it. 
Just as there can be no private language, there can be no private 
morality. The intrinsic nature of moral commitments requires that they be 
shared within a moral community, just as the nature of language requires that 
it be shared among members of a speech community. Much as the developing 
speaker acquires within himself his speech community’s linguistic structures, 
so the developing agent takes on his moral community’s moral content into 
his will. 
                                                                                                                                       
evidence of reflection, whereas repudiation is often merely tossed off. Of course, one can be 
reflective or unreflective in either case. 
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The analogy can be pressed even further, I think, in that just as the 
language one speaks informs in many ways how one thinks, so the moral 
world volitionally imbibed (so to speak) necessarily informs the possibility of 
one’s moral practice and discourse. This is of course not to deny the possibility 
of a large overlap between different moral communities, just as there is among 
different speech communities. But as certain concepts and even patterns of 
thought are specific (and even unique) to speakers of particular languages, I 
think it is plausible to think that genuine moral content can be unique to 
members of particular moral communities.20 
Of course propositions can be translated between languages and indeed 
there may be a “deep grammar” intrinsic to all human language. Just so moral 
content can be “translated” between moral communities, even if sometimes 
imperfectly. Furthermore, lest this be thought an invitation to simple 
relativism, this claim is fully consistent with there being a truth of the matter 
about morality. There may be (indeed I think there is) a “deep morality” 
which is constrained and determined by human nature. Nonetheless, there 
may be (and I think there are) different moralities just as there are different 
languages, and these may generate differing patterns of moral obligation.21 
                                                
20 Williams writes of such “content” as “thick” ethical concepts. These are concepts, particular 
to certain moral communities, which are intrinsically evaluative as well as descriptive. Their 
first-personal use requires membership in the communities in which they are current. (c.f., 
Williams [1985], 129, 142-5). 
21 Again, though, this does not lead to moral relativism if the “deep morality” which all moral 
communities share insofar as they share a constant human nature is ultimately determining. 
Thus, a society that has a social practice plainly in conflict with basic morality—e.g., suttee in 
19th century India—can be and ought to be morally criticized. The grounds of that criticism 
will be precisely this “deep morality” and the mere fact of the communities deeply felt 
attachment to the practice will not, by itself, be sufficient to shield it from criticism. In a case 
like this it become necessary to judge that our confidence in the correctness of our moral 
condemnation outweighs any sort of sensitivity to the indigenous norms. Thus, as part of our 
commitment to morality we are required to effect a fundamental change in the social practices 
of the alien society and thus in the very nature of that moral community. 
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However this may be, real agents acting in the real world express their 
agency through wills formed in the context of particular social circumstances 
and have volitional commitments bearing the marks of those circumstances. 
An understanding of the nature of the development of the will through the 
dialectic of love mediated by loyalty is absolutely key to understanding both 
why individual moral communities take the shape they do and how 
individuals acting within those communities will express themselves through 
their practice of moral life and discourse. By the same token, an 
understanding of the nature of the developmental processes will help us to see 
the limits which human nature places on the scope of these possibilities. 
The process of development I have discussed gives us clues towards 
these very limits. For if we can discover the necessary processes by which 
moral psyches come to be we will have a better idea of what it is that makes us 
human. Our researches have clearly pointed to the operations of a loving 
dialectic and the requirements of loyalty to the generation and inculcation of 
moral values. However, we need not stop at these broad limits. We can further 
specify the sorts of values that our particular moral community embodies and 
requires of its members. 
Thus we require an investigation not only of the general process of 
moral maturation determined by the scope of human nature and common to 
all human societies. We need as well a further investigation into the 
particularities of our own moral community and thus the loyalties which 
inform the values we actually do have and express. Only then can we 
recognize that the moral values we express in the shared fabric of our moral 
community include not only those values of “deep morality” dictated by 
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human nature but also the particular and peculiar values that make our 
civilization, our society, our moral community, the unique one it is. 
As I have repeatedly emphasized, loyalty stands at the heart of this, at 
the heart of the dialectic of love between the individual and his community. 
The nascent loyalty of the developing psyche drives the moral education of 
new members of the community. Mature loyalty ties the community together. 
Paternal loyalty makes possible the moral procreation of that community. 
Loyalty is thus sine qua non for any sort of moral life and thus for morality 
itself. Therefore, any moral theory or practice which militates against loyalty, 
militates against morality. 
Contemporary moral theory can do precisely this to the extent that it 
makes us think that the ethical life must take a particular form involving 
justifications through deliberation from universals to particulars. Depending 
on how such universals are understood (e.g., Kant’s notion of the pure law), 
they have the effect of radically disvaluing the particular and the local and 
thus undermining the foundation of a stable will. Thus, if I am correct in 
maintaining that all human agents must develop through the sort of dialectic 
described above, then the requirement that all actions be justified (even if only 
in principle) through moral reflection in terms of a universalist moral theory 
will have the effect of alienating agents from the only real moral content and 
context they can have. 
This alienation has two particularly malign effects. First, it can yield a 
kind of rarefied indecision, an effete embrace of the complexity of the practical 
life such as to generate a kind of volitional paralysis in which the agent never 
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can quite bring himself to act.22 By making the individual agent the bearer of 
all value, contemporary moral theories tend to require all genuinely ethical 
force to derive somehow from that individual’s reflective capacities to reason 
out his duty (though particular individuals might act from fear of retribution, 
etc.). Such theories simply do not make enough space for the fact that much, 
even the vast majority, of ethical life is passed (quite well) in “deliberative 
silence.” Indeed, it tends to go most smoothly (including generating the most 
ethically preferable actions) precisely when there is no need for deliberation. 
The second malign effect is that this alienation divides morality from 
ethical life as a whole. It makes morality always a “problem,” a challenge for 
the agent to fit morality into the other things he cares about. As such it makes 
the demands of morality come from “outside” in a way that makes them 
particularly disagreeable. In fact, the moral life should come from a 
disposition towards the virtues, and as such can be felt to come not only from 
the “inside” but also to be so natural that acting contrary to them can become 
the alien burden. If the moral virtues are successfully integrated into the 
agent’s character through a successful moral maturation, then the ethical life 
will proceed from his own volitional constitution. Acting in accord with the 
demands of morality will itself become a kind of self-expressive loyalty. Thus, 
loyalty to the vision of a shared moral world is at the heart of a successful 
integration of morality into the lived ethical life. 
                                                
22 Williams writes, “One reason why conservatives and traditionalists attack reflection is that 
they fear the uncertainty that seems to follow from it, the situation in which the best lack all 
conviction. The result they fear is something to be feared, and they are right to detest a certain 
liberal posture that makes a virtue of uncertainty itself and, in place of conviction, enjoys the 
satisfactions—the equally intellectualist satisfactions—of refined indecision. But those 
traditionalist and those liberals share the error of thinking that what conviction in ethical life 
has to be is knowledge, that it must be a mode of certainty” (Williams [1985], 168-9). He goes 
on to argue for the necessity of having ethical “confidence” instead of certainty as I noted 
above. 
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In this chapter I have tried to show just how necessary it is to come to 
grips with the processes of moral development in order to actually understand 
what a morally mature will consists in. I have argued that it is only by taking 
account both of the internal structure of the will and the ways it comes to have 
that structure that we can have a plausibly compelling understanding of the 
ethical life as lived, as opposed to the artificial and abstract constructions of 
the moral theories. Finally, I have argued that loyalty is at the heart of these 
developmental processes and indeed at the heart of the ethical life itself. As 
such, I maintain that any tolerably complete philosophical understanding of 
morality must make an honored place for loyalty and that no moral theory 
that ignores the importance of loyalty can ever be adequate to the demands of 
the lived ethical life. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the Introduction, I claimed that the proper subject matter of moral 
philosophy, above all else, is the constitution of a good will. My claim was 
that many sorts of moral theory, particularly consequentialism but the same is 
true in lesser degrees of others, simply seem not to be about the right sort of 
thing. This is because the force of any normative proposition is effective only 
insofar as it determines the will of the individual moral agent. 
Consequentialism makes the moral agent responsible for something over 
which he does not bear full and direct control—some state of affairs in the 
world as a whole. This seems to me to be simply a mistake, a 
misunderstanding of what moral philosophy is about. 
What is ultimately true in any case is that the only real impact any 
moral theory has in the world is through the actions, habits, and practices of 
real human beings committed to that theory. Thus, even the moral 
philosopher must admit that no matter what account of the good he gives, it 
will be only as effective as real human beings order their wills in reference to 
that account. This is in one sense a trivial truth, but in another it is of the first 
importance. For it points to the fact that the practice of morality is very 
different from thinking about morality, a distinction to which I think too many 
moral philosophers fail to give adequate consideration. 
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Thus a true account of the nature and formal constitution of the will 
would cut across all lines of moral theory. That is, the correct account of the 
will has relevance no matter what the facts of the matter are concerning the 
deeply controversial truths of morality and the good. If, somehow, it really is 
the case—the fact of the matter—that the greatest happiness principle 
encapsulates the truth about the good, nonetheless it will only be effectively 
translated into moral practice through the wills of those committed to it. 
Thus, an understanding of the nature and constitution of the will 
should be of interest to moral philosophers of all stripes. By the same token, 
since it is almost certainly true at minimum that ought implies can, the limits of 
the will most definitely represent the limits as well of moral philosophy. It is 
from reflections such as these that I am confident in claiming that even those 
moral philosophies which I have criticized must accommodate the nature of 
human wills as we actually have them, not merely as the adherents of those 
theories might like them to be. 
For the moral intuitions which inform our valuing of human shaped 
wills as they actually are, while not indefeasible, nevertheless represent the 
core of ethics and the foundation of our moral life. While we may be able to 
abandon some of them in the pursuit of a coherent moral system, we should 
always be hesitant to give up any more of them than we might have to. My 
claim throughout this dissertation has been simply that the moral intuitions 
attached to loyalty are of this stronger sort, precisely because they lie at the 
very foundation of self-hood. 
These considerations suggest that the investigation of the will is a 
necessary and important point of departure for moral philosophy, whatever 
the truth of the matter about the good turns out to be. It also suggests that the 
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account of the will in terms of loyalties can and does subsume all moral 
theories in the way suggested by Frankfurt. Because if morality is truly made 
effective by love through loyalty—the love, as he puts it, of “a certain kind of 
world or certain kind of life”—this is as fully true for the consequentialist, or 
Kantian, or moral contractualist, as it is for anybody else. 
All of these theories of normative ethics are at the mercy of the truths of 
moral psychology. They can actually be effective only through the agents who 
order their lives around them. The sophisticated moral psychologist can then 
explain each contending theory of normative ethics entirely in terms of a 
loving commitment to “a certain kind of world or certain kind of life.” Again, 
this is in one sense a trivial truth but in another it has very important 
implications. 
For if the application of all normative ethics to life as it is really lived is 
reducible to the love of and loyalty to a certain kind of world or certain kind of 
life, then no normative ethics can make demands on the moral agent which 
undermine his capacity for having a will constituted by such a love. This is 
what stands at the heart of my project and my claims for loyalty. Loyalties—
real, substantial, visceral, messy loyalties—alone make possible the kind of 
wills which can be constituted by love for a certain kind of world or certain 
kind of life. Morality itself is a kind of a loyalty—a loyalty to the good (even 
though what the good is understood to be can and does vary widely).1 
                                                
1 This I take to be an empirically true statement about the diversity of belief; it may 
nonetheless be the case (indeed I think it is) that there is a fact of the matter about the good. 
My point here is dialectical; whatever is true about the fact of the matter of the good, it 
nonetheless remains the case that humanly-shaped wills of the sort we value will necessarily 
be ordered by loyalties. Thus, whatever one’s account of the good, effective morality—
morality in a lived life—is a product of loyalty to that account, whether or not it is the correct 
account. 
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The combined tendency of moral philosophy to overemphasize rational 
deliberation and to undermine loyalty has the effect, in the end, of 
undermining itself. For without loyalties morality is empty, the plaything of 
effete moral theories, rather than, as it should be, the substance of a virtuous 
and humanly fulfilling life. Without an emphasis on, and recognition of, 
loyalty, morality and the moral life as a whole are turned into an aesthetic 
pastime. 
I want to be clear: I am not merely saying that without genuine loyalty 
there can be no effective morality in the world (though I am saying that). I am 
going further to claim that without an understanding of the place loyalty 
occupies at the heart of rational agency itself, the practice of moral philosophy 
borders on the nonsensical. Thus, loyalty is not merely the quaint quasi-moral 
phenomenon it is often made out to be, the residue of a lack of moral 
reflection. It is the very substance and foundation of any sort of moral agency 
whatsoever. Until our moral theories take it seriously and accommodate 
themselves to its demands, they will not simply be inaccurate to the moral 
phenomenology of our lives (though they will be that), they will actually do 
violence to the very possibility of a full theory of normative ethics directed at 
the good for human beings. 
 
In the Introduction, I quoted Bernard Williams’ assertion that “unless 
such things [as deep attachments to other persons] exist, there will not be 
enough substance or conviction in a man’s life to compel his allegiance to life 
itself. Life has to have substance if anything is to have sense, including 
adherence to the impartial system; but if it has substance, then it cannot grant 
supreme importance to the impartial system, and that system’s hold on it will 
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be, at the limit, insecure.” I have suggested that this entire dissertation is a 
kind of marginalia on this notion of a life having “substance.” I want now to 
draw together a few observations and conclusions along these lines. 
The analysis of the will that I have taken over from Frankfurt and 
modified with the developmental account is precisely intended to help us 
understand what Williams’ notion of a life with substance actually entails. The 
substance of a life is its specifying content—what makes it the particular life it 
is and what makes any given agent the particular agent he is. The substance of 
a life is found in the loves and loyalties that the agent has, because these loves 
are the very foundation stones from which his rational agency arises. 
The crucial mistake that Kant makes is in thinking that there can be a 
kind of formal principle of causality (the pure will) which alone provides the 
foundation for all moral responsibility and moral agency in a transcendental 
ego. However, I think many more philosophers are guilty of an analogous 
mistake, taking practical reasoning (under various descriptions) to be the only 
foundation of rational agency. It is primarily because their analyses are less 
rigorous than Kant’s that this is less immediately apparent. Nonetheless, even 
consequentialists, moral contractualists, and many other sorts of moral 
theorists, fall into a similar trap. 
All these various theories treat the moral agent primarily as a rational 
decision maker. This turns morality in general, and morally responsible 
agency in particular, into primarily a process of making rational (maximizing) 
judgments. For sure, the various theories differ wildly on the good to be 
maximized (e.g., pleasure, “negative freedoms”, “social justice”, etc.), but they 
share a commitment to arriving at a view that will rationally compel the moral 
agent to act morally. What matters in any given agent is not his particularity at 
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all, but rather some property (generally, but not always, rationality) that he 
shares with all other moral agents and to which he has no more exclusive title 
or claim than anyone else.2 
Yet the paradox is that this rationality, which each of the contending 
parties claims to best represent, is in itself empty. For the actual human 
creatures for whom morality matters, who instantiate the only truly existing 
tokens of the universal rationality, are, qua moral creatures, much more than 
their respective capacities for rationality. Indeed, their capacity to reason is 
itself dependent on their logically and temporally prior existence as (moral) 
selves, which is in turn dependent on their having wills constituted and 
formed by love through loyalty. 
For purposes of moral psychology I think that the rationality of the 
agent is of much less importance than is generally acknowledged. I certainly 
do not mean to deny that agents ought to be rational, but their true moral 
worth and significance lies in something much more than their capacity for 
rational choice. For choice itself, as Frankfurt repeatedly insists, is founded on 
necessity. It is only because my choices issue from a will that is itself stable 
that they count as choices at all. Furthermore, as I have been at pains to argue, 
the stable self that is at the very bottom of all agency is itself and must be 
unchosen, for its formation is necessarily a dialectic of love in which it is quite 
literally called forth by that love. Thus, the very cornerstone of the rational 
agent’s agency lies not in anonymous reason, but in his particular personality, 
                                                
2 Of course a consequentialist might focus on some property like feeling pleasure, and so, like 
Peter Singer for example, argue that the class of relevant creatures whose interests must be 
consulted should be expanded beyond those possessing rationality. Even if this is so, 
however, the point is that the moral imperative to act on such judgments is itself advanced as 
a requirement of rationality (in this case, the exclusion of purportedly rationally unjustified 
discriminations against the lower animals). 
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the personality he owns because of what and whom he loves, and which has 
the shape that it does because of what and who loved him. 
This, then, is the substance of a human life, which is at the heart of 
allegiance to life itself. For it is life itself—life is a product of love and loyalty 
in every sense. Maternal and parental love brings forth the new psyche, 
loyalty to the public values of society give it content, and acting on loyalty to 
those values constituting the soul embodies moral agency itself. These 
values—the agent’s loves and loyalties—literally define the content of the only 
thing which can truly be identified as the source of action, as the locus of 
causation, the ground of agency. Rationality, without love and volition, is 
empty. Loyalty is simply and unavoidably the consequence of having a 
human will shaped by and expressive of love. 
It should be obvious then that this substance must be particular, for 
loves are particular. Loves are not fungible, even when new love comes it does 
not fully replace the old. It is an imbecile who wonders why a new child does 
not alleviate the loss of his older sibling in the heart of his mother, or even, 
less importantly but just as truly, that the new pet cannot simply take the 
place of the old. For love to be love it must be particular; it must have a unique 
object. It is these sorts of particularities which underwrite the deepest 
loyalties. 
So loyalty becomes central to the will, because loyalties are inescapable 
expressions of the particular loves which constitute a human shaped will. 
Thus loyalty is truly at the heart of Williams’ notion of substance. A soul with 
substance—a human shaped soul, a soul that bears and embodies human 
value—simply is a loyal soul. Loyalty simply is the expression of substance. I 
hope that now we can finally begin to appreciate the enthusiasm (which was 
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perhaps somewhat more surprising when we first saw it in Chapter II) with 
which Royce proclaimed: “Loyalty… says to us, ‘In this cause is your life, your 
will, your opportunity, your fulfillment.’” 
 
A Formal Definition 
 
With these observations in hand we can now offer a formal definition 
of the deepest sorts of loyalty. There will be no surprises here, but nonetheless 
it is useful to make a clear statement. At the limit, loyalty is a property of the will, 
expressive of the will’s internal structure as a hierarchy of desires formed in response 
to and as a reflection of a loving world. 
The parts of this definition of course partake of the nature of the 
analysis as I have tried to advance it through Part II of this dissertation. Again, 
I reemphasize that loyalty applies to the will, but as I suggested in the 
Introduction, it is not merely an instrumental property like intelligence or 
courage whose value is entirely dependent on the object of loyalty. For, as I 
have tried to show in my the account of the development of the moral psyche, 
loyalties are intrinsic both to the very advent and constitution of the soul. We 
can say without reservation that without loyalty there would simply be no 
human souls. 
The upshot of this is that the expression of loyalty is simply intrinsic to 
the human condition. Loyalties are not merely inevitable but participate at the 
deepest level of rational agency, because it is through loyalties that the will 
itself is constituted, that the personality and identity of the agent is formed. 
Furthermore, because human souls come to be in response to, and are 
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informed by, the love they receive from the world around them, loyalties 
stand at the very heart of what it is to be human. 
This is why so much of my concern has revolved around the 
admittedly nebulous notion of a human-shaped will. It has certainly never been 
my intention to define strictly the exact dimensions of possible human wills. 
My project has been much less ambitious than that, but at the same time I 
think rather more plausible. My argument has proceeded by claiming to better 
explain the phenomenology of loyalty, of both its felt importance in human 
life, and its pervasiveness in human society. But as well, my argument holds 
that the phenomenology points us towards these deeper truths about the true 
nature of agency and the soul. 
If I am correct in even the broadest terms, loyalty of some sort 
participates in the formation of every human being, and in living any sort of 
valuable life at all every human being expresses loyalty to something beyond 
himself. However, I have also had a more specific goal, to reconcile this truth 
to the practice of moral philosophy in our contemporary Western tradition. 
For I think that once we recognize how central loyalties are to the 
development of the moral self we must come to recognize just how important 
loyalties are in maintaining the possibility of the practice of a moral life. 
Once we realize that loyalties, and the public values which they 
embody, are intrinsic to the very formation of the souls of the young and the 
maintenance of the souls of the morally mature, we ought to recognize that 
they should and must be embraced. We should come to realize that it is a 
moral imperative to defend and protect the values lying behind the loyalties to 
our community and its traditions, in which the very existence of that moral 
community as a moral community are at stake. For if it is the case that without 
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loyalties there can be no moral selves, then it is certainly the case that without 
a vigorous public defense and inculcation of loyalty a moral community 
slowly commits suicide. This does not mean that any moral community 
should be free from criticism, but it does mean that those features of the moral 
community that make moral life possible (e.g., commitments to the truth and 
some sort of mere morality, etc.) must be affirmed through public loyalty. 
The formal definition I have offered makes very clear that loyalty 
mediates between the individual and society. Loyalties are the very means by 
which individuals are tied together to each other in moral community. This is 
because the very effectiveness and practice of morality depends most not on 
the individual’s capacity for moral reflection but on his deep seated and 
almost pre-reflective propensities to express the public values in which he was 
formed. We must move beyond conceiving of morality as practical reasoning 
for the simple and obvious reason that real moral agents, be they philosophers 
or the man on the street, generally and for the most part actually practice 
morality not because of moral reflection, but ingrained social prejudice. And 
of course this social prejudice simply is a kind of loyalty to the community as 
a whole, its constituent members, and its traditions. 
 
I would now like to close by acknowledging the epigraph that 
surmounts the head of this dissertation, several hundred pages back. There I 
offer a quote from Josiah Royce: “When a man feels his present ties to be 
arbitrary or to be a mechanical bondage, he sometimes says that it is irrational 
to be a mere spoke in a wheel. Now, a loyal self, is always more that a spoke in 
a wheel. But still, at worst, it is better to be a spoke in a wheel that a spoke out 
of the wheel.” The sort of prejudice Royce captures here is at the heart of the 
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“case” against loyalty. 
Loyalties are often taken to be arbitrary or mechanical; they are 
unchosen, so how can they be morally significant? They are the product of 
prejudice and habit, not of moral reflection and practical reason; so how can 
they be justified? Yet I hope the reader will now be more ready to consider 
with sympathy the possibility that without these things we simply can have 
no morality, not just no moral philosophy, but no morality. Since moral 
philosophy serves morality, not vice versa, it must bow before the demands of 
moral psychology, the demands of the lived moral life.  
If my account of developmental moral psychology is anywhere close to 
correct, we are all spokes in wheels not of our own making. We might like to 
think that this is somehow demeaning to our moral autonomy, but in fact we 
have no other choice. If we do not like being spokes in whichever wheel we 
find ourselves, the only other option is to be spokes in another one, or worst of 
all to be out place altogether. We are spokes whether we see it or not, and as 
moral philosophers we must make our peace with this if we are to undertake 
the task of pursuing moral knowledge. 
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